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Abstract 
 
With the failure of state-focused anti-corruption reform packages to reduce systemic 
corruption, the role of citizens in anti-corruption efforts has gained traction in academia 
and policy-making quarters. Yet, some of the emerging literature questions the prospect 
of citizens’ demand for accountability in places where corruption is entrenched. In such 
settings, high perceptions of corruption can reinforce the notion that most people are 
likely to act corruptly, undermining belief in the ability and willingness of citizens as well 
as government to tackle corruption. Nevertheless, some of the countries perceived to be 
highly corrupt have experienced frequent episodes of collective resistance to abuses of 
power. This has raised a possibility that exposure to corruption can in fact provoke the 
willingness to get involved in efforts to bring it under control. Furthermore, it seems that 
there are contextual conditions (other than country-level corruption) that shape the impact 
of subjective perceptions as well as direct experience of corruption on propensity to 
engage in anti-corruption tactics based on collective action. 
 
Using analysis of nationally representative public opinion data covering 35 African 
countries, this dissertation examines individual and contextual level conditions under 
which perceptions of corruption and personal experiences of bribery might encourage 
ordinary people to support citizen-centred and collective action methods of curbing 
corruption. It is the first study to utilise a data set of this magnitude to study the 
mobilisation potential of exposure to corruption in the African context. One of the key 
findings is that across different statistical conditions, an increasing experience of paying 
bribes fosters the support for the use of citizen-centred and collective action methods of 
anti-corruption. Importantly, there is strong evidence that an increasing frequency of 
paying bribes is likely to have the same impact in different countries. The effect of the 
perception of corruption is more ambiguous and indeed strongly influenced by observed 
and unobserved country-level conditions. These contextual factors include country-level 
poverty and state-level clientelism. Apart from a focus on the effects of individual-level 
corruption, the analysis zeroes-in on the extent to which the collective action that arises 
in highly clientelistic societies represents a demand for impartiality — a lynchpin of good 
governance and anti-corruption civic engagement.
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Chapter one 
 Introduction 
 
1.1. Systemic corruption in Africa  
 
One of the things that most African elites and citizens agree on is that corruption is 
pervasive in many parts of the African continent. Even Robert Mugabe, a controversial 
Afro-optimist and Pan-Africanist luminary, condemned the staggering levels of 
corruption in his country, warning against Zimbabwe becoming like Kenya and Nigeria 
“where you have to reach into your pocket to get anything done’” (Wrong 2014).1 
Academic and mainstream literatures have long drawn attention to the systemic nature of 
corruption in Africa. The respected Nigerian poet and novelist, Chinua Achebe, observed 
“that anybody who can say that corruption in Nigeria has not yet become alarming is 
either a fool, a crook or else does not live in this country” (Achebe 1984:37). Elsewhere, 
Achebe described levels of corruption in Nigeria as having passed the alarming and 
entered the fatal stage (Achebe 1983). Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz (1999) 
generalise Achebe’s remarks to the entire African continent, noting that in Africa, 
“corruption is not …a matter of a few ‘rotten apples’... it is a habitual part of everyday 
life, an expected element of every social transaction” (Chabal and Daloz 1999:99).  
 
Efforts to estimate levels of corruption at country-level confirm this pervasive nature of 
corruption in the African continent. In 2016, 14 of the 22 countries that Transparency 
International (TI) perceived to be most corrupt (i.e. those that are ranked at the bottom of 
TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index table) were found in Sub-Saharan Africa (TI 2016). 
Based on a variety of data sources, Verisk Maplecroft, a risk analysis and forecasting 
company estimates that half of the countries at extreme risk of corruption are in the south 
of the Sahara Desert.2  
 
                                                 
 
1 More on Mugabe’s remarks and reactions from Kenya and Nigeria here: https://www.kenya-today.com/news/robert-
mugabe-says-nigeria-corrupt-country. Michela Wrong, an expert on corruption in Kenya, uses these remarks in her 
article about grand corruption in Kenya. The article can be found here: 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/06/everyone-is-corrupt-in-kenya-even-grandmothers/ accessed 14 December 2016 
2 See here: https://maplecroft.com/portfolio/new-analysis/2015/06/17/global-corruption-ranking-which-countries-
pose-highest-risk/ accessed 25 August 2017 
2 
Analysis of recent public opinion surveys shows that many ordinary Africans experience 
bribery on regular basis. Transparency International estimates that nearly 75 million 
people in Sub-Saharan Africa paid a bribe in the year 2014 (Pring 2015). According to 
the 2013 Global Corruption Barometer, three out of five citizens of Sierra Leone paid a 
bribe to secure public goods and services (see BBC 2013). In Kenya, “estimates suggest 
that 8 out of 10 interactions with public officials require a bribe and that the average urban 
Kenyan pays a bribe 16 times per month” (Muthukrishna, Francois, Pourahmadi and 
Henrich 2017:1). In South Africa, a recent nationally representative survey found that one 
in four citizens paid a bribe while two in five knew someone who did (Dobbie 2017). 
Furthermore, the number of people who knew someone who paid a bribe increased by 11 
percentage points between 2015 and 2017 (Dobbie 2017). The work of the award-wining 
investigative journalist, Anas Anas, has brought into sharp focus the pervasive nature of 
bribery in Ghana where over a period of two years, 12 judges of the high court, 22 
magistrates and more than one hundred court officials were caught on tape accepting 
bribes in order to facilitate favourable court decisions (see BBC 2016, Aljazeera 2015).3 
Indeed, corruption has become in the words of George Ayittey (2006:12), “the canker of 
the African body politic; malignant and pervasive”. 
 
It is important to emphasise that while a majority of African countries are classified as 
‘thoroughly corrupt’, levels of corruption (or perceptions of it), differ widely across the 
continent, with the likes of Botswana, Namibia, Rwanda, Cape Verde and Mauritius 
consistently ranking above the global average on Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index (also see Medard 2002). Furthermore, as the work of Laurence 
Cockcroft and Anne-Christine Wegener (2016) suggests, Western countries are not only 
struggling with the same forms of corruption that confront developing countries (e.g. 
bribery and fraud), the level of more elusive forms of corruption, in sports and the 
financial sector, is probably higher than it is in developing countries. Indeed, Cockcroft 
and Wegener describe how the former vice president of one of the largest Canadian 
engineering and construction firms who was involved in the financing of political parties 
in exchange for kickbacks, described corruption in Canada as “a cancer that was 
                                                 
 
3 See here http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-34210925.  Also check this 50 minutes documentary by 
Aljazeera. www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2015/11/justice-151122124135186.html Accessed 07 
August 2016  
3 
everywhere” — a description that is often used in reference to corruption in developing 
countries (Cockcroft and Wegener 2016:65). 
  
As the foregoing indicates, corruption is, and should be a concern on both sides of the 
Atlantic Ocean. However, what makes corruption in Africa more interesting for scholars 
and policy-makers is the fact that it seems to have a more devastating effect on 
development in Africa than elsewhere (see Hope 2017).4 Despite the sums involved in 
grand corruption being distinctly modest in Africa compared to the Pacific Rim for 
instance, many of the Asian countries have achieved substantial economic growth while 
their African counterparts stagnated (Szeftel 2000). The most cited example compares 
Ghana and South Korea; both countries had equivalent per capita GDP in 1957 and 
roughly similar levels of corruption for a majority of the past 50 years. However, by the 
end of 1980, South Korean economy was ten times stronger than the economy of Ghana 
(see Kim 2015, Khan 2000a). Jean-François Medard (2002:382) explains that “while in 
Western countries, corruption threatens the bases of our democratic system, in Africa, it 
is the foundations of the state, and of the economic system that are shaken”.    
 
1.2. Government-focused reactions against corruption  
 
Beginning in the late 1980s, the donor community advised many African countries to 
adopt a holistic anti-corruption reform programme, under the guise of institutional 
economics. The main thrust of this programme was to limit governmental discretion and 
the role of the state in economic activities. Privatization and market deregulation were 
some of the policies being touted for their ability to reduce opportunities for corruption. 
Generally, this state-focused approach to anti-corruption was premised on the highly 
pessimistic view of human nature. 5  It argued that, like all human beings, public officials 
have a strong proclivity to put their own interests above public interests (see Manzetti and 
Blake 1996, Rose-Ackerman 1978, 1999, Mbaku 2007). The involvement of the state in 
the economy gives officials more incentives to promote self-interest. Susan Rose-
                                                 
 
4 Take for instance that, according to the Report of the High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows, the continent has 
over the past 50 years lost to systemic corruption the sum roughly “equivalent to all of the official development 
assistance received during the same timeframe” (IFF 2014:13). 
5 State-focused in that it focuses on the role of state-actors, and views ‘fixing state apparatus’ (i.e. public-sector 
reform) as the solution for corruption.  
4 
Ackerman, eloquently captured this in her seminal publication on causes of endemic 
corruption:  
Differences in culture and basic values exist across the world, but there is one 
human trait that is both universal and central to explaining the divergent 
experiences of different countries. That motivating trait is self-interest. Critics 
call it greed. Economists call it utility maximization. Whatever the label, societies 
differ in the way they define and channel self-interest. Endemic corruption 
suggests a pervasive failure to tap self-interest for legitimate and productive 
purposes (cited in Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016:6-7).  
 
The predominant analytical device of corruption control based on the neo-institutional 
economics is the principal-agent model (Heywood 2017, Groenedijk 1997). The kernel 
of the principal-agent thesis is that corruption can be solved by fixing the incentive 
structure of the organisation in which it occurs. To prevent corruption, the principal (e.g. 
the state) puts in place institutional devices (i.e. prescribes the pay-off rules) that are 
supposed to increase the likelihood to detect corruption and ensure that the costs of being 
punished for it far exceed the benefits of getting involved (Klitgaard 1997, Rose-
Ackerman 1978, 1999, Khan 2006, Huther and Shah 2000, Groenedijk 1997). As 
intimated, this approach to corruption control dominated the anti-corruption policy of the 
past twenty years (Heywood 2017, Hough 2017).  
 
Despite principal-agent reforms being adopted in a majority of highly corrupt African 
countries, corruption persisted and, in some cases, increased (Szeftel 1998). This led to 
strong criticisms of the mainstream anti-corruption policies and strategies. Jonathan 
Hopkin was among the first to blame the principal-agent analysis for the erroneous anti-
corruption policy prescriptions (Hopkin 2002). He questioned the logic that expects 
public officers of highly corrupt countries, who benefit from the status quo, to 
demonstrate willingness to bring corruption under control (Hopkin 2002:584): 
In essence, it is being argued that societies should combat corruption by 
establishing a functioning state in which politicians and bureaucrats design 
regulations in the interest of economic efficiency rather than their own personal 
gain, and independent judges interpret the law honestly and have the powers to 
block corrupt behaviour. Yet this is precisely what is problematic in a society 
where corruption is endemic… 
 
1.3. The rise of bottom-up approaches to anti-corruption 
 
The failure of the state-centred approach has led to an increased emphasis on the role of 
non-state actors — including ordinary citizens, civil society organizations (CSOs) and the 
5 
business community — in anti-corruption efforts (Pieth 2014, Klitgaard 2012, 2015, 
Booth 2013, Grimes 2013). According to Robert Klitgaard, the reason attempts at 
controlling corruption ought to involve the business community is that business people 
have an immense understanding of how the corrupt system works (Klitgaard 2015). Most 
importantly they “have a collective interest in reducing corruption, even when they are 
virtually required to participate in corruption systems in order to survive” (Klitgaard 
2015:39). John Sandage explains that one of the main reasons business people are now 
willing to get involved in anti-corruption is the awareness, even among the long-term 
bribe payers and companies working in highly corrupt environments, that “the fight 
against corruption is a win–win situation” (Sandage 2014:32).  
 
More importantly for this dissertation, citizens of highly corrupt societies are assumed to 
have a strong interest in anti-corruption efforts given that they are often the greatest 
victims of institutional dysfunctions (World Bank 2004, Karklins 2005, Landell-Mills 
2013, Rose-Ackerman 2010, Rose-Ackerman and Truex 2015, Besley 2006). Monika 
Bauhr (2012) borrows from the grievance explanation of civic engagement to conjecture 
that the willingness to challenge corruption would be higher in countries where many 
people pay bribes for public goods and services they deserve free of charge or at a token 
fee. Many of such countries are in the African continent. The important role of citizens 
in anti-corruption efforts was emphasised in the 13th International Anti-Corruption 
Conference in Greece. As this conference concluded, “an empowered citizen is the best 
tool we have for fighting corruption... we must strive to reach and mobilise people from 
all quarters, and from all age groups” (IACC 2008). Indeed, according to Alina Mungiu-
Pipiddi (2016), international aid organisations with an anti-corruption agenda should 
commit more resources to empowering ordinary people to seek accountability. 
 
While being a proverbial ‘lone-ranger’ in the fight against corruption is commendable, it 
is unlikely to be as effective as collective endeavours (Yap 2013). As Pierre Landell-Mills 
eloquently put it, “the outrage expressed by ordinary citizens, unless channelled into 
effective collective action, is akin to whistling in the wind” (Landell-Mills 2013:16). 
Heather Marquette and Caryn Peiffer concur, adding that even if individuals had “the 
motivation to ‘stick their necks out’” they would not succeed to overhaul a system based 
on corruption unless they “engaged in a collective and coordinated effort” (Marquette and 
Peiffer 2015:17).  
6 
 
According to Fiona Yap (2013) and Shaazka Beyerle (2014), one of the main advantages 
of the concerted effort by ordinary citizens is its potential to generate political will — a 
phenomenon that has long been cited as being integral to the successful control of 
corruption (see Brinkerhoff, 2000, 2010, Williams 2000, Pope and Vogl 2000).  Indeed, 
Ambrose Lee (2006) illustrates how collective civic action added impetus to the 
government-driven anti-corruption reform in Hong Kong and continues to sustain that 
country’s impressive efforts to control corruption. Eric Uslaner (2008:243) concurs, 
pointing out that “without an engaged and supportive public, anti-corruption campaigns 
as in Hong Kong and Singapore would be difficult to sustain”. Klitgaard (2015) identifies 
citizens’ demand for corruption control as one of the factors sustaining President 
Aquino’s anti-corruption crusade in the Philippines.6  
 
The foregoing notwithstanding, some of the emerging studies — mostly anchored in 
collective action theory —  question the prospect of citizens’ demand for accountability 
in places where corruption is entrenched. In such settings, corruption shapes people’s 
attitudes and behaviour in ways that perpetuate conformity to the corrupt status quo, 
undermining the willingness to “actively work with others or the government to seek 
solutions to the problem of corruption” (Morris and Klesner 2010: 1276). It is against this 
backdrop that Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013) present endemic corruption as a 
collective action dilemma, rather than a principal-agent problem. They conclude, based 
on their research in Kenya and Uganda that where corruption is a rule rather than the 
exception, “we cannot assume the existence of “principled principals,” willing to hold 
corrupt officials accountable” (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013: 450). In these highly 
corrupt contexts, politicians, and “public officials of different ranks, as well as ordinary 
citizens’ are likely to perpetrate rather than fight corrupt exchanges” (Persson, Rothstein 
and Teorell 2013: 455). 
 
Central to this thinking is the idea that corruption erodes the underlying mechanisms of 
co-operation among individuals, including generalised interpersonal trust and a sense of 
collective efficacy (Morris and Klesner 2010, Johnston 2012, Rothstein 2011, Morris 
                                                 
 
6 Benigno Aquino III served as President from 2010 until 2016 
7 
2012). Even if corruption generated the grievances that the proponents of the citizen-
centred approaches say it does, the generalised mistrust that it also provokes would hinder 
both the willingness and ability of individuals to co-operate in anti-corruption efforts 
(Morris and Klesner 2010).  According to Morris and Klesner (2010:1258), the corrosive 
effect of corruption on trust is critical because mistrust undermines “efforts to mobilise 
society to help fight corruption and leads the public to routinely dismiss government 
promises to fight corruption”. This difficulty to inspire public opinion against corruption 
where it is endemic increases the propensity for people (even those who dislike 
corruption) to get involved in it (Rose and Peiffer 2015, Heywood 2017). All these 
considered, it seems as Verdenicci and Hough (2015) observe that anti-corruption civic 
action is more likely to arise in places where corruption is less problematic.  
 
To summarise, the collective action problem of systemic corruption can be understood at 
two levels. On the first level, endemic corruption weakens incentives for non-corrupt 
behaviour. In thoroughly corrupt societies, most actors are incentivised to act in ways that 
perpetuate rather than prevent (or avoid) corruption. People are unlikely to stop 
demanding and/or paying bribes because everyone believes “and ‘for good reason’ that 
almost all other people are going to play dirty” (Rothstein 2005:7). On the second level, 
despite its potential to trigger grievances, systemic corruption weakens the mechanisms 
(e.g. generalised trust and political efficacy) by which citizens can organise and 
successfully pressure the state to sanction corrupt behaviour (Johnston 2012, Persson et 
al 2013). It is personally costly for citizens of highly corrupt societies to resist the 
demands of corrupt officials (level one) and to use collective action methods (protests, 
boycotts, social audits etc.) to put pressure on the state to bring corruption under control 
(level two).  
 
1.4. Rising anti-corruption civic engagement and the challenge of a 
collective action explanation of systemic corruption  
 
On face value, the idea that endemic corruption dampens anti-corruption civic 
engagement seems to be in stark contrast to the various forms of collective political action 
against corruption taking place in highly corrupt and clientelistic societies. In 2015, the 
Petrobras scandal in Brazil ignited a series of protests in that country’s major cities. 
Between 2011 and 2012, thousands of Indians turned up in mass protests targeting 
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corruption and impunity in India. More recently in 2017, Romania experienced the largest 
episodes of mass mobilisation since the anti-communist uprisings of 1989. Hundreds of 
thousands of Romanians condemned a bill that sought to decriminalise the misuse of 
public funds amounting to less than 200,000 lei ($46,000). In Africa, the African 
Development Bank has identified lack of accountability and transparency as well as 
corruption as the major factors of increasingly regular incidents of public protests in this 
continent (AfDB 2015).  
 
Indeed, Burkina Faso’s largest (and perhaps most influential) social movement, Coalition 
nationale de lutte Contre la Vie Chère, la corruption, la fraude, l'impunité et pour les 
libertés (CCVC) 7  had anti-corruption as one its core claims (Engels 2015). This 
movement’s work was decisive in the abrupt end of the 27-year reign of President Blaise 
Campaore, who in 2014-2015, attempted to scrap the country’s newly instituted two-term 
limit to prolong his hold on power. Through collective action, civilian resistance further 
prevented heads of security forces from arrogating political power unto themselves after 
the demise of Campaore. This relentless resistance of ordinary people precipitated another 
act of collective action as the army, political parties, civil society organisations and 
religious leaders eventually sat down and nominated a civilian as the head of a transitional 
government. Roch Marc Kaboré, the former banker who won the presidential poll in the 
first round, was the first Burkinabe in fifty years to win a presidential election despite 
never serving in an interim position and having no visible ties to the military.   
 
Less contentious forms of collective action against corruption have also occurred across 
the developing world as Beyerle (2014), Vogl (2012), Fox (2015) and Landell-Mills 
(2013) demonstrate. Notably, Africans have taken advantage of national and local 
government elections to punish unscrupulous incumbents as Nigeria’s presidential 
election of 2015 and Lesotho’s national election of 2017 demonstrate.8 Although the 
incumbent parties won recent elections in countries such as Gabon and Angola, there are 
indications that a large number of voters rejected them, and that the electoral contest was 
                                                 
 
7 This is translated as ‘The coalition against the high cost of living, corruption, fraud, impunity and for basic 
freedoms’ 
8 Allegations of corruption were central to the premature collapse, through a vote of no confidence, of Lesotho’s 
Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili’s two-year-old administration. In Nigeria, the amount of corruption in the 
presidency of Goodluck Jonathan allegedly contributed to his failure to win the second term of office.  
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much tighter than the official results suggested9. Surely, these different forms of civilian 
resistance in highly corrupt settings cannot be dismissed as mere exceptions as the 
collective action analysis would suggest. It would seem as Frank Vogl has noted and 
contrary to collective action thinking that “ordinary citizens, even in some of the most 
corrupt nations in the world — and some of the most dangerous for anti-corruption 
activists — can organize and secure justice” (Vogl 2012:193). In fact, Beyerle (2014:6) 
concludes that in spite of the bleak circumstances, “or perhaps because of them, people 
can move from being victims and bystanders of malfeasance to becoming a force for 
transforming their societies”. 
 
One of the weaknesses of some of the studies on citizen-centred approaches to anti-
corruption is the excessive focus on ‘successful’ cases. Due to this selection bias, studies 
by Beyerle (2014) and Landell-Mills (2013), for instance, offer a limited account of why 
various forms of collective action that were ostensibly inspired by ‘corruption’ did not 
occur, much less succeed in societies that share similar attributes with those in which they 
were deemed successful. Similarly, these studies do not shed light on the similarities and 
differences in attributes between individuals who take part in anti-corruption collective 
action and those who stay away. Mark Lichbach has these methodological pitfalls in mind 
when he submits that collective action studies must be designed in such a way as to 
“explain why people do not participate in CA [i.e. collective action] and why they do 
participate. They must account for why CA never begins or collapses and why CA does 
start and grow” (Lichbach 1995:127).   
 
More importantly, most of the studies as well the journalistic accounts of political action 
in highly corrupt societies take for granted that individual-level perceptions of corruption 
and personal experiences of bribery play a role in willingness to take part in citizen-
centred anti-corruption efforts. For instance, although Landell-Mills (2013: iv) does not 
have data indicating civic activism rates conditional on individual-level exposure to 
corruption, he suggests that what motivates engagement in anti-corruption activities is 
                                                 
 
9 In both Gabon and Angola, presidential candidates from the ruling parties were declared winners even as 
international observer missions questioned the legitimacy of the election results. Independent media reports suggest 
that opposition candidates won in many urban areas in Angola. See here for possible election rigging in Angola 
https://www.makaangola.org/2017/08/angola-the-stolen-elections/ accessed 08 August 2017.  
For further reports on the presidential election in Gabon, see here: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-37243190 
accessed 08 August 2017 
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that “people are increasingly intolerant of being squeezed for bribes and more incensed 
at officials growing fat on extortions and crooked deals”.  
 
Lastly, as Serena Verdinicci and Dan Hough (2015:10) conclude, citizen-centred 
approach to anti-corruption assumes “that the citizen and civil society always act to 
further the common good, and acts as an inherently pro-democratic force”. In other words, 
citizens involved in these anti-corruption efforts are caricatured as being genuinely 
interested in clean and accountable government, rather than seeking to replace a 
particularised order with the one that serves their own narrow interests. It is in this regard 
that scholars of African politics warn against the false positives in the collective/ social 
movement literature on Africa (de Waal and Ibreck 2013). As Alex de Waal and Rachel 
Ibreck (2013) argue, some of the collective action research on Africa overlooks the fact 
that neo-patrimonial tendencies that characterise state-society relations in Africa shape 
the nature of collective civic engagement, so that instead of acting as a vehicle for a 
sustained demand for a governance norm predicated on equality under the law, it seeks 
to supplant or perpetuate particularistic social and political orders (de Waal and Ibreck 
2013).  
 
Indeed, according to William Reno (2002:839), though many Nigerian ‘activists’ “see 
themselves as marginalised critics of corrupt rulers, they often end up serving elite 
interests”. Using collective action, these social activists often “try and force their way 
into the social system from which they are excluded, not overthrow it” (Reno 2002:839). 
As indicated, this contradicts the basic assumption of citizen-centred approach to 
accountability, which is that the ultimate goal of those who engage in civic action in the 
name of anti-corruption is to defend public interests rather than promote particularistic 
ones. What also complicates matters is the fact that the African state — against which 
anti-corruption collective civic action is (or should be) directed— “accepts, encourages 
or even benefits from everyday forms of resistance” against it (de Waal and Ibreck 
2013:308).  
 
A methodological challenge of studying civic engagement, especially in Africa, is lack 
of access to suitable individual-level data (Mueller 2014, Rosenfeld 2017). As Bryn 
Rosenfeld (2017:641) reminds us, “most representative surveys rarely ask about 
participation in specific protest events.”  But even if they did, the resulting data would 
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not be useful as many mass protests in developing countries hardly ever target a single 
issue, such as ‘corruption’. Indeed, in-depth interviews with protest participants, 
especially leaders, often find that ‘corruption’ is mentioned along with a range of other 
social and political problems that inspired people to turn out. In her analysis of popular 
resistance against corruption in 12 countries, Beyerle (2014:247) notes that “most of the 
civic initiatives targeting corruption were linked to other injustices and struggles”. 
 
These conflations make it extremely difficult to isolate the effects of corruption (e.g. 
scandals, the perceptions of corruption or experiences of bribery) on the willingness to 
take part in collective civic action. Bauhr (2016:6) has this in mind when she observes 
that “while citizens do sometimes mobilise against ‘corruption’, it is rather unclear what 
exactly spurs such movements, since corruption is sometimes used as a “catch-all” 
concept, including both economic grievances and democratic deficits”. To be precise, it 
is not entirely clear whether a perception that corruption is widespread has any 
independent effect on willingness to challenge corruption, or whether it only increases 
such willingness when accompanied by economic grievances.  
 
With the foregoing literature gaps in mind, this dissertation examines the mobilising 
potential of individual-level corruption variables. The use of the term ‘mobilising 
potential’ (see Klandermans 2013) is deliberate to the extent that the study examines the 
extent to which subjective perceptions of corruption and personal experiences of bribery 
influence the preference or support for citizen-centred and collective action methods of 
tackling corruption. Although data limitations is the main reason for focusing on attitudes 
towards citizen-centred anti-corruption tactics, attitudinal data on collective action should 
not been seen as necessarily inferior to their behavioural counterpart. In fact, according 
to Stephen Finkel and Edward Muller (1998) and Bert Klandermans (2013), due to the 
high risk of endogeneity that comes with the statistical analysis of self-reported 
participation rates, data on willingness or intentions to participate can be more useful for 
testing hypotheses based on collective action theories. Nevertheless, drawing upon both 
attitudinal and behavioural types of data, where possible, can provide more insights on 
the causal mechanisms driving collective action (Finkel and Muller 1998).    
 
The analysis in this dissertation draws upon survey data on 52,000 individuals from 35 
African countries. These data provide information on individual perceptions and 
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experiences of corruption as well as their views regarding the role of citizens in efforts to 
bring corruption under control. Currently, Afrobarometer has the largest and most 
representative public opinion data on Africa. To get a more nuanced picture of the 
relationship between corruption and citizen-centred anti-corruption efforts, I merge 
Afrobarometer data set with country-level data drawn from a variety of sources including 
the V-DEM project and the World Bank Institute. 
 
1.5. Overview of chapters  
 
This dissertation has eight chapters including this introduction. Chapter two outlines the 
principal-agent and collective action approaches to understanding (anti-)corruption. It 
examines the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches as well as the overlaps 
between them. It explores the challenges that principal-agent accountability faces in 
Africa, focusing on the mainstream Africanist literature regarding the linkages between 
political leaders and citizens. One of the main highlights of chapter two is unpacking how 
systemic corruption presents an assurance dilemma by eroding generalised interpersonal 
trust and a sense of collective efficacy. Towards the end, the chapter identifies some of 
the main weaknesses of the collective action analysis, pointing out in particular, instances 
in which corruption itself can act as a catalyst for collective action against it.  
 
To the extent that collective action analysis represents what might loosely be described 
as a pessimistic view towards anti-corruption mobilisation, the discussion in chapter three 
focuses on more optimistic perspectives. The chapter identifies the individual and 
context-level explanations for why perceptions of corruption and personal experience of 
bribery can motivate civic engagement against corruption. It does this by evaluating the 
social movement and political participation literatures as they relate to corruption and 
anti-corruption. The chapter also comes back full circle to offer a detailed critique of the 
idea — rooted in mainstream Africanist literature— that ordinary Africans are more 
predisposed to acquiesce rather than hold public officers accountable.  
 
Chapter four makes a case for using survey data to analyse the nexus between corruption 
and anti-corruption collective action. The chapter begins with a brief overview of the 
literature on measuring corruption and discusses some of the main weaknesses of relying 
on public opinion data to study it. It introduces the Afrobarometer survey data, and 
13 
explains how support for anti-corruption collective action — this study’s dependent 
variable— is measured. It describes how the main independent variables, experience of 
bribery and individual-level perceptions of corruption, are measured. It offers a brief 
summary of the data analysis techniques, especially the multilevel modelling strategy 
employed in chapter six. The chapter concludes with a few limitations of the 
Afrobarometer data set and the extent to which these are likely to affect statistical results. 
 
Chapter five focuses on the impact of the experience of bribery and perceptions of 
corruption on support for anti-corruption protests. As a robustness check, it also explores 
the impact of corruption on other citizen-centred methods of tackling corruption, 
including the signing of petitions calling for tougher sanctions against corruption, being 
involved in raising awareness about corruption, supporting anti-corruption organisations 
and voting for clean political parties and candidates. Finally, it examines the consistency 
of the effect of corruption variables by replacing, as a dependent variable, attitudinal 
support for anti-corruption protests with actual participation in protests and 
demonstrations.   
 
Taking the analysis further, chapter six examines how context (i.e. unmeasured and 
measured country-level factors) shape the relationship between individual-level measures 
of corruption and support for citizen-centred and collective action methods of anti-
corruption. The country-level factors being considered are ethnic fractionalisation, civil 
society robustness, government’s control of corruption, state-level clientelism and 
economic development. The chapter also examines how these variables, especially the 
country-level measure of corruption, influence the impact of individual-level corruption 
variables. Towards the end, the chapter explores how individual- and context-level 
corruption shape the impact of the perception of ethnic marginalisation on support for 
anti-corruption civic engagement.  
 
Before the concluding chapter (i.e. chapter eight), the analysis focuses on the dynamics 
of anti-corruption collective action in highly corrupt societies. Specifically, it delves into 
the tripartite relationship between corruption, clientelism (measured at individual-level) 
and collective civic action. Partly due to the complex nature of this relationship, I decided 
to focus on one country, Nigeria. Nigeria is one of Africa’s highly clientelistic societies 
with very high levels of anti-government mobilisation. This single case design holds 
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country-level factors constant and allows the analysis to focus on how individual-level 
variability in exposure to clientelism affects the propensity to take part in protests and 
demonstrations. The analysis in this chapter evaluates the idea that various forms of anti-
government collective action taking place in highly clientelistic societies do not represent 
a genuine demand for impartiality as a governance norm. Chapter eight summarises and 
discusses the key findings of the study, identifies unresolved issues and areas for future 
research. 
 
1.6. Conclusion and brief summary of findings 
 
As intimated, the debate around the impact of corruption on citizens’ willingness to 
challenge corruption has optimistic and pessimistic dimensions. Anchored in the 
grievance model of collective action among others, the optimistic view departs from the 
premise that as the greatest victims of corruption, ordinary people have an interest in 
efforts to bring corruption under control. The expectation based on this view is that 
individuals who have had frequent experiences with corruption or those who think it is 
highly pervasive will have a higher propensity to support various citizen-centred anti-
corruption efforts. Additionally, institutional factors such as poverty can intensify the 
positive effect of individual-level exposure to corruption.  The pessimistic view, on the 
other hand, posits that especially where corruption is endemic, corruption-related 
grievances are not enough to motivate people to rally behind a collective-action based 
anti-corruption drive. In fact, in highly corrupt settings, people who perceive high levels 
of corruption or have directly experienced it are likely to feel that corruption is ‘normal’, 
resigning to the fact that there is nothing ordinary people can do about abuses of power 
(Bauhr and Grimes 2014).  
 
In line with the optimistic view, this study finds that across very different empirical 
specifications, personal experience of bribery (i.e. petty corruption) has a consistently 
positive effect on support for anti-corruption civic engagement. Importantly, an increase 
in the experience of paying bribes increases the likelihood to have taken part in actual 
protests and demonstrations. Lastly, results based on the sixth round of Afrobarometer 
data suggest that poor people are more likely to support anti-corruption civic engagement 
as their experience with bribery increases. The weak cross-national variability in the 
15 
effect of bribery suggests that across the entire African continent, a rising experience of 
paying bribes is likely to increase support for collective action against corruption.  
 
The effect of corruption perceptions is, on the other hand, more inconsistent. In addition 
to increasing the support for at least one form of civic action against corruption, it has a 
very strong positive effect on the belief that there is nothing ordinary people can do about 
corruption. More in-depth analysis shows that an individual with the highest score on the 
perceptions of corruption variable is significantly more likely to say that ‘nothing can be 
done about corruption’ than express support for any form of anti-corruption engagement. 
Results of the multilevel analysis reveal that the best way to understand these 
contradictory findings is to allow the coefficient of the perception of corruption to be 
different for each of the 35 countries in the data set. There is indeed, a strong country to 
country variability in the impact of perceived levels of corruption on support for anti-
corruption collective action. This implies that how the perception of corruption influences 
attitudes towards the role of citizens in efforts to challenge corruption depends, to a large 
extent, on observed and unobserved country-level factors. 
 
This study is the first to clarify the differential impacts of the direct experience of 
corruption and perceptions of corruption on anti-corruption mobilisation in the African 
context. In this regard, it fills an important lacuna in the anti-corruption scholarship, 
namely that much of anti-corruption research does not anticipate that different forms of 
corruption might have very different effects on willingness to oppose corruption (see 
Bauhr 2016). This finding has a practical implication for anti-corruption programming in 
Africa and developing countries. As Bauhr (2016) and Heywood (2017) have noted, an 
understanding of how different forms of corruption influence individual behaviour can 
contribute significantly to ongoing efforts to curb corruption where it is most destructive. 
 
This dissertation also shows, quite surprisingly, that perceived levels of corruption do not 
enhance the positive impact of the feeling of ethnic marginalisation on support for anti-
corruption mobilisation. Rather, an increasing perception of corruption makes those who 
never feel marginalised to support citizen-centred anti-corruption tactics. At high levels 
of corruption perception, the effect becomes so strong that both groups have exactly the 
same probability of supporting citizen-centred methods of tackling corruption. To the 
extent that corruption is believed to feed a sense of ethnic discrimination in deeply divided 
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African societies, one would have thought that the perception of corruption would 
intensify the willingness among those who feel marginalised to use citizen-centred tactics, 
especially protests.  
 
The analysis also shows that institutional quality — which the pessimists argue shapes 
the interpersonal trust mechanism of collective action — only affects individuals with a 
weak sense of interpersonal trust. That is, individuals who do not trust people to fight 
corruption are quite sensitive to changing institutional context; they are highly likely to 
support citizen-centered anti-corruption efforts when they live in Botswana or Namibia 
where corruption is low and least likely to show support for these tactics in highly corrupt 
settings of Burundi and Sudan. On the contrary, individuals who believe that ordinary 
people can fight corruption have the same probability to support anti-corruption collective 
civic action regardless of the level of corruption in their countries. This means that the 
effectiveness of the sanctioning system is much more relevant when bonds of trust and 
solidarity are weak. This study is the first to make these findings using public opinion 
data on Africa. 
 
Chapter eight zeroes in on the other aspect of the pessimistic view on anti-corruption 
mobilisation, namely that the anti-state (anti-corruption) collective action that occurs in 
highly corrupt settings does not represent a genuine demand for accountability. Rather, it 
represents a demand to reconfigure clientelistic relations in ways that benefit the private 
interests of both elites and their cronies. The analysis shows that clientelistic concerns do 
play a significant role in the likelihood to join collective civic action in Nigeria. 
Nevertheless, the results also suggest that concerns for genuine public accountability also 
drive the propensity to undertake collective civic engagement.
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Chapter two  
Controlling corruption: principal-agent thinking and its 
collective action critique  
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter begins with a summary of the principal-agent approach to corruption control, 
highlighting some of its main weaknesses as an analytical device and a guide for anti-
corruption policy. The chapter homes in on the challenge of applying a principal-agent 
lens to analyse the scourge of corruption and prescribe its cures in Africa. Many of the 
weaknesses of the principal-agent approach crystallise into what has been described as 
the mischaracterisation of the problem of systemic corruption, and have acted as the basis 
for the application of collective action theory (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013). This 
collective action approach departs from the premise that systemic corruption is a 
structural problem — an outcome of interactive and reciprocal exchanges among actors 
so that the decision to challenge or perpetuate corruption depends on the number of 
individuals in the same setting that are expected to do the same (Mishra 2006, Karklins 
2005, Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013). 
 
Having described the main elements of collective action theory as applied to the problem 
of systemic corruption, the chapter identifies some of its main weaknesses emphasising, 
among other things, that its anchoring in rational choice institutionalism limits its ability 
to account for the progress being made to combat corruption in places where it is deemed 
to be endemic. The collective action analysis is unable to explain why individuals as well 
as firms operating in highly corrupt societies and therefore constrained in their choices, 
can cooperate and transform their societies. Towards the end of the chapter, I present the 
literature showing how strategies rooted in both principal-agent thinking and collective 
action analysis have been used concurrently to tackle corruption where it was most 
problematic. Specifically, this analysis highlights some of the instances in which 
principal-agent techniques successfully reduced endemic graft, sometimes by inspiring 
collective resistance. I underscore that as far as tackling corruption is concerned, the two 
approaches are more complementary than some analysts would acknowledge. The 
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theoretical discussions in this chapter provide a basis for the arguments that emerge in 
chapter three and are assessed throughout the rest of this dissertation.  
 
2.2. The principal-agent analysis  
 
The principal-agent model has been applied to a wide range of disciplines and has as a 
result produced a substantial body of literature, which this section cannot (feasibly) 
review in its entirety. Generally, the principal-agent model describes the nature, problems 
and outcomes of the relationship between principals and agents (Becker and Stigler 1974, 
Becker 1993, Rose-Ackerman 1978, Klitgaard 1988). In the analysis of corruption, where 
politicians are cast as principals, civil servants take on the role of agents (Banfield 1975). 
Where citizens are modelled as principals, all public officers (politicians, judges, civil 
servants etc.) are cast as agents required “to accomplish those tasks that are the expression 
of their collective principal, to whom the exercise of their power has to be – at least 
accountable” (Della Porta and Vannucci 2012:7). Other scholars (e.g. Klitgaard 1991, 
Lambsdorff 2002, You 2015, Groenedijk 1997, Della Porta and Vannucci 2012) have 
added ‘a client’ as the third actor in principal-agent relationships, subsequently referring 
to this as the Principal-Agent Client (PAC) model. The agent acts on behalf of the 
principal to serve a client.  
 
The principal-agent relationship is characterised by two closely-related problems. The 
problem of adverse selection arises when the principal is unable to select the ‘right kind 
of agents’ while ‘moral hazard’ occurs when the agent, using its significant informational 
advantage and power of discretion, pursues its own interests at the expense of those of 
the principal (Besley 2005, Aidt 2003). Indeed, given that agents are assumed to be driven 
by self-interest, unfettered discretion and significant informational advantage puts them 
at risk of abusing their ‘delegated’ powers for private gain. Principal-agent analysis views 
corruption as a crime of calculation by an individual public officer (the agent) that is 
motivated by self-interest (e.g. greed), and that can be prevented by enforcing 
mechanisms that force her to align her actions with the wishes of the principal (Wedel 
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2012, Klitgaard 1997, 2014). 10  When ‘client’ enters the model, corruption becomes 
according to Della Porta and Vannucci (2012:6): 
a ‘three-player game’ in which an invisible and illegal exchange between an 
agent and a client/briber distorts the incentives to fulfil the terms of the contract 
with which the principal delegates responsibilities and discretionary power to the 
agent, in favour of the private interests of the agent and to the detriment of the 
interests of the principal. 
 
As intimated in the previous chapter, principal-agent notions of accountability have had 
a significant influence on the way donor agencies have addressed governance and 
development issues in the global South. The World Bank has promoted a variety of 
principal-agent inspired public sector reforms aimed at reducing administrative 
discretions, and with them, opportunities for corruption. These administrative reforms 
included the establishment of meritocratic systems for appointment, promotion, and 
performance evaluation (World Bank 1997). The Bank also saw competitive salaries and 
improved working conditions as being necessary to “attract qualified, better trained and 
more honest people” (Mbaku 2007:75). The creation of independent oversight bodies 
(e.g. Ombudsman, Police Complaints Commissions etc.) and anti-corruption agencies 
formed an integral part of the principal-agent based reform effort. Lastly, and perhaps 
more importantly, the principal-agent anti-corruption reform sought to increase the 
probability of detecting and punishing corrupt activities. 
 
In addition to the civil service reforms just described, economic and political reforms 
fashioned around the ideology of ‘liberalism’ 11  were seen as a remedy for political 
accountability problems in developing countries (Szeftel 1998). On the political front, 
competitive elections were touted for their ability to provide a means to replace bad 
politicians with good ones, “who are principled, competent, and share the electorate’s 
ends…” (Fearon 1999:82). Furthermore, the World Bank (1997b:44) identified 
independent media and strong civil society organisations (CSOs) as “arguably the two 
most important factors in eliminating systemic corruption in public institutions”. An 
                                                 
 
10 Groenedijk (1997) makes a point that self-interest does not necessary have to be economic (or materialistic) 
contrary to much of the literature. Personal interests can be anything from greed, altruism and ego, or a little bit of all 
these. An individual agent decides what their personal interest will be; and corruption occurs when they pursue that 
interest against the interests of the principal.   
11 I use this term ‘liberalism’ narrowly to refer to laissez-faire economics, minimal state intervention and electoral 
democracy. Some of the policy prescriptions based on this libertarian perspective to anti-corruption reform, including 
rolling back the state, were briefly highlighted in the previous chapter. 
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independent media and strong CSOs increase transparency, which in turn, reduces 
information asymmetry between the electorate as the principal and public officers as the 
agent (Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2005, Aidt 2003, Besley 2006, World Bank 1997b). 
Transparency increases the probability that a bad politician will be identified, and where 
elections are competitive, a higher likelihood that she will lose the next election 
(Groenedijk 1997). By increasing information available to citizens between elections, 
transparency can increase people’s willingness to put pressure on elected leaders to act in 
the interests of the broad sections of the population (World Bank 1997b, Besley 2006).  
 
2.2.1. Weaknesses of the principal-agent approach 
 
The main weakness of the principal–agent model lies in its presumption of the existence 
of a non-corruptible ‘principal’ (Teorell 2007; Mungiu-Pippidi   2013, Hopkin 2002, 
Persson et al 2013, Booth 2012). As Rothstein and Teorell (2015b:241) submit, the notion 
that society always has people who are prepared to act in the interest of the ‘public’ “is a 
fairly heroic assumption on a general scale”. Mungiu-Pipiddi (2013) points out that the 
most senior state official could be the one serving as a gate-keeper in venal activities. 
Ayittey echoes similar sentiments, suggesting that in Africa, “the chief bandit is often the 
head of state himself” (Ayittey 2006:50). The principal-agent approach ignores the fact 
that in high corruption societies, a group of actors cast as principals often collude with 
the group of actors assumed to be ‘agents’ in furthering corruption. According to Aidt for 
example, tax officials in high corruption settings “collude with taxpayers to understate 
tax liabilities with the result that revenues collected fall far short of their potential” (Aidt 
2003:636). Olivier de Sardan (2006:94) eloquently describes how collusion works in 
Senegal: 
In Senegal, shady tax collectors who get caught in the net of the municipal police 
are immediately released by order of the mayor. The collectors, who are selected 
from the mayor’s political clientele, pay over part of their illicit gains into the 
informal funds of the municipalities. Similarly, the ‘agents d’affaires’, i.e. 
lobbyists, who lurk around the corridors of the courts and sell temporary rights 
or false birth certificates, are never definitively removed from these locations 
because they constitute the intermediary link in the corruption chain, between 
those subject to the law and the men of the law. 
 
Studies on political accountability in highly corrupt societies make a point that ordinary 
people are often reluctant to act as the collective principal, choosing to support efforts 
that undermine accountability and good governance (see Rothstein 2011). To illustrate 
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this point, ahead of the 2016 local government elections in South Africa, thousands of 
residents in the capital city of Tshwane (i.e. Pretoria) took to the streets to oppose the 
decision by the ruling African National Congress (ANC) “to replace a notorious rent-
seeking local politician with a former cabinet minister …as the mayoral candidate in the 
2016 local government elections” (Piper and von Lieres 2016: 324). This mass 
mobilisation was not geared towards demanding a form of governance based on what 
Mungiu-Pippidi (2013, 2016) has termed ‘ethical universalism’. The aim was to protect 
the particularistic allocation of public resources that defined the administration of that 
incumbent mayor, Kgosientso Ramokgopa (Piper and von Lieres 2016).12  
 
Recent studies show that in places where corruption is most endemic, transparency, the 
“motherhood and apple pie of good governance” (Besley 2006:158) may depress rather 
than inspire citizens’ willingness to take on their role as a collective principal (Bauhr and 
Grimes 2014). Information revealing widespread abuses of public office fuels 
“expectations about other people being corrupt, and thereby legitimises corruption” 
(Bauhr 2012:82). The perception that corruption is pervasive can also dampen interest in 
politics as well a sense that the political system can respond to citizens’ demands for 
accountability (i.e. external political efficacy). Declining interest in politics and low 
political efficacy erode the willingness to get involved in efforts to put limits on political 
power (Bauhr and Grimes 2014). Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of the information 
that corruption is pervasive is that it can lead, in the long run, to satisfaction with the 
‘corrupt’ status quo, further undermining citizens’ willingness to support anti-corruption 
efforts (Bauhr and Grimes 2014). 
 
Nevertheless, other studies show that the nexus between transparency and willingness to 
challenge corruption is not as straightforward as the foregoing may seem to suggest. It is 
contingent upon several contextual factors, one of which is how information about 
corruption is communicated to ordinary people. Information about corruption can have 
an empowering effect on citizens if they perceive it as being ‘actionable’ (Fox 2015). 
That is if it also highlights the importance of taking countervailing action and instils belief 
                                                 
 
12 For more information on allegations of corruption under mayor Ramokgopa’s administration see here: 
https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/gauteng/solly-orders-probe-into-millions-wasted-under-kgosientso-rule-
9598679  and https://mg.co.za/article/2012-07-31-tshwane-corruption-rife-report accessed 31 August 2017 
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in the ability of ordinary people to take that action as a collective (Lieberman, Posner and 
Tsai 2014). Lastly, the ‘timing’ of the release of information about corruption can also 
influence the willingness of people to act as the collective principal. Citizens are likely to 
punish corrupt politicians if negative audit information is made available during or just 
before the election period (see Bobonis, Camara Fuertes and Schwabe 2016). Indeed, 
Ferraz and Finnan (2008b) found that incumbent mayors in Brazil were less likely to win 
municipal elections if audit reports unveiled maladministration and corruption ahead of 
the election. 
 
One major weakness of the technical policy prescriptions advanced by the principal-agent 
model is the fact that it undermined the importance of corruption for sustaining 
governments in developing countries (Szeftel 1998, 2000). As Mungiu-Pippidi reminds 
us, corruption is one of the pillars of political stability in post-conflict societies such as 
Bosnia, where the price for disarming ‘ethnocracies’ was to allocate the country’s 
resources among ethnic groups, thereby entrenching particularism as the dominant 
governance norm (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015). Evidence from Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Uganda 
and Senegal suggests that incumbent leaders have abused state resources to facilitate 
intra-elite accommodation and ‘buy’ peace (Khan 2006b, Ariola 2009, Tangri and 
Mwenda 2008). Arriola (2009:1340) emphasises that “African leaders expand their 
patronage-based coalitions to minimize the form of political instability that most directly 
concerns them — being overthrown through extraconstitutional means”. These ‘political 
benefits’ of corruption undermine political will and commitment to anti-corruption 
reform (Khan 2006b). As the next section shows, ordinary Africans also contribute in 
various ways to the weak political will to address corruption. 
 
2.2.2. Africa’s political economy and the perversion of principal-agent relations  
 
Analysis of political and economic dynamics of many African countries often adopts the 
framework of neo-patrimonialism. Bratton and van de Walle observed more than a decade 
ago that neo-patrimonial logic is “a distinctive institutional hallmark of African regimes” 
(Bratton and van de Walle 1994:458). Van de Walle (2009) shows that neo-patrimonial 
tendencies have endured despite the introduction of multiparty politics in many parts of 
the African continent. Mkandawire notes that despite its limitations as an analytical 
device, neo-patrimonialism continues to be “a potent force not only in academic terms 
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but also in framing policies toward Africa by providing a kind of institutionalised 
common sense” (Mkandawire 2015:601). Neo-patrimonialism refers to an institutional 
arrangement in which Max Weber’s patrimonial form of authority co-exists with its legal 
rational counterpart (Chabal and Daloz 1999, Erdmann and Engel 2006, Clapham 1985, 
Hyden 2013).13 The term is sometimes used interchangeably with ‘patron-clientelism’, 
which Scott (1972:92) defines as the “instrumental friendship in which an individual of 
higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to 
provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his 
part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, 
to the patron”.  
 
The literature on Africa’s political economy covers the various ways in which neo-
patrimonialism perverts the relations between citizens as principals and politicians as 
their agents. For instance, Bratton (2006) and Chabal (2009) show that most Africans 
view themselves as clients and subjects rather than citizens with the right to impose limits 
on power. Extending this point, Kelsall maintains, summarising the work of Schatzberg 
(2001) that Africans tend to think about state-society relations “through the metaphor of 
an idealised extended family and its father” (Kelsall 2008: 7). 14 African countries’ very 
high scores on Hofstede’s measure of power distance is one indicator of the hierarchical 
authority patterns prevalent in African societies (Etounga-Manquelle 2000, Yeboah-
Assiamah et al 2016)15. The Cameroonian scholar, Etounga-Manguelle, has argued in this 
regard that many Africans “consider their superiors to be different — having a right to 
privilege”, and believe that social status takes precedence over the laws of the country 
(Etounga-Manquelle 2003:68).  
 
                                                 
 
13 See Erdmann and Engels (2006) and Pitcher, Moran and Johnston (2009) for a fairly exhaustive critique of the 
concept of neo-patrimonialism and contemporary uses. Erdmann and Engels for instance lament the uncritical use of 
the concept of neo-patrimonialism. Similarly, for Pitcher, Moran and Johnston (2009:131), “the vastly different 
contexts and the variety of purposes to which the concept has been applied have diminished its analytical utility”. 
Similarly, de Grassi argues that “as the term is increasingly invoked more widely, it is being used more loosely, and 
precise connotations, justifications, and limitations of the concept are lost as it is turned into a default explanation or 
deus ex machina” (de Grassi 2008, 110). 
14 My emphasis.  
15 Hofstede’s six value dimensions of culture include Power Distance, individualism vs. collectivism, Long-Term vs. 
Short-Term Orientation Masculinity vs. Femininity uncertainty Avoidance, Long-Term vs. Short-Term Orientation 
and Indulgence vs. Restraint. See here https://geert-hofstede.com/national-culture.html accessed on 27 March 2017. 
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The main corollary of the paternalistic imageries that shape political relations in Africa is 
the deferential and acquiescent view of political leadership (Kelsall 2008). The 
individuals — especially women and youth — who try and question authority figures can 
often be ostracised by their own peers and same authorities from whom they seek 
accountability. Indeed, as McNeil and Malena observed, in especially rural parts of 
Africa, the act of seeking accountability is “perceived as an act of disrespect” (McNeil 
and Malena 2010:192). Apart from weakening citizens’ willingness to demand 
accountability, this cultural acceptance of hierarchical distance undermines the 
constraining effect of formal rules and nourishes the personalisation of power at different 
levels of the state (Bayart 1993, 2009). 
 
The paternalistic understanding of state-society relations also manifests in that citizens, 
especially the rural poor, expect their parliamentary representatives to personally cater 
for their private needs. In fact, according to Lindberg (2009:9), this “personal 
assistance/benefits type of accountability relationship is the most common in MPs’ 
relationship to their constituents…” Lindberg (2009, 2010) found that members of the 
Ghanaian parliament spent a substantial amount of their personal income taking care of 
the personal needs of their constituents. Apart from providing “pocket money, money for 
school fees (very common), for the purchase of food items... for funerals and weddings, 
or towards start-up cost for small businesses or a farm…” (Lindberg 2010:123), 
Ghanaians expected their MPs to intervene, personally, in their dealings with state 
officials, including “the police, courts, headmasters, local government officials or 
ministries” (Lindberg and Morrison 2008:118). Most of the MPs that Lindberg (2009, 
2010) interviewed thought that their chances of being re-elected hinged on their ability to 
carry out these extra-institutional functions.  
 
Closely related to this familial understanding of political relations is the idea that Africans 
lack a sense of public interest (see Ekeh 1975, Hyden 2013, Chabal 2013). In his Moral 
economy of corruption in Africa, Olivier de Sardan (1999:26) argues that Africa has 
“almost no ‘practical ethic of the public service’”. In fact, he traces the pervasive nature 
of corruption to the social norms and values that engender the “general lack of a tradition 
of the 'public domain'” (Sardan 1999:29). Mkhandawire (2015:571) aptly captures the 
kernel of this aspect of neo-patrimonialist argument when he notes that it “provides a 
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moral cultural gloss that somehow renders corruption understandable and its victims 
complicit”.  
 
It is important to underscore that when discussing the role of ‘culture’ in undermining a 
sense of public responsibility among citizens and public officials, some of the leading 
analysts also blame the influence of colonialism. It is argued, for instance, that many 
Africans lack the ethic of public service because they consider the post-colonial state as 
a foreign entity to be plundered or used for the advancement of private interests (Clapham 
1996, Bayart 1993, Szeftel 2000, Young 2012, de Sardan 1999). Patrick Chabal (2009) 
explains how colonial intrusion destroyed accountability systems of pre-colonial Africa; 
it was during the colonial period that chiefs became unaccountable to their own people, 
answering instead to the colonial administration. In sharp contrast, Etounga-Manguelle 
(2000) maintains that traditional African culture persisted through the colonial period and 
that the poor sense of public office is not necessarily rooted in colonial domination. 
Whether the reference is to the unaltered, pre-colonial culture or the amalgamated, post-
colonial one, the conclusions are the same: cultural norms in modern Africa 
“‘communicate’ with or influence the practices of corruption” (de Sardan 1999:26). 
 
Apart from cultural norms and values, low levels of information as a result of lack of 
formal education and poor access to impartial news media undermine the principal-agent 
notions of accountability. Lack of information forces voters to rely, primarily, on ethnic 
and religious markers to guide their political decisions (Posner 2009, Mattes and Gouws 
1999, Cho 2010, Norris and Mattes 2003). Politicians are also more incentivised to exploit 
regional, religious and ethnic identities with a net effect being that political campaigns 
and policies are not focused on long-term development goals, including the control of 
corruption. This undermines the reliance of voters on developmental performance as a 
standard against which to assess political candidates and, ultimately, select those most 
likely to serve in the interest of the public. Moreover, the electoral ‘success’ of 
clientelistic political parties and candidates can stifle the development of programmatic 
political formations (Issakson and Bigsten 2014:5). 
 
As I noted on page 19, competitive elections are a sine qua non of principal-agent 
accountability. But, in contexts in which democratic institutions are weak — which is the 
case in Africa— the increasingly unpredictable political careers that characterise contexts 
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in which elections are competitive can generate the incentive for politicians to loot as 
much as possible while in office. Strong ethnic identification enables these politicians to 
justify their looting as a way to promote the interests of their ethnic group. The incoming 
politicians may argue that corruption is a way ‘to balance off the wealth’ that other 
identity groups accumulated, fraudulently, while in office (Githongo 2006).  Indeed, 
research on politics in Africa shows that the corrupt actions of the incumbent can 
encourage incoming politicians to become the “main actors of an ‘our turn to eat’ game, 
which is a bad equilibrium unlikely to be broken” (Burgess, Miquel, Jedwab and Morjaria 
2009:4).  
 
Another way in which electoral competition increases adverse selection and moral hazard 
in the young African democracies is that it can encourage some citizens to trade their 
votes for personal material benefits (van de Walle 2007a). Lindberg and Morrison 
(2008:120) drive home this point when they conclude that African “voters are likely to 
know that their value is higher when [electoral] competition is high and to be encouraged 
by street talk of money and other handouts from candidates or their aides …”  
 
Although civil society organisations are regarded as a lynchpin of principal-agent 
accountability, the nature of African politics and economics stifles their ability to fulfil 
their democratic responsibilities (Piper and von Lieres 2016, de Waal and Ibreck 2013, 
Hyden 2013). Due partly to poor economic prospects in Africa, the leaders of CSOs are 
often tempted to get involved in the patronage networks through which much of upward 
social mobility occurs (see Szeftel 2000). There is a narrative that most leaders of grass-
roots organisations hold the ambition to enter government. This has two detrimental 
effects. First, it leaves CSOs at risk of being co-opted, neutralised and used to advance 
particularistic interests (de Waal and Ibreck 2013). Second, ordinary people grow 
increasingly suspicious of the motives of the CSOs and their anti-corruption campaigns. 
Indeed, McNeil and Malena (2010:199) observe that “in Benin, the great majority of 
people are convinced that CSO leaders, like political leaders, are trying only to protect 
their own material interests. It is hard for them to believe that some civil society leaders 
might truly seek to achieve better governance and citizen advancement”. 
 
Some of the civil society organisations seeking democratic accountability have been 
accused of lacking ‘civicness’ — what Mungiu-Pipiddi (2013:104) has termed 
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“universalist-minded civil-society”.  As Hyden (2013:91) observes, leaders of CSOs in 
Africa seem to struggle with “how to turn their own associations from being havens for 
affective relations into more civic-minded entities”. Another problem is according to de 
Waal and Ibreck (2013) that the cultural logic of neo-patrimonialism penetrates and 
dominates CSOs in Africa. Indeed, some of the influential local CSOs parade as mere 
extensions of the government of the day, acting to enable rather than disrupt the 
clientelistic relations that dominate the political system. Piper and von Lieres (2016) show 
that the close relationship between the ANC government and some influential civil 
society organisations at the grassroots is designed to benefit the clientelistic machinery 
of the South African state and entrench the ruling party’s  dominance at the local level.16 
It is because of this strong symbiosis between the ruling party, government and civil 
society organisations that the latter are seen as no more than “alternative patronage 
systems competing for better positions and limited change within a fundamentally 
unaltered system” (de Waal and Ibreck 2013:309).  
 
Many of the points raised in this and the previous section crystallise into the major 
criticism against the principal-agent model, persuasively captured by Persson et al 
(2013:450) as “a theoretical mischaracterization of the problem of systemic 
corruption”17. The authors invite us to distinguish, as a starting point, between corruption 
as a ‘deviant’ behaviour by rogue individuals (or few bad apples) and as a structure of 
interactions between individuals. The former can easily be addressed by technical fixes 
espoused by the principal-agent approach while the latter is more resistant to these 
techniques (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013). It is important to outline the basic 
tenets of this collective action understanding of corruption, both as an analytical device 
and potential guide for anti-corruption policy. This is especially because while it seeks to 
explain why corruption persists in neo-patrimonial systems, the collective action 
approach rejects the strong emphasis on cultural variables that forms the core of the neo-
patrimonial theory (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013). Collective action thinking is a 
progeny of rational- choice institutionalism, and therefore models systemic corruption as 
a predictor rather than an outcome variable. On the contrary, much of the neo-patrimonial 
                                                 
 
16 ANC has a close relationship with South Africa’s largest labour federation, COSATU. It is also strongly aligned 
with South African National Civic Organisation, a less organised formation, “but representing a patchwork of ANC-
aligned leaders at community or residential level” (Piper and von Lieres’ 2016:323). 
17 Emphasis in original 
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perspective as applied to African politics sees endemic corruption as an outcome of 
cultural configurations. 
 
2.3. The application of collective action theory to corruption  
 
Although its application to corruption and anti-corruption is fairly recent, collective 
action has always been central to “the subject of political science” (Ostrom 1998:1). This 
is not surprising given that good governance — one of the key concerns of political 
studies — is a public good. As part of the ‘good governance’ mosaic, corruption control 
qualifies as a public good; while a clean government benefits all members of society, 
those bearing the costs of its production are unable to exclude non-contributors from 
enjoying the benefits (Rothstein 2011a, Marquette and Peiffer 2015). Besides being a 
public good in its own right, corruption control is also “an important input into the 
production of other public goods, including sound economic management, well‐
functioning markets, and reliable human security” (Eigen and Eigen-Zucchi 2003:577). 
Indeed, according to Mauro (1996) highly corrupt societies are less likely to invest in 
human capital, including spending more on education and healthcare. Like all public 
goods, corruption control faces a collective action dilemma as each individual has greater 
immediate pay-offs for placing her own interest above the interests of the public.  
 
The large literature on collective action can be divided into two ‘generations’ of collective 
action theories (see Ostrom 1998, Ostrom and Ahn 2009). The first generation is 
associated with the seminal work of Mancur Olson (1965, 1971) and seeks to explain, 
through classical rational choice theory, why collective action fails. The second 
generation is more concerned with why collective action occurs and persists (Ostrom 
2005). In this regard, and in sharp contrast to the first-generation perspective, the second 
generation puts emphasis on non-utility considerations (i.e. non-material incentives) 
(Ostrom 2009; Elster 1989). Elinor Ostrom criticises Olson’s work for overstating the 
effect of economic incentives, and in the process, undermining the role of norms and 
values in motivating collective action (Ostrom 2005, 2009). Much of her work 
demonstrates that individuals have a higher disposition to contribute to public goods 
without the inducement of material incentives when they perceive that others are 
behaving cooperatively. As a result, Ostrom proposes a collective action theory that 
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transcends emphasis on material incentives and seriously considers the role of reputation, 
trust and reciprocity (Ostrom 2007, 2000).  
 
The application of collective action thinking to corruption control reflects elements of the 
first and second generations of collective action theory. Elements from the first-
generation manifest in the fact that the public good of corruption control faces a free-rider 
problem. The second generation emerges in the notion that where corruption is systemic, 
efforts to control it confront ‘an assurance dilemma’ (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 
2013).  
 
2.3.1. Corruption control as an assurance problem  
 
Amartya Sen is credited with developing the concept of ‘assurance problem’ (or 
assurance game) (see Nichols 2004). In his seminal publication on this topic, Sen 
(1967:115) argued that an individual will not contribute to public goods provision “except 
if he has grounds for assurance that others, too, will act in a manner designed to promote 
the future welfare of the community”. An assurance problem of co-operation arises when 
“the particular outcome depends both on prior expectations and on a preference for 
coordinating one's own actions with the actions of others” (Runge 1984:158). What you 
do depends on what others are likely to do. In the area of corruption, Mauro was one of 
the first to moot the idea that systemic corruption is akin to an ‘assurance game’ (also 
known as co-ordination game). He used the following scenario to make this point: 
You live in a society where everybody steals. Do you choose to steal? The 
probability that you will be caught is low, because the police are very busy 
chasing other thieves, and, even if you do get caught, the chances of your being 
punished severely for a crime that is so common are low. Therefore, you too steal 
(Mauro 1998:12). 
 
As Mauro (1998) suggests, where corruption is pervasive, it becomes optimal for an 
individual to be corrupt; that is, without the assurance that rules will be enforced, all actors 
are better off if they cheat than if they comply with the rules. As Rothstein and Teorell 
(2015b:241) note in reference to the assurance problem of corruption; “almost everyone 
has something to gain from a corrupt system as long as a large enough body of actors 
continues to play foul.” Even those individuals who think corruption is morally 
reprehensible “are usually likely to take part because they see no point in doing 
otherwise” (Rothstein 2011:246).  
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Using survey data from Estonia, Tavitz (2010:1267) found that high perceptions of 
corruption increase the propensity for public officials as well as citizens to engage in 
corruption. Specifically, the perceived pervasiveness of corruption had a powerful effect 
on the probability that a public official agreed to facilitate a corrupt deal. Furthermore, 
holding other variables “at their means (or medians), increasing the value of perceived 
pervasiveness of corruption from its minimum to its maximum increase[d] the predicted 
probability” of an individual paying a bribe. More importantly, a combination of 
perceived acceptability and pervasiveness of corruption “increase[d] the predicted 
probability of having paid a bribe from .03 to .47” (Tavitz 2010:1268). 
 
The perception that anonymous others are primed to act corruptly in pursuit of self-
interest destroys generalised interpersonal trust, which is one of the most important 
antecedents of voluntary provision of public goods. Generalised trust is defined as the 
individual belief “that, at worst, others will not knowingly or willingly do him harm, and 
at best, that they will act in his interests” (Newton 2001:202). Indeed, several studies 
attest to the negative relationship between interpersonal trust and personal experience of 
corruption. Using individual-level data, Selisgon (2006) found that those Latin Americans 
who had a regular experience with bribery were also less trusting of people in general. 
Based on the analysis of experimental data on Swedish and Romanian students, Rothstein 
and Eek (2006) concluded that bribers were generally less trusting than people who did 
not pay any bribes.  
 
Similar findings have been noted in studies focusing on perceptions of corruption rather 
than personal experiences of bribery. Seligson (2006) found that in Nicaragua, Bolivia, 
Paraguay and El Salvador low generalised interpersonal trust was associated with a high 
perception of corruption. Similarly, an analysis by Uslaner and Rothstein (2005) reveals 
that high perception of corruption makes Romanians and Estonians less likely to trust 
their compatriots. The trust-corruption relationship does not only work at the individual-
level. A country-level analysis by Uslaner (2004:16) suggests that “countries that became 
more trusting (Mexico and Italy, in particular) became less corrupt and countries that 
became less trusting showed an increase in corruption (Argentina, South Africa, and 
France, in particular)”. 
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The dysfunctional public institutions that characterise highly corrupt societies contribute 
to the assurance problem of corruption control for both public officials and citizens. In an 
environment where demanding bribes is part of a systematic corruption network, a typical 
law enforcement officer expects a majority of her colleagues to take advantage of the 
weak enforcement of rules and use their entrusted powers for private gain. Indeed, 
Hoffman and Patel (2017:12) show that in Nigeria, “police officers ask for bribes because 
they think that their colleagues do, and that they are also expected to do so”. In this 
environment, attempting to ‘stay clean’ does not only make you look foolish, it can be 
life-threatening (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013). As Isaac and Norton (2013:19) 
point out, “in corrupt civic environments, reformers face the possibility of economic 
harassment, violent attacks, and even death. The same is true for police officers”.  
 
Ordinary people’s actions are likely to be shaped by their expectations that other citizens 
facing a highly dysfunctional bureaucracy, in a place where corruption is seen as normal, 
are most likely to pay bribes in their interactions with public officers (Aidt 2003, Persson, 
Rothsien and Teorell 2012, 2013, Bauhr 2012). Even those who are personally opposed 
to bureaucratic corruption understand that refusing to comply with demands for bribes 
means going without the public goods and services that a bribe normally secures. In this 
regard, a majority of people living in highly dysfunctional societies may see corruption 
as a solution (Marquitte and Peiffer 2015, Heywood 2017). It is difficult to convince 
people to fight what seems to work in the interim, especially when doing so is likely to 
be personally risky, may result in very slow changes to the status quo and deliver small 
material gains to the individual (Johnston and Kpundeh 2002, Morris and Klesner 2010, 
Johnston 2012). In fact, when compared with paying a bribe or crafting personal 
relationships with officers and getting on with life, joining the ‘war’ on corruption where 
it is endemic can seem quite daunting for an individual (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 
2013).  
 
2.3.2. Corruption control as a free-rider problem 
 
Contrary to the assurance problem in which an actor prefers to contribute so long as others 
are doing the same, a free-rider problem is one in which an actor’s decision not to 
contribute is independent of the actions of others (Chong 1991). This arises from the 
belief that in public goods’ settings, there is a perpetual conflict between individual pay-
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offs and collective benefits, such that regardless of what others do, defection (i.e. non-
cooperation) is always a dominant strategy. In such settings, a utility-maximising actor 
will not pull his weight even when others are expected to contribute towards the provision 
of public goods (Runge 1984, Chong 1991). Free-rider problems are often illustrated by 
a two-person single period prisoners’ dilemma game, which was formalised by Albert 
Tucker and popularised by Garrett Hardin (1968). In the prisoners’ dilemma game, both 
actors are better off (walk free) if they co-operate and both deny the crime. However, if 
only one confesses and the accomplice denies, the former will walk free while the latter 
receives the maximum sentence for the crime. If they both confess, they will go to jail on 
less serious charges. Although confessing is sub-optimal as both individuals will still end 
up in prison, they will both confess as they each try to maximise their individual pay offs.  
 
A free-rider problem of anti-corruption is that the individual who does not contribute to 
the public good of good governance will still enjoy the benefits of living in a corruption-
free environment. Most people are therefore expected to shirk their civic responsibilities, 
knowing that they will enjoy the same benefits as those who take part in efforts to resist 
corruption (Yap 2013). This results in the overall under-provision of the public good of a 
clean government. Michael Johnston (2014:647) explains the free-rider problem that anti-
corruption faces when he notes: 
 …checking corruption is difficult, time-consuming and often risky; if others 
succeed I may well benefit whether or not I have been involved. Why, then, 
should I become an active reformer? Indeed, fighting corruption may well entail 
giving up various petty benefits I now receive, or anticipate, and potentially 
plunge me into an immediate future of considerable risk. 
 
The free-rider perspective illuminates the fact that the persistence of corruption is more 
than an issue of shared expectations and lack of interpersonal trust as the assurance 
perspective would have us to believe. There is in fact a possibility that high levels of 
generalised interpersonal trust may give rise to free-riding (see Elster 1989). Indeed, 
according to Bauhr (2016), individuals who pay bribes to gain illicit advantages are less 
likely to participate in anti-corruption efforts when they believe that ordinary people are 
able to fight corruption. Eigen and Eigen-Zucchi (2003:584) argue that where corruption 
levels are low (and trust very high), an individual is best off if she pays a bribe, since 
he/she “faces less competition along this margin, raising the returns from corrupt 
practices”. This, indeed, tells us that the free-rider problem remains a challenge even 
when the assurance problem is absent. Nevertheless, endemic corruption is more of an 
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assurance game than a free-rider problem (Rothstein and Teorell 2015b). As a result, its 
solutions should be tailored to change expectations about other people’s behaviour; 
people “must be convinced that ‘another world is possible’ — meaning that they can to 
some extent envision a situation in which the collective action problem is solved” 
(Rothstein and Teorell 2015b:244). That is, if they can be made to believe that others are 
inclined to contribute to the public good of a clean government, individuals can be 
induced to hold their end of the bargain without recourse to any form of material 
incentives. 
 
2.4. The weaknesses of collective action analysis  
  
One of the major criticisms of the collective action approach to corruption is its limited 
ability to account for change endogenously, a feature inherited from its strong anchoring 
on rational choice institutionalism (Rothstein and Teorell 2015b).18. The approach is 
unable to explain, in its current form, why a variety of anti-corruption coalitions are taking 
place and sometimes succeeding to combat corruption in places where it is viewed as 
being a rule rather than exception (see Duvanova 2007). Most importantly, as Rothstein 
and Teorell (2015b) have noted, it is unable to explain how non-corrupt institutions 
emerge (Rothstein and Teorell 2015b). With specific reference to Africa, collective action 
thinking fails to shed light on the conditions under which corruption (or specific types of 
corruption) might undermine a system based on personal relationships, deference and 
hierarchy — the very system on which it is built.  
 
By casting actors as simply reacting to structural constraints, rational choice 
institutionalism does not anticipate that there are conditions under which the experience 
or perceptions of corruption can inspire attempts to change the institution of corruption. 
Indeed, institutional theorists were sceptical of the idea that perceptions of corruption 
encouraged the colour revolutions that occurred in Ukraine, Serbia and Georgia in the 
middle of the last decade. In line with institutional theorisation, much of the commentary 
on colour revolutions emphasised the role of exogenous factors, including the support 
opposition parties in these countries received from NGOs based in the United States 
                                                 
 
18 According to Harty (2004:52) “rational choice institutionalists view institutions as a set of rules and information 
that promote 'gains from exchange' by reducing the costs associated with the pursuit of individual rationality in 
strategic interactions.” 
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(Tucker 2007). Breaking ranks with this thinking, Tucker (2007) stresses the critical role 
of domestic factors, especially perceptions of corruption, in motivating ordinary people 
to overcome co-ordination problems and take part in protests and demonstrations. 
Similarly, Caiden (2013:214) rejects the exogenous factors’ explanation of the 2011 mass 
uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East. As he notes, “the uprisings were not the 
outcome of any Western–designed democracy promotion programmes or any Western 
intervention… at the heart they were motivated by the ideals of democracy, human rights, 
respect for the individual, responsive government, civilised conduct and abhorrence of 
wrong-doing” (Caiden 2013:214). As Yap (2015) correctly conjectures, the colour 
revolutions and the Arab uprisings suggest that there are conditions — not accommodated 
by rational choice institutionalism — which may explain why citizens are able to 
overcome co-ordination problems and demand accountability. I elaborate more on these 
in chapter three.  
 
The key proposition of the collective action analysis is that “even if most people morally 
disapprove of corruption and are fully aware of its negative consequences for society at 
large, very few rational actors have a clear-cut interest in establishing or defending clean 
institutions” (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013: 463-464). It might indeed be the case 
that individuals in high corruption societies are not willing to contribute to good 
governance as a public good. However, it is important to realise that these societies have 
many individuals and groups who are ready to co-operate in defence of their private 
interests when deemed to be under threat from greed and corruption. Corruption always 
creates winners and losers and as Johnston (2014), Mungiu-Pippidi (2016) and Rose-
Ackerman (2010) note, it is the latter who are often willing to challenge it. The argument 
that Johnston (2014) proposes, and which Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013) overlook 
is that where corruption is endemic, collective action arises from the need to challenge 
various forms of particularism and not necessarily to achieve the public good of a clean 
government. 19 Institutions of accountability may arise at a later stage as the by-product 
of political settlement (Johnston 2014).  
 
                                                 
 
19 According to Mungiu-Pipiddi (2016:96) “particularism limits access to resources, favouring some applicants while 
discriminating against others, resulting in unfair allocation. It is a broader concept than corruption, since it includes 
nominally legal phenomena as well.” 
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Johnston’s historical analysis demonstrates how attempts by marginalised groups to 
defend their private interests against institutionalised corruption precipitated efforts to 
institutionalise merit, rule of law and accountability. During the Elizabethan period in 
England, for example, it was customary for university graduates to obtain jobs in 
government or the church through personal preferment. The graduates that this system 
marginalised were instrumental in efforts to dismantle and replace it with the one based 
on merit alone (Johnston 2014). In another example, Johnston explains how a coalition 
of groups inspired by a range of private interests mobilised against the machine politics 
of the 17th-18th century United States: 
Upper status groups sought to regain lost influence. Less-favoured ethnic 
communities, many of them poorer than those that had first been drawn into the 
machine, sought help on a basis of need, not political loyalty. Ending machine 
corruption might build a better city, but there were personal stakes on the table 
as well (Johnston 2014:42). 
 
Using cross-national survey data on firms, Duvanova (2007) demonstrates how the 
increasing burden of corruption encouraged the formation of civil society organisations 
in places where corruption was systemic. She found, for example, that one of the main 
reasons for the proliferation of business associations in Russia was the need to protect 
individual firms against institutional weaknesses (such as lack of contract enforcement), 
and bureaucratic extortions. The activities of these business associations included training 
individuals and firms on various tactics for resisting bureaucratic corruption. They also 
reported allegations of corruption on behalf of members and when the need arose, took 
such corruption-related matters to court. The point that is worth being emphasised is that 
the need for protection against corruption was critical for the emergence of collective 
action against petty corruption in Russia.  
 
2.5. Overlaps between principal-agent and collective action approaches 
to corruption control 
 
The importance of collective action analysis is its ability to provide a sound explanation 
for why systemic corruption is so difficult to address through the techniques based solely 
on principal-agent approach (Rothstein and Teorell 2015). However, its framing as 
primarily a critique of principal-agent analysis creates an impression that it is 
fundamentally different (rather than complementary) to the principal-agent model. This 
is despite that both approaches are rooted in rational choice theory, admitting for instance, 
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that the decision to engage in corruption is a cost benefit calculation (Marquette and 
Peiffer 2015).20  
 
Indeed, Persson, Rothstein and Teorell (2013) undermine the linkage between anti-
corruption strategies based on both approaches when they conclude that systemic 
corruption demands radically different solutions to those proposed by principal-agent 
analysis. It would seem from such a conclusion that when corruption approximates a 
collective action problem (i.e. when it is an assurance problem), solutions that are inspired 
by principal-agent thinking are doomed to fail. But, there are several examples 
demonstrating that principal –agent strategies can still be useful even when corruption 
approximates an assurance dilemma. This section summarises some of these examples 
and drives home the point that it is important to consider both approaches as being 
complementary (Marquette and Peiffer 2015).  
 
Research by scholars at the Innovation for Successful Societies (in the USA) illustrates 
how approaches based on principal-agent understanding were employed to galvanise an 
anti-money laundering coalition in Brazil (LaForge 2017). Brazil’s fight against 
corruption gained much traction in the early 2000 when President Lula and justice 
minister Marcio Bastos threw their weight behind various efforts to tackle corruption and 
money laundering. Lula and Bastos undertook several institutional reforms that were 
inspired by principal-agent thinking. These included staffing key agencies with highly 
motivated, talented and well-paid individuals. The previously fragmented accountability 
mechanisms were re-organised into a co-coordinated anti-corruption structure comprising 
the Office of the Inspector General, Federal Secretariat for Internal Control, the Office of 
the Ombudsman and a Secretariat for Corruption and Prevention and Strategic 
Information. Finally, specialised federal courts for prosecuting financial and money 
laundering crimes were created and empowered with human and financial resources 
(LaForge 2017). 
   
Many of the anti-corruption reforms were facilitated by the newly created National 
Strategy for Combating Money Laundering and Corruption (ENCCLA)— an inter-
                                                 
 
20 Both approaches share the foundational assumption underlying rational choice models that the maximization of self- 
interest is the primary driver of human behaviour (Nichols and Robertson 2017). 
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agency forum that fostered “co-ordination and joint policy-making among public 
agencies in the fight against money laundering, and later corruption” (LaForge 2017:5). 
Justice Minister Bastos used his significant influence among the political and business 
elites to ensure that reluctant agency leaders and other senior officials bought into the 
ENCCLA initiative.21 He convinced the ‘doubting Thomases’ in the highest echelons of 
the judiciary that Lula’s administration was serious about tackling money laundering and, 
importantly, that the ENCCLA initiative was key to that endeavour (LaForge 2017).  
 
Under the guise of ENCCLA, representatives of more than 50 state agencies convened 
annually for up to four days to among other things, share priorities, build inter-agency 
trust and plan how to co-ordinate actions against corruption and money laundering. The 
gathering was designed in such a way as to foster interpersonal trust among delegates. 
This was viewed as being integral to inter-agency co-ordination and collaboration in 
Brazil’s highly corrupt environment. It encouraged an honest dialogue about the 
complexities of anti-money laundering and helped to build a strong network of ‘public 
officials’ who, although privately opposed to corruption, had felt there was nothing much 
an individual could do about it. In other words, ENCCLA revealed what other public 
officials were thinking about corruption and anti-corruption, helping to solve what Timur 
Kuran dubbed a problem of ‘preference falsification’ (Kuran 1995). 22  Although the 
sessions were conducted in private, the goals each agency adopted voluntarily were made 
public, thereby allowing media and civil society organisations to monitor the progress 
(LaForge 2017).  
 
The ENCCLA initiative created strong agency- and individual-level incentives to fight 
corruption, thereby limiting the risk of defection. The frequent interactions at ENCCLA 
and similar gatherings changed beliefs about the efficacy of efforts to bring corruption 
under control. Delegates learned that the fears and concerns regarding corruption control 
were in fact widespread and that people were willing to tackle corruption as long as others 
                                                 
 
21 He built these connections while he was working as a highly successful attorney. 
22 In Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification, Kuran (1995) drives home the 
point that people's preferences are a function of social conditions, more especially the pressure imposed by other people. 
Individuals are unlikely to express their true preferences when this is deemed inconsistent with perceived public opinion 
or other existing social and political pressures. In highly corrupt societies, those who are strongly opposed to corruption 
are likely to play along until they have information that there are (enough) others willing to challenge corruption.  
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were willing to keep their end of the bargain. As interpersonal and inter-agency trust 
developed, it became easier for agencies to share sensitive (bank account and tax-related) 
material, which proved useful for investigating and prosecuting serious financial crimes 
(LaForge 2017). As one ENCCLA delegate observed, a sense of solidarity that emerged 
at ENCCLA inspired individuals to make it their “personal mission to deliver” on anti-
corruption (LaForge 2017:11).  
 
Another example of how principal-agent strategies can inspire anti-corruption collective 
action comes from Isaac and Norton’s (2013) analysis of the work of William Parker —
the reformist Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) chief of the 1950s. Parker 
employed a variety of tools from the principal-agent arsenal to address endemic 
corruption in the 1950’s LAPD. He ensured that salaries of police officers were 
substantially increased, while simultaneously, refusing to relax his policy of immediate 
dismissal of venal officers (Isaac and Norton 2013) 23 . In line with principal-agent 
thinking, Parker established a requirement for officers to declare their additional sources 
of income, which though initially resisted, proved useful for detecting illicit sources of 
income. He also involved the media in monitoring the work of the police, thereby 
improving transparency— another important principal-agent tool for anti-corruption. As 
the reform programme gained momentum, collective action began to manifest as 
community members became increasingly willing to work with the department in crime 
prevention and to hold individual police officers to a higher standard of accountability 
(Isaac and Norton 2013). In turn, individual officers were also incentivised to shun 
corruption in order to avoid being labelled as ‘dirty cops’ in a police department that was 
increasingly being perceived as ‘clean’ (Isaac and Norton 2013).  In less than ten years, 
Parker’s efforts had sparked anti-corruption collective action and shifted the equilibrium 
from very high to low corruption.  
 
The foregoing examples reveal important lessons regarding the role of the principal in 
generating collective action against corruption. Endemic corruption can in fact be tackled 
by a combination of principal-agent and collective action approaches. In particular, and 
                                                 
 
23 It is reported that Parker retained a small (i.e. below average) but highly trained and well remunerated police force. 
He often spoke passionately about “wanting the job of an LAPD officer to be both financially remunerative and 
socially respectable” (Isaac and Newton 2013:26) 
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perhaps most importantly, they illustrate that collective action can be triggered by a 
principal who moves first and bears the large (initial) cost of transformation. In this 
regard, they are consistent with the argument proposed by Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl that 
a small group “of interested and resourceful people can begin contributions toward an 
action that will tend to ‘explode’, to draw in the other, less interested or less resourceful 
members of the population and to carry the event toward its maximum potential” 
(Marwell, Oliver and Prahl 1988:547). These examples are also consistent with Mungiu-
Pippidi’s observation that as far as breaking the vicious circle of corruption is concerned, 
“human agency [matters] a great deal everywhere” (Mungiu-Pippidi 2016:104).  
 
The lacuna in much of the literature concerns the question of what motivates some 
principals such as justice minister Bastos or various justice ministers in Taiwan (see 
Mungiu-Pippidi   2016) to throw their weight behind anti-corruption and stay the course. 
In the case of William Parker, the largest incentive for reform was his intense loathing of 
corruption (Isaac and Norton 2013). In Chile and Uruguay, the incentive seems to have 
been rooted in political economy; the need to fight poverty provided the initial impetus 
for political leadership to bring corruption under control (Mungiu-Pipiddi 2016). In 
Georgia and Rwanda, the motivation emanated from the existential threat that both 
countries faced because of the violent political conflict they had experienced (Mungiu-
Pipiddi 2016, Marquette and Peiffer 2015). Similarly, as Rothstein (2010) and Rothstein 
and Teorell (2015b) illustrate, the existential threat facing the 19th century Sweden 
inspired political elites to prioritise governance and anti-corruption reforms.  
 
2.5.1. The roots of political will in collective civic mobilisation 
 
Nevertheless, and most importantly for this study, political will for anti-corruption can 
also be generated from the grass-roots (see Beyerle 2014). For instance, in 2000 South 
Korea’s CSOs launched an aggressive anti-corruption campaign that included compiling 
a list of venal politicians, asking major political parties not to nominate them and 
appealing to voters to reject blacklisted candidates should political parties refuse to oblige 
(Bayerle 2014, You 2016). Due to strong public support for the campaign, most of the 
blacklisted politicians did not win their parties’ nominations. Furthermore, more than 60 
per cent of the blacklisted candidates who competed as independents were defeated in the 
polls. In this case, a collective initiative triggered by civil society organisations and 
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overwhelmingly supported by ordinary people ‘forced’ political parties to demonstrate 
willingness to challenge corruption. 
 
Another example of how citizens can inspire public officers to tackle corruption is offered 
by Olken (2006, 2009). His research shows that when citizens were reluctant to be 
involved in mechanisms of accountability, officials rarely took financial audits — a 
principal-agent tool for accountability— seriously. In rural Indonesian villages where he 
conducted his research, a lack of civic engagement was further exacerbated by the fact 
that negative audit reports rarely attracted punishment, even though the individuals 
suspected of malfeasance were liable for criminal prosecution. Olken (2006) observes 
that once citizens’ attendance at community meetings increased, and the results of audits 
were widely disseminated and discussed in these meetings, officials changed their 
behaviour despite knowing that ‘malfeasance’ was unlikely to attract any legal action. 
Olken concluded that the uncomfortable feeling and inconvenience of having to explain 
irregularities to disapproving community members was one of the main incentives for the 
willingness and effort to produce a clean audit. Fox underscores this finding, adding that, 
“it was mainly the threat of community responses to the promised local dissemination of 
the findings that gave [these] audits the clout to reduce corruption” (Fox 2015:349). 
 
Research by Reinikka and Svensson (2004, 2005) illustrates how increased transparency 
inspired collective action and how this, in turn, generated the willingness by officials to 
tackle corruption in the publicly funded schools’ programme in Uganda. Having made 
the case that ‘local capture’ of funds for primary school programmes was rife in Uganda, 
the duo proceeded to show how a deliberate effort by the government to change incentive 
structures changed the corrupt equilibrium. They used data obtained from a natural 
experiment in which the central government published in the national newspapers 
monthly transfers of public funds to districts and required schools to do the same with 
their expenditure. This initiative empowered both schools and parents with information 
to monitor how local officials handled the programme’s fund. This inspired commitment 
among public officials to tackle corruption in their ranks. The message of Reinikka and 
Svensson’s research is that the national government acting as a principal shaped the 
behaviour of agents (local officials) and inspired citizens (working together with the 
recipient schools) to take on the role of the principal through collective action. The 
findings provide another layer of evidence to the lesson teased out in the examples 
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presented in previous paragraphs, that by being the first to move, a principal can trigger 
a cascade of collective initiatives against endemic graft. 
    
2.6. Conclusion 
 
The emerging application of collective action theory to the analysis of corruption has 
done well to drive home the point that endemic corruption is an institution, and therefore 
provides the calculus that people use to predict the behaviour of others. This has shed 
important light on why it is often difficult to address systematic and systemic corruption 
through the technical fixes espoused by the dominant principal-agent approaches. 
However, as both a theory and as a guide to anti-corruption policy, the collective action 
approach has several weaknesses of its own. First, it has inherited the inability to explain 
change endogenously that is characteristic of rational choice institutionalism. For this 
reason, it is unable to account for why individuals operating in highly corrupt settings, 
and apparently severely constrained in their choices, can co-operate and change the 
corrupt equilibrium. 
 
Because it neglects peoples’ ability to think critically about institutions, rational choice 
institutionalism is unable to explain why the greatest beneficiaries of the status quo might 
choose to sacrifice their benefits in support institutional change. Second and perhaps most 
importantly, because of its anchoring in neo-institutionalism, the collective action model 
overlooks the fact that corruption itself can be a motivating factor for institutional change. 
I fully elaborate on this point in the next chapter. Thirdly, the collective action analysis 
overlooks the possibility that corruption may yield very different effects across similar 
societies and individuals. Again, the next chapter looks at some of the possible 
explanations of these variations in more detail. 
 
One of the main challenges in the current literature is the bifurcation of collective action 
and principal-agent solutions to endemic corruption. This chapter has shown that there 
are instances in which collective reproduction of corruption has been addressed by 
approaches based on principal-agent thinking. It would seem, as Marquette and Peiffer 
(2015) and You (2016) observe that corruption, even where it is admittedly pervasive, is 
seldom exclusively a collective action problem (also see Rose-Ackerman 2010). It is 
important therefore not to discard “the usefulness of principal-agent theory’s 
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understanding of corruption carte blanche, even in the context of systemic corruption” 
(Marquette and Peiffer 2015:12). 
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Chapter three 
Mechanisms of collective civic engagement in highly corrupt 
settings 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has highlighted the fact that despite the pessimism expressed by the 
collective action analysis, anti-corruption approaches based on principal-agent thinking 
can still be useful in efforts to combat corruption in places where it is a rule rather than 
exception. I summarised examples showing how people residing in highly corrupt 
societies have tackled corruption through collective action. This chapter builds on this 
analysis and identifies the individual and contextual level mechanisms that might explain 
the willingness of ordinary people in highly corrupt societies to co-operate in holding 
their governments accountable. In particular, it focuses on how personal experience of 
bribery and subjective perceptions of corruption might motivate people to seek 
accountability. This inevitably compels us to traverse the colossal social movements and 
political participation literatures.  
 
I should emphasise, however, that both space and the focus of this research do not permit 
an exhaustive account of the most important works in social movements’ research. The 
volume edited by Jacquelien van Stekelenburg, Conny Roggeband and Bert Klandermans 
(2013) provides a useful starting point for those interested in a reasonably thorough 
review of the state of social movement research. Much of the discussion here is limited 
to explaining individual and contextual-level conditions under which an individual’s 
perceptions and experiences of corruption can motivate willingness to use collective civic 
action to challenge corruption.  
 
Two arguments emerge from this literature review. The first is that, even in highly corrupt 
societies, corruption creates victims and can as a result act as a mobilising grievance. The 
impact of corruption (as a mobilising grievance) is strongly moderated by several 
contextual and individual-level factors that work to either intensify the positive impact 
(e.g. poor economic conditions) or help in reducing co-ordination problems (e.g. 
associational density). The second argument emerges from the critique of the mainstream 
literature on African politics which projects ordinary Africans as passive victims of 
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structural forces rather than autonomous actors with initiative. Based on emerging 
systematic studies of African publics, I show that a growing number of ordinary Africans 
have embraced democratic norms and values (or the ethic of democratic citizenship) and 
could be more willing to support efforts to oppose abuses of power than the mainstream 
African politics literature summarised in the previous chapter suggests. In essence, the 
discussions in this chapter are tied together by three different, yet interrelated threads; 
grievances, resources and democratic values.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows. The following section conceptualises collective civic 
action or collective demand for accountability. The sections that follow summarise the 
grievance model of collective action and its main criticisms. I then examine how 
explanations based on the grievance narrative shed light on the effect of corruption 
perceptions on the decision to undertake anti-government collective action. I also outline 
why the experience of bribery might encourage individuals to join the fight against 
corruption. Towards the end of the chapter, I introduce democratic and collective action 
norms as another basis for people’s willingness to punish ‘corruption’.  
 
3.2. Understanding collective civic action 
 
All forms of collective action are joined efforts to influence a particular outcome whose 
benefits go beyond the individual. What distinguishes collective civic action from the 
larger concept of collective action is that the former is more concerned with putting 
pressure on political authority to provide public goods and services (Opp 2001). 
Collective action encompasses joined activities that may or may not involve the 
‘government’ or some political authority as an actor. One example of collective action is 
the maintenance of common/ community assets such as when rural fishermen agree to 
prevent over-fishing. Voluntary contributions by community members to build a school 
is another example of collective action. Collective civic action, on the other hand, entails 
making collective claims against a political authority. These distinctions 
notwithstanding, scholars often use the concept of collective action even when they are 
describing collective civic action.  
 
Although the term ‘collective’ presupposes joint activity as intimated, sometimes the 
concept of collective civic action is used to refer to actions of one individual carried out 
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on behalf of a specific group to influence a political outcome (Wright 2009). In this 
regard, symbolic acts of political resistance, including sabotage, arson, hunger strikes, 
and self-immolation can be regarded as forms of collective civic action (Wright and Tropp 
2002). Another reason for taking these actions as instances of collective civic action is 
that they often (but not always) represent an undercurrent of significant mass discontent, 
and act as a trigger for large-scale protests, wildcat strikes, riots and civil wars (Lohmann 
1994). A clear example is the hunger strike by the Indian cleric Anna Hazare which in 
2011 inspired one of the biggest anti-corruption uprisings in the history of India.24 The 
sporadic acts of sabotage against the apartheid government in South Africa can also be 
considered in the same light. 
 
Scholars in anti-corruption refer to collective civic action as ‘collective demand for 
accountability’ (see Lee 2011). The literature on collective demand for accountability can 
be divided into two camps. The first one falls under the rubric of ‘social accountability’ 
— an umbrella concept that refers to the “diverse approaches to exercise voice, ranging 
from simple exposure of government failures to participatory performance monitoring, 
expenditure tracking, budget analysis and participatory budgeting, among others” 
(Schartz 2013:162). Reflecting its roots in principal-agent thinking, social accountability 
literature often refers to citizens as principals and national and local politicians and 
bureaucrats as agents (Booth 2013, Lee 2012, Brinkerhoff and Waterberg 2015).  
 
It is worth pointing out that the effectiveness of social accountability initiatives depends 
on the willingness of national governments to be held accountable (Verdenicci and Hough 
2015, Bauhr 2008, Fox 2015, Booth 2012, Lee 2011). As much of the literature points 
out, governments of highly corrupt societies often lack the political will (and sometimes, 
the capacity) to support genuine social accountability programmes, leaving them as 
window dressing activities (Verdenicci and Hough 2015, Fox 2015). This lack of teeth 
(as Fox [2015] puts it) of social accountability necessitates extra-institutional and 
                                                 
 
24 Anna Hazare’s hunger strike spearheaded a movement that sought tougher anti-corruption legislation. He 
demanded the ombudsman, referred to as the Lokpal (or protector of the people) to be established at all levels of the 
federal state and empowered to investigate all individuals and state agencies. Public demonstrations, candlelight 
vigils, open letters and discussions, and the spectacular acts of fasting in public for solidarity with Hazare all marked 
Anna Hazare’s movement. 
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sometimes spontaneous methods of exercising voice — which take a form of public 
protests and demonstrations — “to induce reluctant political leaders to conduct anti-
corruption purges” (Williams 2000: xvi). These extra-institutional forms of collective 
civic action constitute the second camp in the literature on collective demand for 
accountability. 
 
The distinction between ‘invited spaces and invented spaces’ helps to clarify these 
institutional and extra-institutional forms of collective civic action. Invited spaces such 
as social accountability programmes are created from above by the state while invented 
spaces (e.g. protests) arise through the organic and largely obtrusive efforts by citizens to 
impose limits on political power (Piper and von Lieres 2016). Citizens often invent the 
space for participation when they challenge ineffective invited spaces (Mansuri and Rao 
2013). 
 
 3.3. The grievance model and its discontents 
 
Grievance explanations of collective civic action draw from the seminal work of Ted 
Robert Gurr (1970). In his attempt to make sense of the political violence of the 
1960s, Gurr surmised that relative deprivation, or the gap between individuals’ economic 
expectations and their present conditions generates anger and the willingness to take part 
in collective dissent. This gap is triggered by one’s comparison with a standard, “be it 
one’s past, someone else’s situation, or a cognitive standard such as equity or justice” 
(van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013:887). Over the years, scholars have used the 
generic concept of ‘grievances’ rather than relative deprivation “to capture the essence of 
the state of mind that motivates people to [take] political action” (Gurr 2015: 245). 
Klandermans (1997:38) defines grievances as the “outrage about the way authorities are 
treating a social problem”. 
 
The grievance model posits that personal discontent and the desire for change are central 
to individual willingness to bear the costs of collective civic action (Gurr 2015). Indeed, 
as Snow and Soule (2010:23) argue, “none of the various sets of conditions necessary for 
the emergence and operation of social movements is more important that the generation 
of deeply felt [and] shared grievances”. The grievance model (or some of its versions) 
has been used to explain collective civic engagement in many parts of the African 
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continent (see Resnick 2015). This is largely because most participants in collective 
endeavours are drawn from the poorest parts of African societies (Mattes 2008, Bratton 
and van de Walle 1992, Branch and Mampilly 2015, Alexander 2010). Alexander 
(2010:26) has gone so far as to describe the “stay-aways, blockading of roads, 
construction of barricades, burning of tyres, destruction of buildings [and] chasing 
unpopular individuals out of townships…” which commonly occur in South Africa’s 
mainly poor neighbourhoods as “the rebellion of the poor”. Between 2008 and 2009, riots 
related to sharp increases in the price of food occurred in at least 14 African countries, 
notably Senegal, Burkina Faso and Mauritania (Bush 2009). These increasingly frequent 
and large protest events were attended by a majority of the urban poor, who 
understandably, used much of their income on food (Bush 2009).  
 
According to Branch and Mampilly (2015), the high participation rates by the poor is one 
of the major differences between civic engagement in Africa and other parts of the world, 
notably Europe where most participants belong to the middle class. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that these differences are due to the fact that a greater proportion of Africans are 
poor while a larger portion of Western Europeans are in the middle class. What is unclear 
from studies emphasising the positive impact of socio-economic grievances is why 
deprivation produces collective action in some African countries and not in similarly poor 
societies. Bratton and van de Walle (1992) underlined this conundrum in their analysis of 
the pro-democratization protests of the early 1990s. As they conclude, economic 
grievance argument fails to explain why protests happened during the times they did and 
in some poor countries and not others (Bratton and van de Walle 1992).  
 
A major flaw in the economic grievance analysis is that the rate of collective civic 
engagement does not correspond with the ever-present nature of extreme deprivation 
(Tarrow 1998, Tilly 2003). As Tarrow observes, “even a cursory look at modern history 
shows that outbreaks of contention cannot be derived from the deprivation people suffer 
or the disorganization in their societies. For these preconditions are far more enduring 
than the movements they support” (Tarrow 1998: 71). Results of a multilevel regression 
analysis of self-reported rates of protest across the globe indicate that “many people who 
hold equal grievances do not protest” (Dalton, van Sickle and Weldon 2010:17). Lichbach 
(1996) explains that even if aggrieved individuals wanted to engage in collective action, 
free-riding would prove to be a major hindrance.  
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Over the years, theoretical and empirical weaknesses of the grievance model led to a 
stronger emphasis on ‘resources’ as a more plausible explanation of the propensity to take 
part in collective action. The resource mobilisation model departed from the premise that 
individuals took action because they had the means to do so, not necessarily because they 
had stronger grievances than those who stayed away (Dalton, van Sickle and Weldon 
2010, van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears 2008). It stressed the importance of socio-
economic development variables such as income, time and formal education attainment. 
Other important predictors were previous involvement in collective action and access to 
social networks (Dalton, van Sickle and Weldon 2010, Wantchekon and Vermeersch 
2011). While these explained differences in participation rates between individuals, 
Dalton, van Sickle and Weldon (2010:22) found that they also explained differences in 
average rates of protest between countries; an individual with resources in a rich and 
democratic country was found to be “significantly more likely to engage in protest activity 
than an individual with resources in a poorer, less-democratic country”.  
 
Otherwise known as ‘associational density’, a network of strong civil society 
organisations has been identified as a critical context-level resource for collective civic 
action (Lee 2011, Grimes 2015). Associational density reduces the potential cost of 
collective action by providing the ‘assurance’ to people with grievances that like-minded 
individuals will take part in collective action (Klandermans 2013). Importantly, as 
Oberschall (1994:86) has argued, this “assurance carries beyond the initial decision to 
participate to encompass staying the course in the face of police brutality and other efforts 
to block opposition”. The assurance rooted in robust civil society fosters a sense of 
collective efficacy, or the belief that working together, ordinary people can overturn their 
collective disadvantage (Klandermans 2013, Oberschall 1994).  
 
Further to that, civil society organisations are important in that they offer selective 
incentives for their members to participate in collective action. Members who respond 
positively to the mobilisation process “get social approval for conforming; those who 
resist are criticised and lose social standing” (Oberschall 1994:85). Sometimes, members 
join protests out of loyalty to the organisation not necessarily because the issue around 
which the protest is organised affects them directly (Opp 1990, Jasper 1998). Indeed, 
Gibson (1997) found that one of the main motivations for taking part in public protests 
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against the Soviet putsch of 1991 was the need to fulfil the expectation from a 
participant’s social group to oppose the coup.  
  
Another important external resource is the regular access to information. The country’s 
communication infrastructure (i.e. mainstream media, internet penetration) plays a critical 
role in the flow of information regarding what other people think should be done about 
public goods’ problems such as poor control of corruption. Ability to share information, 
especially through online platforms (e.g. WhatsApp, WeChat, Twitter and Facebook) also 
increases ‘connectivity’ between individuals, forging new identities and ultimately 
increasing a sense of collective efficacy to tackle social and political problems such as 
corruption (Mekouar 2016, Williams and Obadare 2014). Both traditional and new media 
reveal how ordinary people from other countries are responding to the same problems 
that one’s country is facing. As Oberschall (1994:86) noted, “people observe the trend 
and diffusion of demonstrations on the same issues against the same target and make an 
estimate from this information… if no collective protests have happened in one’s country, 
they observe vicariously the size and trend of anti-regime protests in neighbouring, 
similar regimes”. Bratton and van de Walle (1997) argue that this cross-national diffusion 
of regime contention is the reason an increase in number of television sets per country 
was significantly associated with the probability of anti-government protests that 
characterised democratic transitions in many parts of Africa in the early 1990s. The 
probability of protest action rose with an increase in the number of households owning a 
television set. 
 
The foregoing discussions demonstrate that grievances, resources as well as political and 
economic environmental forces conspire to foster the willingness to engage in collective 
action. Indeed, several scholars have argued that a mixture of grievances, resources and 
structural opportunities offer a more nuanced explanation of the propensity to engage in 
various forms of collective action (see Regan and Norton 2005, Gurr 2015). Reconciling 
these various perspectives towards collective action, Klandermans (2013:216) concludes 
that “grievances are discussed in people’s social networks and the feelings of efficacy of 
the people who take part influence what emotions they display”. Scacco’s analysis of 
communal riots in Nigeria led her to conclude that a combination of grievances (e.g. 
poverty) and resources (e.g. social networks) explained both the willingness and actual 
participation in collective violence (Scacco 2016). Likewise, Mueller’s extensive analysis 
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of protests in Niger led her to conclude that “economic grievances, combined with social 
networks that help protesters organize” explain the 2009-2010 uprisings in Niger 
(Mueller 2014:3). A meta-analysis by van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears (2008) found 
that along with social identity, grievances (or a sense of injustice) and a sense of efficacy 
(i.e. resources) have approximately equal impact on the propensity to engage in collective 
action.  The analysis that follows draws upon the various perspectives on collective action 
to explore the individual- and context-level conditions under which the grievances 
engendered by perceptions and personal experiences of corruption might lead to anti-
corruption civic engagement.  
 
 3.4. Mobilising grievances  
 
One of the points that proponents of the grievance model stress is that grievances are not 
created equally (see Snow 1998). That is, in other words, grievances differ in their ability 
to inspire civic engagement. For instance, declining standards in public transport or 
education may not create the same intensity of personal discontent as the shortage of such 
basic commodities as food and fuel or the prospect of losing a job. Similarly, those with 
school-age children will be inspired to challenge education-related problems than those 
without such dependents. Most importantly, as the work of Bergstrand (2014) suggests, 
grievances that are more direct and personal or that lead to significant personal losses can 
have a particularly strong mobilisation effect.  
 
Research on the individual-level effects of corruption, as a grievance, corroborate 
Bergstrand’s (2014) argument. Bauhr (2012:80) maintains, for instance, that “If 
corruption is not clearly felt in everyday life and its effects are divided and diffuse, it may 
motivate less engagement among broad sections of the population”. For De Sousa and 
Moriconi (2013:479), “different types of corruption may trigger different degrees of 
public condemnation” and by extension, willingness to challenge corruption. Analysing 
survey experimental data obtained in Delhi, India, Weschle (2016) concluded that citizens 
were more likely to tolerate corruption if the money was used to fund elections (e.g. voter 
buying) than if it was used to enrich a politician. Johnston’s (2015) historical analysis on 
the emergence of the institutions of accountability makes a strong case for the role of 
personalised grievances. 
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Olken’s (2007) research in rural Indonesia illustrates how personalised grievances 
motivate citizens to challenge specific types of corruption. Olken (2007) found that 
Indonesian villagers were keener to prevent the officials (of the road construction 
projects) from fraudulently billing the labour they (i.e. villagers) had offered voluntarily 
and keeping the money for themselves. The villagers were less interested in preventing 
officials from stealing the building materials and selling them off in the black market, 
even though this was a more harmful form of corruption for the project (and thus for the 
interests of the entire community). The strong incentive to prevent illegal wage 
expenditures was grounded in the fact that this type of corruption was felt at the 
individual-level (i.e. the loss was more personal). Finding out that one has been personally 
cheated can produce grievances that are more intense than discovering that the 
community was ripped off. 
 
3.4.1. The experience of bribery as a mobilising grievance 
 
Very few studies have examined the effect of the experience of bribery, as a grievance, 
on anti-corruption collective action. Scholars interested in Africa often examine 
individual-level predictors of the direct exposure to corruption (see Justesen and 
Bjornskov 2014; Peiffer and Rose 2016; Mbate 2017), and not the impact of bribery 
experience on political participation. Much of what we know about the nexus between 
bribe experiences and civic action comes from studies conducted in Latin America. Most 
of these studies found a negative relationship between personal experience of bribery and 
political legitimacy (see Faughnan and Seligson 2015, Seligson 2006) or support for 
democracy (Booth and Seligson 2009). Since low legitimacy often leads to a higher 
propensity to engage in anti-government protests (see Dalton, van Sickle and Weldon 
2010), it is inferred that the increasing experience of paying bribes is more likely to 
inspire extra-institutional political engagement (Booth and Seligson 2009).  
 
Apart from its corrosive effect on legitimacy and support for democracy, systemic 
bureaucratic extortions cause intense emotional distress. As Nichols and Robertson 
(2017:7) observe:  
People who have not endured the hardship of living with endemic bribery may 
think that official demands for bribery are nothing more than background noise, 
easily and quickly paid and forgotten. In truth, every bribe demand represents an 
assertion of power over those without power or adequate redress, which over time 
engenders deep frustration, resentment, and anger. 
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Based on the analysis of the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB), Bauhr (2016) provides 
an explanation that is consistent with Nichols and Robertson’s (2017) observation. Bauhr 
divides bribe payers into two groups: need bribers and greed bribers. Her analysis shows 
that individuals who pay bribes to gain illicit advantage (i.e. greed bribers) are less willing 
to undertake civic action targeting corruption. On the contrary, those who are ‘forced’ to 
pay above and beyond the officially sanctioned fees are more willing to support anti-
corruption mobilisation. Bauhr’s (2016) explanation is that demand for bribes (i.e. 
extortions) provokes a strong sense of indignation and consequently, the willingness to 
be personally involved in anti-corruption efforts. According to the extant social 
movement literature, indignation, resentment and anger are the emotions that make 
individuals to discount the personal costs of taking part in collective dissent (see Jasper 
1998, Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013). Jasper (1998) calls them ‘reactive 
emotions’ and contends that they provide a powerful motivation for individuals to support 
a variety of collective resistance efforts. Paying more attention to the emotional side of 
the grievance explanation has enabled social movement scholars to explain why 
collective action arises in highly repressive settings or among individuals who may not 
feel empowered enough to make a difference (i.e. individuals with a low sense of both 
internal and external efficacy) (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2001).  
 
While Bauhr’s analysis is insightful, it overlooks the impact of the financial burden that 
having to pay a bribe imposes on individuals and households. The analysis does not reveal 
whether socio-economic status of a need briber moderates her willingness to act against 
corruption in a significant way. To the extent that reactive emotions intensify with the 
amount of personal losses as Bergstrand (2014) has argued, it is possible that poor people 
who pay bribes on regular basis are more willing to challenge corruption than their well-
to-do compatriots who also pay bribes regularly.  
 
Indeed, the analysis by Gingerich (2009) suggests that the accumulated burden of bribe 
payments intensifies citizens’ propensity to undertake aggressive anti-government 
protests in Bolivia. In this regard, he finds a non-linear relationship between the 
experience of bribery and propensity to participate in these activities. As he notes, the 
initial experiences of bribery do not produce noticeable changes in likelihood to engage 
in anti-government protests “until the exposure level crosses some threshold point, after 
which further increases in exposure produce very large increases in the propensity to 
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engage in anti-government protest” (Gingerich 2009:27). In other words, the positive 
impact of the experience of bribery has a tipping point. There is a threshold beyond which 
further extortions lead to a significant impetus to challenge the state through aggressive 
collective action.  It is important to note that the survey items Gingerich (2009) used did 
not ask how much respondents paid in bribes, instead they provided information on the 
number of public institutions where bribe was demanded and paid. This justifies his 
argument that it is not just the paying of bribes that pushes people to challenge the state; 
it is the accumulated burden of corruption.  
 
3.4.2. Perceptions of corruption, economic development and economic grievances   
 
The relationship between subjective perceptions of corruption and willingness to 
challenge corruption is often deemed to be strongly moderated by economic factors (see 
Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga 2013). De Sousa and Moriconi (2013) maintain, for 
instance, that perceptions of corruption may have a mobilising effect when personal 
economic conditions are hard. As they emphasise, citizens do not fight corruption on 
moral grounds but due to “the fact that they cannot find a plausible explanation for their 
sudden loss of wellbeing…” (de Sousa and Moriconi 2013: 478). Results of a field 
experiment in Senegal show that “perceptions of corruption increase the likelihood of 
both voting and protesting, particularly when economic conditions are poor” (Inman and 
Andrews 2009: 24).  
 
The moderating effect of economic conditions also seem to operate at country level. Even 
if they are not poor themselves, individuals living in poor countries seem to be more 
sensitive to information about corruption in the political system (see Manzetti and Blake 
1996). As Medard (2002:394) argued, “with the generalisation of economic crisis, 
corruption becomes literally unbearable for the masses of the population, even if they 
have to practice it in order to survive. Its fundamentally inegalitarian effects become 
visible and are resented as intolerable”. Analysis by Manzetti and Blake (1996) suggests 
that residents of poor countries (or those going through an economic crisis) tend to blame 
corrupt political leadership for the country’s poor economic conditions, and as a result, 
express strong willingness to get involved in efforts to hold public officials accountable. 
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Manzetti and Blake (1996) show that while ordinary Venezuelans thought corruption was 
widespread, most were not aggrieved by it until austerity measures took a toll on overall 
standards of living. Importantly, as the authors show, individuals held corrupt leadership 
(and not fiscal austerity policies) responsible for the plummeting living standards, even 
though it would have been easier to blame these on budget cuts. It was the first time in 
modern Venezuela that a majority of citizens told pollsters that corruption was the most 
important problem in the country. Qualitative evidence corroborated these public opinion 
data. As one prominent Venezuelan journalist remarked, Venezuelans did not mind 
corruption while the economy was doing well; “nobody minded what [leaders] did as long 
as we all benefited. When the oil market collapsed, and we in the middle class started 
seeing the results of corruption in our public services, then we started getting mad” 
(Manzetti and Blake 1996:684). The increasing public discontent with corruption led to 
a serious legitimacy crisis that culminated into weeks of mass demonstrations and the 
eventual demise of the president.  
 
Manzetti and Blake (1996) contrast these findings with the case of Argentina, which had 
similar levels of corruption prior to the economic crisis and experimented with similar 
austerity policies as Venezuela. One of the reasons why the president of Argentina 
enjoyed high public approval ratings despite austerity and frequent corruption scandals in 
his administration is that people perceived his economic policies to be ‘working’. Over a 
six-year period, the inflation rate was reduced by approximately 800 per cent, resulting 
in noticeable improvement in standards of living. Indeed, people felt that the economic 
sacrifices they made were paying off and that the administration was decisively dealing 
with allegations of corruption. Ultimately, Argentinian president did not face demands to 
step down and went on to complete his term of office. 
 
An alternative view of the relationship between corruption and economic factors is 
premised on modernisation theory and sees anti-corruption collective action as likely to 
emerge in economically powerful nations. Indeed, according to de Mesquita and Downs 
(2005:79), economic development creates a large “number of individuals with sufficient 
time, education, and money to get involved in politics”. Research by Charron and 
Lapuente demonstrates that citizens of high income countries are more willing to put 
pressure on “leaders to undertake mid- to long-term investments for improving” 
institutions of accountability and rule of law (Charron and Lapuente 2010: 463). On the 
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other hand, citizens of low income countries are unlikely to demand the state to invest in 
its capacity to combat corruption. Although Charron and Lapuente do not account for the 
role of individual’s perceptions of corruption, it is possible that citizens of high income 
countries are also more likely to challenge the government when they perceive high levels 
of corruption. 
 
3.4.3. Public goods dissatisfaction and the mobilising effect of clientelism  
 
According to Finkel and Muller (1998), an individual’s dissatisfaction with the provision 
of public goods can act as a powerful incentive for joining anti-government protests. 
Naturally, those who are more strongly affected by poor provision of a specific public 
good will be more inclined to participate than those who are less affected. Olken’s (2007) 
findings provide an important nuance to this thinking; as he argues, citizens are more 
interested in demanding accountability where they have “a personal stake in ensuring that 
the goods are delivered, and that theft is minimised” (Olken 2007:244). In particular, he 
maintains that people are more likely to get involved in collectively monitoring the public 
provision of “more private goods, such as subsidised food, education, or medical care” 
(Olken 2007:244). In essence, citizens have greater willingness to challenge corruption if 
it leads to poor provision of the public goods they deeply care about.  
 
One of the things that usually provoke public goods’ dissatisfaction and therefore 
willingness to participate in extra-institutional tactics is blatant state-level clientelism. 
The positive effect of clientelism is likely to be higher among those who perceive high 
levels of corruption or those who have fallen victim to bureaucratic extortions. In this 
regard, research by Gingerich (2009) demonstrates that “when victimisers are 
institutionally linked to the President and his coalition via patronage networks, the 
inclination of corruption victims to rebel against the government is much greater than 
when no such linkage exist” (Gingerich 2009:34).  
 
The positive effect of clientelism among those who perceive high levels of corruption 
makes more sense if we consider the nature of patron-clientelism in many parts of the 
African continent. Africa’s clientelistic governments are unresponsive to the basic needs 
of the majority of citizens due to the poor performance of the economy (see Medard 2002, 
van de Walle 2009). When the number of recipients of favours is small or declining, state-
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level clientelism becomes a source of intense grievances and willingness to challenge 
corruption (Medard 2002). Beeskers and van Gool (2012) and Smith (2009) have pointed 
out that clientelism as currently practised in Africa suffers from weak legitimacy due to 
its increasingly predatory nature at community level. These characteristics provide a basis 
for those who perceive high levels of corruption to support anti-corruption collective civic 
engagement as clientelism increases. 
 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, clientelistic allocation of resources makes it easy 
for political entrepreneurs to politicise perceptions of corruption by ascribing to the state 
or individual politicians the responsibility for poor provision of public goods (Beeskers 
and van Gool 2012). Reno (2002) demonstrates how Nigeria’s highly clientelistic 
political system is directly responsible for the high propensity to use collective (at times 
violent) action to challenge the corrupt machinery of the state. 
 
 
3.4.4. Identity-based grievances and popular perceptions of corruption 
 
The discussion in chapter two explained how ethnic diversity and strength of ethnic 
identification can hinder ordinary Africans from rallying behind an anti-corruption drive. 
In focusing on this, the analysis de-emphasised the fact that social identity can act as a 
mobilising force against perceived political disadvantages (Opp 2012). Opp (2012:77) 
summarises the causal link between social identity and collective civic action as follows; 
 A strong identification with a group is related to a strong interest in the well-
being of the group. If there is such an interest, then action on behalf of the group 
(i.e. ‘voice’) is rewarding as well. Thus, if individuals strongly identify with a 
group they get high (internal) benefits if they act in order to improve the situation 
of the group, and they incur costs if they are inactive. 
 
As alluded in the previous chapter, in the African context, the most politicising group 
identity is ethnicity. In Africa, ethnic identities tend to override other social identities, 
shaping how individuals think and act politically and how they construct the notion of 
self-interest. Mazrui demonstrates this primacy of ethnic identification when he asserts 
that “when the chips are down, Igbo peasants are most likely to side with the Igbo 
bourgeoisie than they are with fellow peasants in Yorubaland” (Mazrui 2014:43). In 
settings where ethnicity plays such a critical role, perceptions of corruption can often be 
entwined with a sense of ethnic marginalisation (Orjuela 2013). That is, individuals who 
perceive high levels of corruption may feel that corruption is specifically targeted at or 
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has more harmful effects on members of their ethnic groups. This combination of non-
group based grievances (e.g. corruption perceptions) with those associated with a 
politicising group identity (i.e. perceptions of ethnic marginalisation) can be a basis for 
high levels of regime disapproval, low institutional trust and willingness to take part in 
contentious politics (Klandermans 2013). As Githongo (2006:21) observes with respect 
to Kenya: 
Ironically, it’s not the corruption in itself that people object to but the fact that it 
is perpetrated predominantly by an elite from one ethnic group to the exclusion 
of others, especially theirs. …The resentments and sense of exclusion created by 
these circumstances often have a more destructive impact than the actual graft 
itself – a point that is often missed by those who fail to view the issue 
holistically… So, it is not the absolute levels of corruption that complicate 
matters politically but the extent to which they exacerbate perceptions of 
economic inequality among different ethnic groups. 
 
To complicate matters, in places where corruption is endemic, and some citizens feel that 
their groups are marginalised, it is possible that the propensity to engage in corruption 
proceeds in tandem with the willingness to engage in collective civic action. From the 
perspective of an individual who feels that corruption is more harmful to his identity 
group, abusing public office on behalf of the in-group and joining different forms of 
civilian resistance against corruption serve the same purpose of defending the interests of 
the ethnic group (see Orjuela 2013).  
 
 3.5. Civil Society, media and ‘framing’  
 
According to Snow and Bendford (1992:137), a frame is “an interpretive schema that 
simplifies and condenses ‘the world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding 
objects, situations, events, experiences and sequences of actions within one’s present or 
past environment”. The main objective of ‘frames’ is to shape grievances and provide a 
target against which reactive emotions can be vented (Benford and Snow 2000). The need 
for framing arises from the possibility that strong perceptions of corruption or the 
experience of paying bribes may not in themselves inspire willingness to participate in 
anti-corruption efforts. Someone else, usually Civil Society Organisations, must help 
individuals to interpret their experiences from a political vantage point, by ascribing the 
blame to some political authority. Social movement research suggests that when blame 
can be ascribed to a structural group “such as political leadership, law enforcement, or 
other institutional organization, protest behaviour becomes increasingly attractive, as 
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more normative modes of engagement are perceived as lacking efficacy” (LeFebvre and 
Armstrong 2016:3). 
 
Successful framing can transform perceptions of grand corruption into more personalised 
grievances, increasing people’s willingness to participate in collective dissent to protect 
or advance what they have been made to understand as their ‘personal interests’. It can 
change a personal experience with bribery into a salient political issue against which 
collective action is required. It can also inflate a sense of financial loss and dignity among 
the victims of extortions, increasing their support for social movements attempting to 
address corruption. Frames that project all bribers as victims of dysfunctional institutions 
can be used to reach out to those individuals who pay bribes to gain illicit access to public 
goods and services. This makes more sense if one considers with Seligson (2006) that 
bureaucratic corruption erodes political legitimacy even for those who are most tolerant 
of it. 
 
Beyerle (2013) illustrates how the civil society organisations working in highly corrupt 
societies ‘frame’ major corruption scandals in ways that rouse the spirit of resistance and 
build a critical mass against further abuses. In Indonesia for instance, civil society 
organisations took advantage of the government’s attempts to undermine the anti-
corruption agency, to mount a powerful anti-corruption civic action. As the state-
sponsored victimisation of the leaders of the Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK) 
increased, civic leaders responded by framing this as an attack on Indonesians, which 
necessitated collective resistance. They subsequently launched the ‘Love Indonesia, Love 
Anti-Corruption Commission (CICAK) campaign.’ 
  
Part of the framing process involved using the popular gecko lizard as the symbol of the 
defiance campaign. This was after the chief of police, who was being investigated by the 
anti-corruption commission, poked fun at the mass mobilisation effort by suggesting that 
it was akin to “a gecko challenging a crocodile” (Beyerle 2017:93). Popular musicians 
composed songs and slogans extolling the power of ordinary Indonesians to fight abuses 
of power. One of the popular songs was based on the sarcastic remarks of the police chief 
and implied that the gecko was in fact going to swallow the crocodile. The song could be 
downloaded free of charge either as a song or ringtone. Pictures of a gecko were 
emblazoned on t-shirts that thousands of protesters wore during protest events. Coupled 
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with supportive private media, these efforts provoked a strong patriotic sentiment, a sense 
of injustice among ordinary people and a belief that change through collective action was 
possible. 
 
All in all, the ability to frame corruption as a moral evil that citizens should oppose and 
as both a ‘personal’ and ‘political’ issue makes individuals appreciate the imperatives of 
being personally involved. Additionally, the framing efforts tend to be more successful 
in places where media and civil society are relatively free to operate such as in Ghana, 
Senegal, Namibia and South Africa25.  In this regard, two individuals with the same 
perception or experience of corruption, but who live in societies that differ in levels of 
political openness and strength of civil society may have vastly different attitudes towards 
the effectiveness of citizens’ involvement in anti-corruption efforts. One would expect a 
Ghanaian with high perceptions of corruption to have a higher propensity to support anti-
corruption collective action than a Burundian with similar attributes. 
 
3.6. Democratic and collective action norms: a critique of the dominant 
literature on African politics  
 
Much of what we know about politics and corruption in Africa can be organised under 
the rubric of ‘African studies’ — a field of study rooted in history, anthropology and 
development studies (see Mattes and Bratton 2008). In this regard, the dominant 
perspective regarding both elites and mass political behaviour has often emphasised the 
strong effect of cultural factors (see for instance Smith 2008, de Sardan 1999, Blundo and 
de Sardan 2006). Partly as a result of this strong emphasis on structural factors, much of 
the more influential Africanist literature reduces “African politics to personal 
accumulation and patronage, devoid of ideals, struggles for justice, notions of equality, 
and so on” (Szeftel 1998:223). Most of the main ideas in this literature as they relate to 
demand for accountability were extensively covered in chapter two, and there is no need 
to rehash them here. However, there is a need to discuss some of this literature’s main 
theoretical and methodological weaknesses, and state why in light of the emerging 
                                                 
 
25 These are some of the African countries that have high scores on the Freedom House and Polity measures of 
democracy. According to Grasso and Giugni (2016:676) “individuals in more social democratic arrangements appear 
to be more likely to react politically when they feel that the crisis has impacted them negatively”. 
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scholarly evidence, its pessimism regarding a genuine citizen-driven anti-corruption drive 
could be misplaced.   
 
The view that problems regarding political accountability have their roots in a similar 
‘African culture’ — or to be politically correct— ‘similar structural conditions’ was 
reiterated by Crawford Young (2012) in his attempt to justify broad generalisations about 
politics in this continent. He noted:  
There are large similarities in cultural patterns, similarities that underpin the 
regular invocation of an “African society” as a generic entity by leaders and 
analysts. Historians find an elaborated tradition constructed over broad areas. 
African philosophers postulate a distinctively African view of the world and its 
causative mainsprings. The premise of a common African culture was a staple of 
nationalist discourse, from Julius Nyerere to Léopold Senghor (Young 2012:6). 
 
It is worth pointing out that Young is merely repeating the mantra that many adherents of 
neo-patrimonialism offered to justify its use as a general framework for understanding 
politics in ‘Africa’. His argument bears striking resemblance with Christopher Clapham’s 
conjecture that it is “plausible to suggest that there is some continent-wide African 
‘political culture’, presumably deriving from the interaction between colonial statehood 
on the one hand and embedded social structures and values” (Clapham 1996:819). Taking 
cue from these and similar remarks, international media, the donor community and policy 
advocates often generalise to the whole African continent, the political processes 
observed in individual countries, as though “to know one [African country] is to know 
them all” (Allen 1995:302).26  
 
What explains, further, the predominance of narratives inspired in neo-patrimonialism 
school is its “influence on key donors, its privileged access to leading journals, and the 
constitution of tight self-referential networks of Africanist scholarship” (Mkandawire 
2015:563). As Mkandawire points out, over the years, Africa-based scholars who 
subscribed to neo-patrimonialism and promoted among others the idea that ordinary 
citizens are complicit in corruption were eulogised and extensively cited, partly due to 
the perception that “self-criticism is more objective than self-adulation or self-
exculpation” (Mkandawire 2015:570).  
 
                                                 
 
26 My emphasis. 
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Mustapha (2002) is among the first African scholars to challenge the validity of the data27 
that neo-patrimonialist scholars use to support the portrayal of ordinary Africans as 
passive victims of structural factors. More recently, Mkandawire has criticised the 
neopatrimonialism scholars’ excessive reliance on highly subjective information from the 
locals who “tell delectable tales of mischief in the tropics…” (Mkandawire 2015: 570). 
As he observes, the copious cross-citations of these personal anecdotes in leading 
academic publications has had an effect of concealing the reality that much of the 
evidence in the mainstream African politics literature “comes from sporadic empiricism 
that is largely anecdotal in nature” (Mkandawire 2015:570). 
 
Apart from drawing upon largely questionable data, much of the commentary on the 
political economy of Africa ignores the drive and the capacity of ordinary Africans to 
challenge political misconduct (Allen 1995, Mkandawire 2015). The neo-patrimonialism 
school glosses over the many examples of collective anti-elite resistance during the pre-
colonial period in which political acquiescence and deference to authority— which 
supposedly underpin the logic of neo-patrimonialism— are supposedly rooted. One 
example of such collective resistance is found in the work of the Senegalese historian and 
anthropologist, Cheick anta-Diop (1987), who discusses a particularly violent revolt 
against a corrupt dynasty in pre-colonial Ghana. In light of such largely ignored evidence 
of collective resistance against political misconduct in Africa’s patrimonial (and neo-
patrimonial) states, Mkhandawire (2015:572) observes that “the prevalence of coercion 
on the one hand, and resistance, defiance, and injustice on the other, clearly suggests that 
neo-patrimonial relations are not as self-stabilising as often presumed”. 
 
Further to that, contemporary African studies do not interrogate, systematically, cross-
regional differences in corruption permissiveness, and citizens’ complicity and 
acquiescence. This is largely due to the predominance of single case analysis that until 
very recently dominated the study of politics in Africa. Notwithstanding this limitation, 
many Africanists have never shied away from making broad generalisations about 
African politics based on their observations of one or very few countries (see Briggs 
2017). According to Briggs, the “problem of generalising from specific, and often 
                                                 
 
27 Jean-Franqois Bayart’s published his seminal “The State in Africa: The politics of the belly” in 1993. 
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atypical, countries to the continent as a whole” continues to perpetuate the stereotype, 
especially “among researchers based at institutions outside of Africa”, that political 
institutions and processes in Africa are homogenous (Briggs 2017:6). It also perpetuates 
the view that similar attributes such as similarly high levels of corruption in Kenya and 
Uganda have the same foundations, and that they yield similar outcomes at individual 
level (see for example, Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013). 
 
An explanation based solely on “neo-patrimonialism does not do justice to the processes 
of social change actually taking place in Africa today” (Chabal 2009:11). 28  It 
underestimates the changes in democratic norms and values that partly emanate from 
democratic socialisation process underway in many parts of the continent (Williams and 
Obadare 2014, Mattes and Bratton 2007). Some of these changes in values and norms are 
exemplified by the increasing reliance on democratic institutions such as elections (rather 
than violence) to settle political conflict (Posner and Young 2007). An increasing number 
of the democratically elected African leaders now leave at the end of their maximum 
terms in office or through electoral defeat. According to Posner and Young (2007), the 
large increase in both the regularity and competitiveness of elections attest to the fact that 
Africans see voting as an important leadership selection mechanism. 
 
Importantly, as the work of Barkan (2008) has shown, legislatures are gaining 
considerable influence in Africa, although there are instances in which they still pander 
to the whims of the executive. Legislatures have blocked attempts by presidents in 
Nigeria, Zambia and Malawi to change the constitution in order to prolong their hold on 
power (Posner and Young 2007). The presidents of Mozambique and Tanzania only 
withdrew their intentions to seek the third term when it became clear that both the public 
opinion and the majority of MPs were strongly opposed to constitutional changes. Indeed, 
as Posner and Young (2007) have noted, these examples strongly indicate an increasing 
institutionalisation of democracy, challenging the “caricature of Africa as a place where 
‘abstract constitutions and formal institutions exist on paper, but …do not shape the 
conduct of individual actors, especially those in power’”. This is the depiction that has 
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informed some of the influential accounts on the failures of democratic accountability in 
Africa. 
  
Focusing on citizens, Mattes and Bratton (2007) explain in sharp contrast to the way 
Africa has been portrayed that individual and collective (i.e. generational) experience 
with multiparty democracy account for the differences in democratic norms and values 
expressed by ordinary citizens. Moreover, their analysis illuminates the differential 
effects of the nature of the pre-democratic regime on citizens’ commitment to democracy 
as an ideal — something that the neo-patrimonialism school overlooks. Additionally, part 
of their analysis challenges the view that Africans care more about economic goods than 
the provision of more political goods such as accountability, transparency and the rule of 
law. 
 
Lindberg (2006), analysing more than 200 African elections, finds a strong positive effect 
of elections on the development of democratic attitudes and values. Oddly, this finding is 
robust to the quality of such elections. Lindberg attributes these changes in values and 
norms to the lasting effect of civil and democratic education campaigns that usually occur 
during election periods. Once the election is over, many citizens retain the political 
awareness and a sense of empowerment they received during the electioneering period. 
The after-effect is so strong that some people “may even become ‘norm entrepreneurs,’ 
transferring their awareness to others in the social sphere” (Lindberg 2006:146).  
 
In a study that focuses on the role of the emerging black middle class in South Africa, 
Mattes (2015) finds that “middle-class Blacks are more likely to prioritize issues of 
corruption, governance and democracy as priorities for government action and less likely 
to want government to focus on securing basic needs” (Mattes 2015:685). The group is 
also less likely to support the ruling African National Congress, which has been in power 
since the fall of apartheid in 1994, and which has increasingly been accused of corruption 
in recent years. Nevertheless, compared to the lower class, South Africa’s middle class is 
less likely to support various forms of collective civic engagement, including taking part 
in protests and demonstrations. This means that even though members of the middle class 
are not as actively involved in civic action as their lower-class compatriots, their 
supportive attitudes towards accountability and the rule of law make them a potentially 
strong constituency for anti-corruption mobilisation.  
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The emphasis on the role of ethnicity, religion and other social identifiers in African 
electoral politics has been strongly contested. Bratton and Kimenyi (2008) and Ichino and 
Nathan (2013) provide evidence suggesting that when political information is limited, 
Africans use heuristics other than identity to inform voting decisions. Additionally, 
according to Elischer (2013) and Cheeseman and Larmer (2013), the low number of 
political parties that contest on the basis of ethnic identity, and the rise in the number of 
multi-ethnic political parties provide evidence that ethnic clientelism is becoming a less 
important element in African electoral politics. Lastly, the fact that more than 40 per cent 
of African countries, including ethno-linguistically diverse societies have witnessed a 
change of government through highly competitive elections calls “into question views of 
the African voter as unidimensionally clientelistic and devoid of interest in policies and 
performance” (Weghorst and Lindberg 2013:718). They conclude that “empirical 
accounts of African elections as a ‘clientelistic harvesting season’ overlook the increasing 
sophistication of voters” (Weghorst and Lindberg 2013:718). 
 
In general, what this emerging Africanist literature illustrates is that ordinary Africans 
may be more willing to support accountability and rule of law than much of the African 
studies’ literature suggests (also see Williams and Obadare 2014). Nevertheless, the 
contradictions in African politics literature may also suggest that popular demand for 
political accountability is a much more complex subject; the individual-level propensity 
to demand accountability could be shaped by variations in country-specific factors often 
omitted in much of the emerging large N studies on Africa. It is with these in mind, that 
Lynch and Crawford caution scholars to take into account “differences between and 
within countries” when analysing political relations in contemporary Africa (Lynch and 
Crawford 2011:276). 
 
There are at least two ways in which democratic norms and values could increase the 
propensity to engage in citizen-centred and collective action methods of tackling 
corruption. First, to the extent that political participation is an important part of 
democratic citizenship, individuals who embrace democratic ideals, that is, those who 
identify as ‘democrats’ are likely to support citizens’ involvement in efforts to demand 
accountability (Dalton 2008, Norris 2011). Second, corruption is likely to clash with the 
core values of democratic citizenship including equality, inclusive political process, 
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fairness and the “ethical and moral responsibility to others in the polity and beyond” 
(Dalton 2008:79). In their analysis of (the 19th century) Sweden’s transition from a 
systematically corrupt society, Rothstein and Teorell (2015b) and Rothstein (2011) 
identify the emergence of civic norms and values as an important factor.  
 
Once individuals internalise democracy as part of their personal identity, it shapes their 
interests and goals (Welzel 2006). As Lindberg (2006:146) argues, once individuals 
identify themselves as democrats, “and are recognized as such among friends, family, and 
perhaps even enemies, they have a vested interest in voicing their concerns in the social 
sphere”. They are likely to support courses and ideas that align with and promote their 
democratic ethos (Lindberg 2006). When coupled with an existing preference for 
collective civic action as a feature of a democratic citizenship, a perception that corruption 
is widespread is likely to increase the propensity to support citizen-centred approaches to 
anti-corruption. 
 
Paying attention to individual norms and values as motivation for anti-corruption 
collective action strongly challenges the literature on collective action against corruption 
anchored in rational choice institutionalism. Apart from that, a focus on values justifies 
the expectation that individuals who think that corruption is widespread will support 
efforts to oppose it, even when they do not have personalised economic grievances related 
to corruption. When informed by personal values, resisting corruption while working 
hard to motivate others to do the same has significant internal benefits (see Opp 1997). 
Indeed, according to Mishra (2006:355), personal norms and values — the individual 
phenomena about which people usually feel strongly— make it easy to resist corruption 
and carry on with “honest behaviour despite the corrupt strategy yielding higher economic 
pay-offs”.  
  
3.7. Summary and conclusions 
 
One of the aims of this chapter was to present an alternative to the pessimistic account of 
anti-corruption resistance that formed a large part of chapter two. In particular, I 
questioned the view that endemic corruption automatically makes individuals less willing 
to resist various forms of corruption. The bulk of this chapter demonstrated how 
corruption can create an incentive for individuals to be involved in efforts to bring it under 
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control — something that explanations anchored in rational choice institutionalism 
overlook. Rooted in rational choice institutionalism, collective action analysis of 
corruption control cannot accommodate the role of reactive emotions in generating ideas 
and incentives for endogenous institutional change. Additionally, it is unable to anticipate 
that democratic values can motivate individuals to challenge corruption as a matter of 
principle. 
 
The analysis has shown how perceptions of corruption can generate a sense of collective 
injustice, and subsequent willingness to punish corruption. I have demonstrated why 
individuals with high perceptions of corruption are likely to be willing to participate in 
especially anti-state protests when they think grand corruption is harmful to the interests 
of their reference group — particularly ethnic groups. In this regard, we can expect an 
increase in perceptions of corruption to have a stronger mobilising impact in highly 
corrupt and fractionalised countries (e.g. Nigeria, Kenya) than in highly corrupt but less 
fractionalised societies (e.g. Burundi and Zimbabwe).  
 
The chapter has also shown that the corrosive effect of corruption on political legitimacy 
is likely to lead to an increase in support for various forms of civic engagement, including 
protests and demonstrations. Moving on, I presented literature suggesting that perceptions 
of corruption and experiences of bribery can inspire willingness to challenge corruption 
when they coincide with intense dissatisfaction with the way public goods are provided. 
Differently put, support for anti-corruption collective action is likely to arise from the 
discontent with poor public goods provision combined with a strong perception of 
corruption or frequent personal experience with bribery. In this regard, we can expect 
people who perceive high levels of corruption to support anti-corruption civic 
engagement when they live in countries where clientelism dominates much of the 
provision of public goods.   
 
I demonstrated how the preferential treatment of certain groups can make it easy for rival 
politicians and interest groups to politicise perceptions of corruption and use them to 
inspire anti-government action. The important caveat to this point is that this elite-
manipulated contentious action under the guise of anti-corruption may not represent a 
genuine demand for impartial governance processes. Branch and Mampilly have this in 
mind when they argue that in Africa, “anti-corruption can be a guise for very different 
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political programmes, many of which may not be democratic, or even liberal” (Branch 
and Mampilly 2015:213). This indicates that clientelism has the potential to produce what 
one might call a ‘corrupted’ collective civic action — the type that is not intended for 
promoting impartiality as a guiding principle of good governance. This takes us back to 
the pessimistic view towards anti-corruption collective action discussed in chapter two, 
especially the fact that where corruption is systemic, citizens (i.e. principals) are unlikely 
to act in ways that promote the interests of the broad sections of the society (Persson, 
Rothstein and Teorell 2013). In terms of that view, collective civic action can occur in 
highly corrupt societies, but it will not be representative of a demand for impartiality as a 
governance norm — the ultimate aim of the fight against corruption. 
 
Nevertheless, and in defence of the optimistic perspective, the foregoing point should not 
be interpreted as disavowing the role of grievances in influencing a genuine demand for 
accountability. Indeed, as the work of Gingerich (2009) demonstrates, the mobilising 
effect of the accumulated experience of paying bribes remains even when the model is 
adjusted for the impact of clientelism. Apart from that, the literature review has shown 
that other individual-level characteristics such as negative assessment of personal living 
conditions is likely to intensify the positive impact of the accumulated experience of 
bribery. This all means that independent of the individual experience of clientelism, an 
increasing experience of bribery (or high perceptions of corruption) is more likely to 
trigger the willingness to challenge corruption.  
 
In keeping with the optimistic perspective, this chapter provided a strong critique of the 
mainstream literature on African politics. It presented literature showing that much of the 
influential Africanist literature overlooks the positive changes in democratic norms and 
values taking place in various parts of the continent. Based on these changes in value 
orientations, one expects strong propensity to challenge corruption among those who 
think it is widespread.  Specifically, respondents that display the characteristics of 
democratic citizenship (i.e. those who unconditionally support democracy and citizens’ 
involvement in governance processes) are likely to support citizen-centred anti-
corruption efforts, when they harbour high levels of corruption.  
 
Throughout this chapter, I have emphasised the role of national context in shaping the 
impact of corruption perceptions and bribery experiences. In this regard, I proposed that 
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one would expect the effect of the perceptions of corruption to depend on, among others, 
strength of civil society, media openness and economic development. Chapter four 
discusses how several country-level variables are measured and summarise how I expect 
them to moderate the nexus between corruption and the propensity to engage in collective 
action against it.  
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Chapter four 
 Data and measurements 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
This dissertation draws upon public opinion survey data spanning 35 African countries 
and more than 50,000 individuals to investigate the role of corruption in support for 
collective action against it. The choice of public opinion surveys as the main source of 
data is both practical and research- problem driven. To the extent that “any acting that is 
done in the pursuit of collective goods is done by individuals” (Hechter, Friedman and 
Appelbaum 1982:415), a study that seeks to explain the impact of corruption on citizens’ 
reaction to it must draw upon individual-level data as the starting point. From the 
perspective of available resources, publicly available surveys are most accessible and 
high-quality sources of data for cross-national research that is conducted under time 
constraints (i.e. within a period of 36 months).  
 
Although availability of public opinion data on Africa is a recent phenomenon, surveys 
have been a mainstay of the studies on the impact of various individual-level variables on 
propensity to get involved in collective action. Surveys enable researchers to focus on 
material incentives, beliefs, fears and unique experiences of a large number of potential 
actors, across time and space. Drawing upon the rational choice framework, a German 
political sociologist, Karl-Dieter Opp has for the past three decades relied on survey data 
to examine the mobilising potential of a host of individual-level variables. He argues that 
surveys can be leveraged to provide reliable information about the motivational structure 
of actors— an important goal of studies on collective action. Furthermore, survey data 
are useful for doing what he calls “impact analysis, which is based on the idea that the 
researcher measures certain incentives and then tests whether these incentives have an 
impact on the action to be explained” (Opp 2001:7). 29 
 
My choice of the Afrobarometer data set is rooted in the fact that it covers the highest 
number of African countries and has the variables that are relevant for this analysis. The 
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Afrobarometer data set covers among other things, self-reported rates of participation in 
protests and demonstrations, views about the most effective way to tackle corruption, 
attitudes towards the role of citizens in political accountability, subjective perceptions of 
corruption and personal experiences of bribery. It also provides measures of the variables 
that potentially confound the association between corruption and citizens’ reactions to 
corruption. In other words, Afrobarometer data offer a rare opportunity to examine 
corruption-related individual-level incentives or disincentives for taking part in anti-
corruption collective action. 
 
Having laid out the foregoing preliminaries, this chapter proceeds as follows. The next 
section provides an overview of the concept and measures of corruption, conscious of the 
fact that definitions of corruption “are controversial, and solid evidence is often 
elusive…” (Johnston 1991:48). From there, the chapter zeroes in on strengths and 
weaknesses of this study’s main predictor variables, personal experiences of bribery and 
subjective perceptions of corruption. Section 4.2 introduces Afrobarometer data and 
describes how the survey items from Afrobarometer will be used to construct the key 
variables used throughout this analysis. The section after that briefly describes the reasons 
behind the statistical techniques being employed in especially chapter six of this 
dissertation.   
 
As intimated in the previous chapter, observable and unobservable country-level factors 
are likely to shape citizens’ willingness to support efforts to put corruption under control. 
More importantly, they can also moderate the impact of the key predictor variables of 
corruption perceptions and bribery experiences. As I explain towards the end of this 
chapter, multilevel modelling technique provides the best method of investigating 
whether the impact of individual-level variables changes as a function of country-level 
factors (Snijders and Bosker 2012). This method also enables researchers to account for 
the nested structure of cross-national public opinion data such as those that the 
Afrobarometer provides. Having made a case for the use of multilevel regression 
techniques, this chapter briefly discusses the measures of the country-level variables that 
I believe, based on the discussion in the previous chapter, shape the relationship between 
individual-level corruption variables and support for citizen-centred anti-corruption 
tactics. The chapter concludes with a few weaknesses of the Afrobarometer data and the 
extent to which these might affect the reliability of the findings.  
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4.2. A brief review of the concept and measurement of corruption 
 
Besides the fact that several languages lack local equivalents of the key concepts in 
corruption research, such as ‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’ (see Hough 2017), the 
illegal and clandestine nature of ‘corruption’, its varied manifestations in the real world 
(Sequeira 2012, Heywood 2015) and its moralistic overtones (see Génaux 2004), make it 
extremely difficult for scholars to accurately estimate its prevalence within and across 
nations and institutions 30  (Hellman 2013). Making matters worse, as Hough (2017) 
reminds us, the term ‘corruption’ is often used indiscriminately to vilify political 
opponents or describe what and who the speaker does not like. Corruption is “now often 
utilised as a stick with which to beat political opponents, and it frequently appears to be 
more of a term of abuse than a statement with any basis in reality” (Hough 2017:33).  
 
These challenges notwithstanding, according to Deborah Hellman, “most theories agree 
that corruption requires the violation of a normative standard, some benefit (personal or 
political), and some connection between the two” (Hellman 2013:1393). Joseph Nye 
provides a more precise definition. For him, corruption entails a “behaviour which 
deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, 
close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the 
exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence” (Nye 1967:419). Drawing largely 
from Nye’s definition, many in the academia and policy-making quarters view corruption 
as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, recognising with Johnston “that terms 
such as ‘abuse’, ‘public’, ‘private’, and even ‘benefit’ can be matters of considerable 
dispute” (Johnston 1999:6). Indeed, as Heywood (2017:23) points out, while this 
definition is less than ideal, it “nonetheless serves to capture the essence of what we 
instinctively understand by the term [corruption]...” 
 
Most attempts to measure corruption begin with a distinction between petty (or lower 
level/ bureaucratic) and grand (higher level/ political) forms of corruption. The former 
usually takes the form of illegal rewards that low ranking public officials demand from 
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citizens in exchange for doing their jobs, or which citizens offer voluntarily31 in order to 
influence decisions of such officials (Rose-Ackerman 2002). Grand corruption occurs at 
higher levels of the state and may involve, among other things, illicit payments of huge 
sums of money by corporations to exert undue influence on the entire political process. 
Whilst petty corruption is illegal in many parts of the world, grand/political corruption 
may not necessarily violate official regulations. Daniel Kaufmann has this in mind when 
he asserts: 
Corruption ought to also encompass some acts that may be legal in a strict narrow 
sense, but where the rules of the game and the state laws, policies, regulations 
and institutions may have been shaped in part by undue influence of certain 
vested interests for their own private benefit (and not for the benefit of the public 
at large). It may not be strictly illegal, but unethical and extra-legal (cited in 
Bauhr 2012:73). 
 
Studies on corruption have used a variety of data-generation techniques to estimate the 
nature, causes, outcomes and scale of corruption. Hough (2017), Johnston (2014) and 
Lambsdorff and Schulze (2015) expertly summarise many of these methods, including 
public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS), corruption convictions, laboratory and field 
experiments and more recently, the use of large data sets on public procurement (i.e. big 
data). Useful though these techniques are, they are often unsuitable for cross-national 
studies seeking to evaluate the effect of corruption on mass political behaviour in the 
African continent. The publicly-available ‘big data’ and PETS are often too domain-
specific, focusing on for example public tendering and risks of corruption in education 
and healthcare sectors. Moreover, I have not seen a large N study that utilises 
experimental data about corruption and collective action against it. This is partly due to 
the logistical and costs-related challenges of conducting field experiments in many 
different countries, especially those found in the south of the Sahara Desert (see 
Habyriamana, Humphreys, Posner and Weinstein 2009).  
 
Some researchers have resorted to the use of laboratory experiments involving University 
students (or other participants) from different parts of the world (see for example, 
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avoid being arrested for speeding, drug possession etc. 
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Muthukrishna, Francois, Pourahmadi and Henrich 2017). The value of laboratory 
experiments lies in their ability to get “deeper insights into the motivations that underlie 
corrupt transactions and getting clearer guidance for reform” (Lambsdorff and Schulze 
2015:106). However, the extent to which results of lab-experiments and experimental 
designs in general can be generalised to the real world remains a grave concern 
(Muthukrishna, Francois, Pourahmadi and Henrich 2017). These constraints often ‘force’ 
those who seek to assess the effects of corruption to rely more on expert and public 
opinion surveys (Treisman 2000).  
 
As Lee (2011:14) reminds us, “the great allure of polls is their ability—when properly 
sampled to reflect a representative cross section of the population in question—to let the 
few speak efficiently and accurately for the many”.  Rose-Ackerman (2010:6) notes that 
over and above giving a more cross-nationally comparable data on levels of perceived 
corruption, public opinion surveys “help to capture the way corruption affects different 
parts of society, and … highlight the connections between corruption and government 
legitimacy” (Rose-Ackerman 2010:61). It is also important to point out that subjective 
perceptions of corruption — which are captured by public opinion surveys —  might have 
more important consequences than actual levels of corruption. As Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2006) argue, people’s perceptions of corruption tend to influence their 
behaviour more than the objective reality does. Melgar, Rossi and Smith (2010: 121) 
make a point that “even when corruption perception may strongly differ from the current 
level of corruption, the latter influences the former”. That is, a society in which a majority 
of people think corruption is very high might actually end up having many individuals 
taking part in corruption. Lastly, surveys provide the best way to study motivations for 
corruption, evaluations and interpretations of corrupt practices and how citizens are likely 
to react to corruption (Miller, Grodeland and Koshechkina 2001) 
 
The above-mentioned strengths notwithstanding, there are several limitations in the use 
of public opinion surveys to study corruption, including the difficulty in identifying 
causal effects as a result of endogeneity bias among other things (Serra and Watchenkon 
2012). The next section briefly examines some of these concerns. 
 
4.2.1. Citizens’ perceptions of corruption 
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Most opinion surveys ask respondents to assess the level of corruption in several public 
institutions. Following Mauro (1995), the term ‘corruption’ is often left undefined, 
allowing respondents to use a range of heuristics and unique experiences when answering 
the questions. The inferential logic seems to be that an “act is corrupt when the weight of 
public opinion determines it so” (Peters and Welch 1978a: 975). Manzetti and Wilson 
(2006:958) contend that perception-based data about corruption reflect particular acts that 
“the respondent has witnessed or otherwise acquired information about and deems those 
acts corrupt”. 32   While such acts vary widely across contexts, they are everywhere 
regarded as reprehensible. Orjuela (2014:756) proves this point when she argues that, in 
all societies, “corruption has a distinctly moral character – it is ‘evil’, ‘a cancer in 
society’”. Charron and Lapuente (2010:451) concur, adding that “most humans, 
irrespective of their cultural background, tend to perceive corruption as something 
wrong.” It is safe to conclude therefore that when citizens tell pollsters that judges or 
police officers are involved in corruption for instance, they have in mind reprehensible 
actions that these public officers might have committed.   
 
But leaving the term ‘corruption’ indeterminate can limit the comparability of public 
opinion survey data across individuals and societies (Miller 2006, Leon, Arana and Leon 
2013, Heywood 2015). It is possible that the heuristics that individuals use when asked 
to estimate the level of corruption in their countries vary too randomly as to be useful for 
systematic analysis. Most importantly, such heuristics may “not necessarily bear a 
relationship to actual corruption” (Bohn 2012:70). As Hough observes, the fact that 
perception-based data are strongly correlated with things like violence and human rights 
suggest that these questions could be “tapping into a much larger worldview” (Hough 
2017:62). Olken (2009) discovered that at least in Indonesia, citizens’ perceptions of 
corruption contradict the objective reality and tend to vary by both individual level 
characteristics (e.g. gender and education) and the social structure (e.g. ethnic 
heterogeneity of the community). In their research on the comparability of corruption 
perception data, Leon, Arana and Leon (2013) found that the reason why Spain appears 
to be less corrupt than Chile is scale dependent. Chileans tend to adopt a stricter view of 
the concept of corruption while Spaniards use a lower standard for identical practices. In 
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other words, “the threshold levels of corruption perceptions for citizens in Chile are much 
higher than the threshold levels for citizens in Spain…” (Leon, Arana and Leon 
2013:990). 
 
It is also worrisome that widely publicised anti-corruption efforts can increase 
perceptions of corruption to a point where citizens of countries in which aggressive anti-
corruption campaigns occur overestimate levels of corruption in their countries (see 
Bauhr and Grimes 2014; Morris and Klesner 2010; Miller 2006). The danger, as Seligson 
noted, is that increases in the perception of corruption due to these efforts could occur 
“precisely at the time when actual corruption is declining” (Seligson 2006:390). Another 
challenge is that perceptions can be swayed by one big (sometimes isolated) corruption 
scandal. The sharp increase will momentarily make an otherwise clean country appear as 
though it has a bigger corruption problem than countries without a recent scandal, even 
if corruption is more systemic in the latter. Zhang has also argued that corruption scandals 
are likely to aggravate corruption perceptions in western democracies where “reporting 
about politics tend to take on a predominantly negative slant” (Zhang 2015:5). Indeed, 
Faughnan and Seligson (2015: 212) worry “about over-reporting of corruption in a 
country in which the press is free but irresponsible”.   
 
Another weakness is that the simple act of asking questions about corruption can 
significantly influence perceptions of corruption and this effect can vary widely across 
societies and individuals. This bias can also extend to questions regarding what citizens 
think ordinary people should do about corruption. As Miller, Grodeland and Koshechkina 
(2001:22) observe, “If a person hardly thinks about corruption on a daily basis but is 
suddenly presented with dozens of questions on this topic, their answers may overstate 
the importance of corruption in their lives, or even in their dealings with officials”. In a 
nutshell, the main risk of relying on corruption perceptions is that they are influenced by 
too many contextual factors that are likely to be hard to identify and measure (Leon, 
Arana and Leon 2013, Miller 2006). These sources of ‘error’ can make it difficult to 
undertake meaningful cross-national research on the political outcomes of corruption. 
 
The foregoing criticisms notwithstanding, Uslaner (2008:243) argues that “People’s 
perceptions of corruption are rarely so out of sync with ‘reality’”. Similarly, Jonathan 
Rose’s research has led him to “rule out the suggestion that corruption perceptions are 
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solely a function of ostensibly unrelated factors, such as the level of democracy, economic 
development or subjective well-being” (Rose 2015: 416). Rose found that subjective 
perceptions of corruption were consistent with objective data about the corruptibility of 
particular institutions and individuals. For instance, the British MPs who were implicated 
in the parliamentary expenses scandal in 2009 had been perceived by the public as more 
corrupt than the MPs who had not been mentioned (Rose 2015).33  Charron (2015:163) 
also found that at least in Europe, citizens’ perceptions of corruption were “mostly devoid 
of outside noise”. In particular, subjective perceptions of corruption were largely 
consistent with citizens’ experiences of bribery as well as expert assessments of 
corruption levels in particular countries. Charron’s research addresses the long-standing 
concern that citizens of low-corruption countries may inflate their perceptions of 
corruption than people from high-corruption countries where the vice is perceived as 
normal. His findings do not support this speculation.  
 
However, some of his findings suggest that perceived levels of corruption could be shaped 
by geographical, economic and political (institutional) factors (Charron 2015). If 
Charron’s analysis is sound, cross-national studies that draw upon perception-based data 
have to adopt statistical techniques that allow researchers to explicitly model these 
country-level error structures. This would be a prudent approach even for studies whose 
primary interest lies at individual- rather than country-level. As I have intimated in the 
introduction to this chapter and as I shall show in section 4.4, chapter six of this 
dissertation adopts multilevel modelling technique as one of the best ways to handle 
contextual heterogeneity. 
 
4.2.2. Individual experiences of corruption  
 
Due partly to the limitations of perception-based data, cross-national surveys often 
include questions about personal experience with bribery or what Seligson (2006,) terms 
‘corruption victimisation’.34 Usually respondents are asked about the frequency with 
                                                 
 
33 The Parliamentary expenses scandal of 2009 was precipitated by media revelations of the full extent of expenses’ 
claims by Members of the British Parliament. The Daily Telegraph published a detailed breakdown of expenses claimed 
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following criticism with the way the scandal was handled.  
34 I do not necessarily agree with the labelling ‘corruption victimisation’ as it appears to suggest that all bribes involve 
victimisation of briber payers. It excludes instances of collusion between bribe payers and receivers or instances where 
77 
which they or a member of their household has paid a bribe over the past 12 months.  
Although these questions offer potentially more valid measurement of corruption 
compared to their perception-based counterparts, they also face several challenges of their 
own. First, they do not completely solve the issue of non-comparability as the definition 
of ‘bribe’ can vary across countries and individuals. Second, since bribery is illegal and 
sometimes regarded as immoral, survey questions about personal involvement in bribery 
can suffer from under-reporting due to the need to present oneself in a favourable light 
(i.e. social desirability bias).  
 
Third, citizens from societies where gift-giving is acceptable — usually highly corrupt 
societies— may under-report their involvement in corruption as they would not consider 
the ‘gifts’ they offered voluntarily to government officials as constituting a ‘bribe’ per se 
(see Blundo and de Sardan 2006). If this is the case, bribery questions are likely to under-
estimate levels of corruption in highly corrupt societies.  
 
However, studies conducted in highly corrupt societies find that bribery items provoke 
very minimal, if any, social desirability biases. For instance, Miller, Grodeland and 
Koshechkina (2001) found that citizens of the highly corrupt post-communist societies 
freely share their experiences of bribery in focus group discussions. Analysing 
Afrobarometer survey data from more than 30 African countries, Peiffer and Rose (2015) 
found no evidence suggesting the risk of social desirability bias. Four out of five of the 
respondents who reported paying a bribe thought that bribery was wrong and punishable, 
contrary to the authors’ expectation that most bribers would not admit the wrongfulness 
of the exchange (Peiffer and Rose 2015). But, Peiffer and Rose’s results are 
unidimensional in that they deal with the potential for under-reporting and not why, if at 
all, some respondents might deliberately overstate35 their participation in bribery (see 
Sequeira 2012).  
 
Another weakness of bribery survey items is that they only capture ‘street-level 
corruption’, which as Lambsdorff and Schulze (2015) point out, may not be as 
                                                 
 
individuals tantalise monetary and other offers to get preferential treatment. Indeed, Bauhr’s (2017) distinction between 
greed and need corruption demonstrates that the fact that bribery is not always extortive.   
35 Perhaps as Sequeira (2012) contends, a strategy to emphasise how widespread corruption really is and potentially 
influence action. 
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fundamentally important for country’s development as grand corruption. However, 
Miller, Grodeland and Koshechkina (2001:12) fervently disagree with this argument, 
pointing out that “at systemic level, pervasive low-level corruption itself becomes a high-
level problem”. Indeed, as Uslaner observes, corrupt street-level officials often get their 
cues from higher echelons (Uslaner 2008); they are also unlikely to change their ways 
when they get promoted. Students who enter Universities via bribery payments are likely 
“to believe that they will only be able to get ahead by making further payments” (Miller, 
Grodeland and Koshechkina 2001:13). The most important problem of bureaucratic 
corruption is the fact that it distorts the relationship between citizens and the state, 
undermining the democratic principle of fairness and equal treatment by the state.   
 
It is useful to utilise both the perceptions-based and experience-based measures of 
corruption to leverage their strengths and mitigate their weaknesses (You 2015). Apart 
from this, they could be tapping into different dimensions of the concept of corruption. 
As intimated, the survey items about experiences of bribery are regarded as measures of 
petty corruption while subjective perceptions indicate the prevalence of grand corruption 
(Charron 2015). Lastly, using both measures helps us to establish whether direct objective 
experience of bribery and subjective perception of corruption have similar effects on 
propensity to be personally involved in efforts to tackle corruption. This is one of the  
largest gaps in anti-corruption studies focusing on Africa. 
 
4.3. The Afrobarometer surveys 
 
As indicated, this study draws from the publicly available data supplied by the 
Afrobarometer network (http://www.afrobarometer.org/). Afrobarometer is an 
independent and non-partisan research network that runs a comparative series of 
nationally representative surveys covering various social, economic and political 
dynamics in Africa. Since 1999, Afrobarometer has conducted six rounds of these surveys 
in a growing number of African countries. Each round uses identical sets of survey items, 
making it possible for scholars to undertake cross-national research. Afrobarometer 
carefully translates these standardised questionnaires into local languages and administers 
them in the preferred language of each respondent36. Caution is usually exercised in 
                                                 
 
36 Afrobarometer often engages services of professional linguists for these tasks 
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questionnaire translations to preserve the meaning of concepts while making sure that 
questions are comprehensible to all respondents, irrespective of their levels of education.  
 
While Afrobarometer’s face to face interviewing method can potentially inhibit truthful 
answering of more sensitive questions, it helps to ensure that all respondents understand 
the questions as well as the ethical considerations of survey research such as anonymity, 
confidentiality and the respondent’s right to terminate the interview. All Afrobarometer 
questionnaires are piloted in various local languages and appropriately refined before the 
actual survey takes place. The Afrobarometer survey manual provides information about 
the pre-testing of questionnaires, training of data collectors and data entrants, sampling, 
monitoring and evaluation, ethical considerations and other issues relating to conducting 
surveys according to scientific and international best practices37.  
 
While I draw insights from other rounds (especially in chapter seven), this study uses 
rounds three and six as primary sources of data. Round three was conducted in 2005 in 
18 African countries while round six took place between 2014 and 2016 in 36 countries. 
At the time of conducting this research, round six data were only available for 35 
countries. Afrobarometer sample sizes range between 1200 and 2400 respondents per 
country. The main reason for using two datasets is to take advantage of their different 
strengths in so far as the aim of this dissertation is concerned. For example, the way in 
which an item measuring action against corruption was designed in round six 
complements the way in which it was asked in round three as I demonstrate in the next 
section. Respondents in round six surveys were drawn from the five major parts of the 
African continent as shown in the first column of Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1: African regions and countries surveyed in rounds three and six  
Region  Country Name        Number of 
observations in round 
three 
Number of 
observations in 
round six 
Central Africa Sao Tome Not surveyed 1,196 
East Africa Burundi 1,198 1,200 
East Africa Kenya 1,278 2,397 
                                                 
 
37 The Manual for round six surveys can be accessed at: 
http://www.afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/survey_manuals/ab_r6_survey_manual_en.pdf 
 accessed on 5 October 2016 
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East Africa Madagascar 1,350 1,200 
East Africa Mauritius Not surveyed 1,200 
East Africa Sudan Not surveyed 1,200 
East Africa Tanzania 1,304 2,386 
East Africa Uganda 2,400 2,400 
North Africa Algeria Not surveyed 1,200 
North Africa Egypt Not surveyed 1,198 
North Africa Morocco Not surveyed 2400 
North Africa Tunisia Not surveyed 1,200 
Southern Africa Botswana 1,200 1,200 
Southern Africa Lesotho 1,161 1,200 
Southern Africa Malawi 1,200 2,400 
Southern Africa Mozambique 1,198 2,400 
Southern Africa Namibia 1,200 1,200 
Southern Africa South Africa 2,400 2,390 
Southern Africa Swaziland Not surveyed 1,200 
Southern Africa Zambia 1,200 1,199 
Southern Africa Zimbabwe 1,048 2,400 
West Africa Benin Not surveyed 1,200 
West Africa Burkina Faso Not surveyed 1,200 
West Africa Cameroon Not surveyed 1,182 
West Africa Cape Verde 1,256 1,200 
West Africa Ivory Coast Not surveyed 1,199 
West Africa Ghana 1,197 2,400 
West Africa Guinea Not surveyed 1,200 
West Africa Liberia Not surveyed 1,199 
West Africa Mali 1,244 1,200 
West Africa Niger Not surveyed 1,200 
West Africa Nigeria 2,363 2,400 
West Africa Senegal 1,200 1,200 
West Africa Sierra Leone Not surveyed 1,191 
West Africa Togo Not surveyed 1,200 
    
 
Total No. of 
observations 
25,397 51,537 
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4.3.1. Measuring the outcome variable 
 
As indicated above, this study’s dependent variable is measured using items drawn from 
rounds three and six of Afrobarometer surveys. To be sure, these items do not tell us what 
citizens have actually done to address corruption. Rather, they elicit opinions about the 
action they would take (or prefer people like them to take) against corruption. Thus, the 
items can be construed as measuring attitudinal ‘support for collective action against 
corruption’. In round three, Afrobarometer posed the following question: What, if 
anything, would you do to try to resolve each of the following situations: ‘you suspected 
a school or clinic official of stealing’. Answers were coded as follows:  
• do nothing 
• don’t worry, things will be resolved given enough time  
• lodge a complaint through proper channels or procedures  
• use connections with influential people  
• offer a tip or bribe and  
• join in public protest. 
 
Few people would contest the view that the act of stealing from local schools and clinics 
by officials constitutes ‘corruption’, to the extent that it violates the relationship of trust 
between citizens as a collective principal and officers as their agent. As I noted in section 
4.1.1 of this chapter, asking people about a vague phenomenon as corruption can be 
fraught with measurement errors as respondents are likely to invoke a wide range of 
practices to answer the question. These errors are significantly reduced when respondents 
are made to adopt a similar frame of reference that this item provides by speaking of theft 
by officials instead of the value-laden concept of ‘corruption’. The inclusion of ‘join 
protests’ in the list of responses enables us to examine who among the supposed 
‘principals’ supports collective civic action against corruption. 
 
Saying that one would ‘offer a tip or bribe’ or ‘use connections with influential people’ 
may seem to be a strange way to tackle corruption, until one considers with Alam (1995) 
that corruption is one way in which victims of corruption can deal with venal officials. 
Alam calls this an ‘illicit countervailing action against corruption’. To illustrate how it 
works, he provides an example involving a powerful factory that pays bribes so that 
government officials ignore the toxic chemicals it dumps into the river, thereby hurting 
the fisheries. Illicit countervailing action arises when the fishermen respond with bribes 
of their own to ‘influence’ the government to enforce the law regarding appropriate 
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disposal of this toxic waste (Alam 1995). Alam’s illicit countervailing action echoes the 
sentiments by James Scott who noted that, “those who feel that their essential interests 
are ignored or considered illegitimate in the formal political system will gravitate to the 
informal channel of influence represented by corruption” (Scott 1969: 328). 
 
Furthermore, the option to use influential connections to address a public-goods problem 
(such as corruption in schools and clinics) enables us to probe the role of corruption in 
willingness to draw on clientelistic networks. As Chang and Kerr (2016:73) have noted, 
“those individuals who respond ‘use connections with influential people’ to solve 
problems likely belong to a patronage network and have ‘strings to pull’.”  In this regard, 
one can think of ‘offering a tip or bribe’ and ‘using connections with influential people’ 
as indicating the willingness to use ‘corruption’ and/or clientelistic relations to tackle 
suspected acts of malfeasance. Since these options have a similar interpretation, I merge 
them into a single response option. The other options remain unchanged. Thus, the 
dependent variable “action against corruption” has five response categories with “do 
nothing” taking the lowest value and “join in public protests” the highest.  
 
As indicated in section 3.1 of chapter three, while definitions of collective action 
emphasise spatio-temporal proximity of actors (e.g. public protests), non-simultaneous 
actions of single individuals carried out with an intention to promote shared interests also 
qualify as instances of collective action (also see Chant 2007; Simon and Klandermans 
2001). As Wright (2009: 860) argues, “a group member engages in collective action any 
time she or he acts as a representative of the group and where the action is directed at 
improving the conditions of the group as a whole.” This more comprehensive view of 
collective civic action is much more evident in the emerging anti-corruption research and 
practice. As Beyerle (2014: 33) has noted, “grassroots civic initiatives targeting 
corruption have significantly expanded the civil resistance repertoire…” She compiles a 
long list of collective action tactics that were employed to tackle various types of 
corruption in twelve countries including Uganda, Kenya and Egypt. Such tactics include 
among others, civil disobedience, boycotts, public protests, writing letters to newspaper 
editors, participating in radio call-in programmes and contributing to anti-corruption 
campaigns (Beyerle 2014). 
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Furthermore, an attempt to replace a corrupt incumbent through the ballot (i.e. protest 
voting) is also increasingly being considered as part of the gamut of anti-corruption 
collective resistance (de Sousa and Moriconi 2013). Yap demonstrates this understanding 
when she concludes that “demand for punishment occurs when citizens withdraw support 
from the government for failing to penalise government officers or representatives for 
corruption, such as through protests, demonstrations or electoral overthrow” (Yap 2013: 
58-59).  
 
In the 6th round of the Afrobarometer surveys, respondents were asked what they thought 
was “the most effective thing that an ordinary person like you can do to help combat 
corruption”. This item has two important features. First, the use of the phrase “ordinary 
person like you” positions respondents at the centre of the fight against corruption. 
Secondly, in contrast with the item used in round three which has ‘join protests’ as the 
only form of collective demand for accountability, this item has several response options 
that qualify as examples of ‘civic engagement’ against corruption. These are: 
• Sign a petition asking for a stronger fight against corruption  
• Join or support an organization that is fighting corruption  
• Participate in protest marches or demonstrations against corruption 
• Vote for clean candidates or parties or for parties that promise to fight corruption  
• Speak out about corruption, for example, by calling a radio program or writing a 
letter  
• Talk to friends and relatives about the problem  
 
In addition to these ‘civic action strategies’, this survey item offers three more answering 
options. Two of these, ‘ordinary people cannot do anything’ and ‘report corruption’ were 
included in the item posed in round three. The other one, ‘refuse to pay bribes’ allows us 
to investigate the individual-level factors of the belief that citizens can, in fact, stand up 
to venal officials. It enables us to examine the proposition in recent studies on collective 
analysis of corruption that corruption makes individuals less likely to believe that refusing 
to pay a bribe is a viable option. That is, in other words, high levels of corruption increase 
the likelihood to see corruption as a solution, thereby reducing the willingness to take a 
stand against it. As Heywood (2017:25) observes, “this ‘problem-solving’ understanding 
of corruption — in which lived experience means that it may be the only means of 
accessing basic needs — stresses how corruption can therefore serve as a positive function 
for citizens (and political leaders) who need to operate and survive in the context of weak 
or ineffective state institutions”.  
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Applying the same models in both the third and sixth rounds of the surveys allows this 
study to validate the results; that is, check to ensure that data-specific peculiarities do not 
explain some of the major ‘findings’. As I explain in section 5.5 of chapter five, data from 
round three are likely to suffer from design effects contamination. Further to that, limiting 
an instance of collective action to protests seems to be extreme, if one considers with 
Lichbach (1998) that protests are rare events, even in democracies.38 Because of their 
likelihood to turn violent in places like South Africa and Kenya, some respondents may 
not consider protests as a legitimate form of collective action against corruption, 
preferring less extreme civilian resistance tactics. Klandermans and van Stekelenburg 
(2014:344) have this in mind when they note that “an individual might be motivated to 
take part in one activity — for example signing a petition— but not necessarily in another, 
for example, taking part in street demonstration. Many people defect because the type of 
activity does not appeal to them”.39  
 
One of the main challenges of asking citizens about what they might do to tackle 
corruption is the potential to trigger social desirability bias. It is conceivable that the 
majority of the respondents in round three (approximately 70%) only said they would 
lodge a complaint against corruption because it sounded like the type of thing that 
someone who is suspicious of malfeasance should do. Although preliminary robustness 
tests do not change the results (as I show in chapter five), I provide an extra layer of 
robustness by further looking at how corruption influences actual participation in protests 
and demonstrations. The survey item used for this purpose reads as follows: ‘Here is a 
list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me 
whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year: Attended a 
street demonstration or protest march?’ Analysing how the same variables used to predict 
the likelihood of supporting anti-corruption collective action shape the likelihood of 
taking part in actual protests addresses the concern that attitudinal support may not fully 
convert into actual collective action, because intentions and actual action may be driven 
                                                 
 
38 According to Lichbach, protestors represent only 5 per cent of the population. Those who do not protest represent 
“at least ninety five percent of aggrieved people, at least ninety-five percent of the time, in at least ninety-five percent 
of places” (Lichbach 1998, 12). 
39 My emphasis 
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by different factors (see Klandermans 2013). This protest question is also utilised (as a 
dependent variable) in the analysis offered in chapter seven. 
  
4.3.2. Measuring the perceptions of ‘corruption’ and the experiences of bribery 
 
In both rounds three and six, Afrobarometer asked respondents to assess how many of the 
officials in several public institutions were corrupt. The response options on a four-point 
Likert scale ranged from ‘none of them are involved in corruption’ to ‘all of them are 
involved’ (see Appendix 1). A maximum likelihood factor analysis with oblique rotation 
extracted one solution with a Cronbach’s alpha value greater than 0.80 in both rounds 
three and six, suggesting that these survey items can form a reliable measure of corruption 
perceptions index. Subsequently, I created with these items a composite index of popular 
perceptions of corruption. Personal experience with bribery is measured based on an 
additive index of five similarly worded questions about respondents’ payments of bribes. 
The questions read as follows: ‘In the past year, how often (if ever) have you had to pay 
a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour to government officials in order to: A) Get a document 
or permit? B) Get a child admitted in school? C) Get medicine or medical attention? D) 
Get a household service (like piped water, electricity, or phone)? E) Avoid problems with 
the police (like passing a checkpoint or avoiding a fine or arrest)?’ 
 
For each of the items, respondents chose one of the following options: ‘No experience 
with this in the past year,’ ‘Once or twice,’ ‘A few times,’ or ‘often. I conducted a 
maximum likelihood factor analysis with oblique rotation to allow factors to be 
correlated. The procedure extracted one solution with a Cronbach’s alpha value of greater 
than 0.70 (in both sets of data), indicating that these items can form a reliable additive 
index of bribery experience. The experience of paying bribes is therefore a 16-point 
additive scale of five items about the frequency of bribe payment. Higher values on the 
scale indicate a higher frequency of bribery payment while lower values indicate the 
opposite.   
 
 4.3.3. Generalised interpersonal trust and other individual-level control variables 
 
The ideas around generalised interpersonal trust and efficacy are central to the collective 
action analysis of anti-corruption and feature prominently in social movement studies. 
The pessimistic view towards anti-corruption civic engagement outlined in chapter two 
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describes how endemic corruption erodes both generalised interpersonal trust and various 
forms of efficacy (i.e. internal, external and collective efficacy). Afrobarometer data 
allows us to explore how corruption influences the impact of generalised social trust and 
efficacy on support for anti-corruption civic engagement.  
 
In the third round of surveys, Afrobarometer used the following standard trust question 
to measure generalised interpersonal trust: ‘Generally speaking, would you say most 
people can be trusted or that you should be careful in dealing with people?’ 40   In 
quantitative studies of social capital, those who agree that most people can be trusted are 
regarded as ‘generalised trusters’. Popular though this question is, a large body of 
literature has raised serious concerns about its apparently poor validity and reliability as 
a measure of generalised interpersonal trust (see Beugelsdijk 2008, Sturgis and Smith, 
2010, Uslaner 2012).  As Nannestad observes, “for good reasons, probably nobody trusts 
anybody with respect to everything. Trust can be argued to be issue or domain-specific: I 
may trust you to handle my economic affairs but not my children, or vice versa. The 
generalised trust question as it is normally posed ignores this aspect…” (Nannestad 
2008:417). Taking this weakness into account, the sixth round of Afrobarometer asked a 
question that is more specific to corruption; ‘please tell me whether you agree or disagree 
with the following statement: ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against 
corruption?’ [Interviewer: Probe for strength of opinion.]. For reasons I shall explain in 
chapter six, I consider this question as a measure of both generalised interpersonal trust 
and perceived collective efficacy to fight corruption.  
 
Other individual-level control variables, including measures of poverty, relative living 
conditions, institutional trust and membership in voluntary associations are discussed in 
specific chapters. Generally, the models presented in each of the three empirical chapters 
(i.e. chapters five, six and seven) were adjusted for the effects of the variables that are 
likely to have a direct effect on support for collective action or moderate the effects of the 
key predictor variables of corruption perceptions and experiences. The discussions 
                                                 
 
40 Originally devised by Elisabeth Noelle-Neuman in 1948, and first used in a paper in the American Sociological 
Review (Rosenberg, 1956), this question is widely used as a measure of generalised interpersonal trust. Because of 
this wide usage, it is often referred to as the ‘standard trust question’ (see Uslaner 2002. Zmerli and Newton 2008, 
Beugelsdijk 2008). 
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presented in chapter two and three have been used as a basis for selecting these control 
variables.  
 
4.4. Modeling the effect of national context 
 
The Afrobarometer data have an explicit multilevel structure. The multistage sampling 
technique that Afrobarometer employs selects individuals that are nested within 
households, which are nested within enumeration areas (EA), which are nested within 
districts and/or regions and finally, within countries. Obviously, the political attitudes of 
the individuals within the same ‘nest’ (e.g. country) are more similar than attitudes of 
individuals from a different nest. The largest and most theoretically informative 
differences are likely to be between countries. Indeed, in sharp contrast to the way Africa 
has been portrayed by the qualitatively oriented studies (as explained in section 3.6 of 
chapter three), the nascent public opinion research finds large cross-national variability 
in political attitudes and behaviours in Africa. As Mattes and Bratton (2007) observed, 
such cross-national differences are much wider than the differences between Western 
European countries, which comparative political scientists frequently analyse using 
multilevel techniques (see Stockemer and Sundström 2013, Dahlberg and Solevid 2016, 
Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Curiously, there is also regional variation in citizens’ 
demand for democracy within the African continent. For instance, Bratton and Houessou 
(2014:13) found, that demand for democracy is greatest in West Africa, where “regimes 
are particularly susceptible to mass mobilisation from below.” 
 
These findings suggest that research on Africa must take contextual heterogeneity much 
more seriously. One way to address the impact of contextual heterogeneity is to focus on 
a single country. This holds country-level factors constant and allows the analysis to focus 
on differences between individuals. Another one is to consider contextual variation as a 
nuisance and employ statistical techniques that adjust for its effect on the outcome 
variable. This technique is referred to as a fixed-effects (or dummy variable) modeling. 
The regression models presented in chapter five utilise this technique since the limited 
number of higher level units (18 countries) that come with round three data set prohibits 
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the use of multilevel analysis.41 Several simulation studies agree with Kreft’s (1996) 
finding that at least 50 groups are likely to yield reliable multilevel regression results, and 
that 30 groups should be considered as a minimum (see Hox 2010, Bryan and Jenkins 
2015). Another reason for using the fixed effects approach in chapter five is based on the 
estimation challenges that go with multinomial multilevel regression modelling required 
by the discrete choice data. This is explained in more detail in chapter six.  
 
One problem with fixed effects statistical technique is that the results are only applicable 
to the countries in the sample (i.e. the 18 countries represented in round three data set) 
(see Jones and Steenbergen 2002). On the contrary, the results of the multilevel models 
can be applied to the rest of the African continent since the models assume that the units 
of observations (e.g. countries) were drawn from a random population of African 
countries. Using multilevel techniques, we are able to quantify the variability between 
countries in support for collective civic action against corruption. Apart from that, by 
allowing the effect of key individual-level predictors (e.g. perceptions of corruption) to 
be different for each of the countries in the data, multilevel estimation enables us to 
explore how national context shapes the relationship between corruption at individual-
level and citizens’ support for collective civic engagement against corruption. Finally, 
multilevel analysis enables us to show how, and for which type of people these contextual 
effects matter. Another advantage is that several different country-level variables can be 
included simultaneously with individual-level variables — something that cannot be 
achieved with fixed effects estimation (Bryan and Jenkins 2015). Multilevel analysis is 
also quite informative even when we do not include higher-level variables. This is 
because the ‘random effects’ themselves can be conceived as latent variables, capturing 
the underlying, unobserved or unmeasured processes influencing the dependent variable 
of interest.  
 
There are many country-level variables likely to moderate the relationship between 
exposure to corruption and potential reactions to corruption. Based on the literature 
assessment in chapters two and three, I have narrowed these down to the following: the 
general corruption context, the strength of civil society, country-level poverty, state-level 
                                                 
 
41 As Hox (2010:233) observes “the maximum likelihood estimation methods used commonly in multilevel analysis 
are asymptomatic, which translates to the assumption that the sample size is large”. 
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clientelism, ethno-linguistic fractionalisation, media freedom/repression, 
democracy/political competition and per capita GDP. Besides the fact that these variables 
are very strongly correlated42, the limited number of countries (35 in total) prohibits 
adding more than a handful of context-level variables in each multilevel regression model. 
As a result, I limit myself to the first five country-level variables. In the following 
sections, I briefly outline how each of these variables has been operationalised and the 
corresponding sources of data. 
 
4.4.1. Control of corruption indicator 
 
As part of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), the control of corruption 
indicator (CCI) “captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of 
the state by elites and private interests” (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010:4). For 
large N studies, the CCI is regarded as the most comprehensive perceptions-based 
measure of corruption, being superior to the Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) in terms of variety of sources and scope of indicators (Hough 
2017, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud 2010). The CCI’s data sources are more heterogonous 
than it is often the case with other global measures of corruption such as Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI). In addition to sourcing information from a wide range of 
national and international experts, the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) make 
use of public opinion data from the likes of Afrobarometer, Latinobarometro and 
AsiaBarometer. A country’s CCI score is reported in terms of standard normal unit, and 
falls within -2.5 to 2.5, or in percentile rank ranging from 0 to 100. As it is the case with 
standardised measures, zero represents the average. Numbers below zero represent poor 
control of corruption while those above zero represent stronger corruption control 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010).  
 
A context-level measure of corruption such as the CCI allows us to investigate the idea 
that differences in willingness to oppose corruption is a structural problem, not an 
individual one. From the discussion in chapter two, one expects individuals from 
                                                 
 
42 The correlation between the natural log of per capita GDP and internet penetration is r=0.85 for instance. The 
media repression variable is also strongly correlated with the strength of civil society variable (r=0.88) (both from the 
V-DEM dataset). Mean poverty rate and log of GDP are strongly correlated as well (-0.81). 
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countries with high scores on CCI to be less willing to challenge corruption than those 
residing in countries with low scores on CCI. Importantly, in line with collective action 
analysis of corruption, one expects an increase in perceptions and experiences of 
corruption to have a stronger corrosive effect on support for collective action at low 
values of the CCI (i.e. in highly corrupt societies).    
 
4.4.2. Clientelism at state level and civil society robustness 
 
Over the years, quantitative research has struggled to capture systematically the slippery 
concept of clientelism (see Muno 2013).43 The Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) project 
has, however, made a commendable effort to gauge state-level clientelism, defining it as 
the extent to which public resources are used for the benefit of “a specific corporation, 
sector, social group, region, party, or set of constituents” (Coppedge et al 2016:195). 
Values in this variable range from zero (where all the public spending is used for the 
benefit of certain subnational groupings to the exclusion of others), to four (where all 
social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods in character) (Coppedge et al 
2016). This variable enables us to examine whether an individual who lives in a country 
where most public goods and services are distributed via clientelistic affiliations will be 
less willing to get involved in citizens’ efforts to demand accountability, even if she thinks 
that corruption is widespread. Or alternatively, as proposed in chapter three, whether an 
increase in state-level clientelism increases the positive effect of the perceptions of 
corruption on support for citizen-centred anti-corruption tactics (see pages 55 and 56). 
 
The V-DEM’s ‘core civil society index’ (CCSI) provides a very useful measure of the 
strength of civil society. V-DEM defines strength of civil society (or civil society 
robustness) as the extent to which civil society organisations enjoy “autonomy from the 
state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, 
however conceived” (Coppedge et al 2016:57). The measure is made up of items asking 
about the extent to which (a) CSOs are free to enter and exit the political arena or public 
life (i.e. the extent to which the government monopolises CSOs), (b) citizens are free to 
join any CSO of their choice and (c) government violently and actively pursues all real 
and even some imagined members of CSOs. Further details of this measure are provided 
                                                 
 
43 Consider for instance that Phillip Keefer (2005, 2007) uses seven indicators to measure clientelism.  
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in Appendix 1. This measure allows us to investigate the proposition that the assurance 
rooted in strong associational density underpins differences in willingness to challenge 
corruption through collective civic action (see page 48).   
 
For ease of interpretation, I reversed the scale of the measure of clientelism so that higher 
scores represent more clientelism. Similarly, the scale of CCI has been reversed such that 
the numbers below zero represent stronger control of corruption (i.e. less corruption) 
while those above zero represent weaker corruption control (i.e. more corruption). I 
utilised the 2014-2015 versions of both WGI and V-DEM data sets to coincide with the 
period within which the 6th round of the Afrobarometer surveys were conducted. For 
countries for which V-DEM did not provide the 2014-2015 update, I used the 2012 
estimates. These were the most recent estimates for the countries in which the 2014-2015 
versions were incomplete.44 
 
4.4.3. Ethno-linguistic diversity 
 
One of the most controversial topics in cross-national research is the measure of ethnic 
diversity (see Posner 2004, Fearon 2003). Posner (2004) compiles a list of seven measures 
of ethnic diversity currently being used in comparative cross-national studies. These 
include ethnic fractionalisation index calculated by Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, 
Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003), Fearon’s (2003) fractionalisation index and Africa-specific 
fractionalisation index developed by Scarritt and Mozaffar (1999). Posner then identifies 
how these measures, in particular the widely used Alesina et al’s measure, misrepresent 
the nature and consequences of ethnicity in Africa. As Posner argues, this measure does 
not take into account the fact that some ethno-linguistic groups are more politically 
relevant than others. Furthermore, in some highly fractionalised African countries (e.g. 
Burkina Faso), none of the ethnic groups is politically salient (i.e. ethnic groups are not 
being mobilised for political advantage). Posner offers an improved measure of ethnic 
fractionalisation in Africa based on the number of ethnic groups that are politically 
relevant.  
 
                                                 
 
44 There are less than five countries for which this is the case. 
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Persuasive though Posner’s argument is, his measure only covers 42 African countries. It 
has no information on six of the 35 countries represented in Afrobarometer data (Cape 
Verde, Sao-Tome, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia). The same lack of information 
on some African countries confronts Scarritt and Mozaffar’s (1999) Africa-sensitive 
measure of ethnic diversity. Because of the negative impact on reliability that loss of data 
at country-level can have on the results of multilevel regressions, the analysis in chapter 
six draws upon the widely used Alesina et al’s data on ethno-linguistic fractionalisation. 
This measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the overall 
population belong to different ethnic groups. More diverse countries have a higher 
probability score (thus, a higher ELF score) while less diverse countries get a lower a 
score. 
 
4.4.4. Country-level poverty rate 
4.5. Conclusions and further comments on Afrobarometer data 
 
The chapter has justified the use of public opinion data to explore the relationship between 
corruption and collective action against it. It has also raised potential weaknesses of the 
survey methodology in investigating anti-corruption and proffered various ways to 
mitigate their negative effects on the quality of the results. Of particular concern is the 
fact that the study measures the attitudes towards collective action against corruption 
rather than actual involvement in anti-corruption efforts. There is simply no publicly 
available cross-national data on how citizens actually behave when they suspect 
corruption. This study can therefore be described as the systematic exploration of what 
Klandermans (2015) terms ‘mobilisation potential’. He makes a sharp distinction between 
mobilisation potential and action mobilisation (or manifest participation). The former 
refers to a mental disposition, the propensity to take part in collective civic action while 
the latter is “the transformation of that potential into action” (Klandermans 2015:11).  
 
The chapter has also raised a number of concerns about data reliability. The first one 
entails the potential for social desirability bias when respondents answer the questions 
about their involvement in bribery and what they think people should do to help curb 
corruption. Nevertheless, recent findings that Afrobarometer bribery data are not at risk 
of such social desirability biases are reassuring (see Peiffer and Rose 2013). A further 
concern entails whether the meaning of ‘bribe’ is consistent across countries and 
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individuals. The Afrobarometer minimised this risk by specifying that a ‘bribe’ refers to 
a gift or favour provided in exchange for public service or to address a problem with the 
police. 
 
Other potential drawbacks include the fact that the third round of the surveys was 
conducted in societies that were, politically-speaking, relatively open. This limits the 
analysis to largely democratic countries. The sixth round addressed this challenge by 
including several countries that are widely viewed as autocracies (e.g. Swaziland and 
Sudan) or flawed democracies (e.g. Morocco, Burundi, Zimbabwe and Egypt). 
Nevertheless, this representativeness may have come at the price of data reliability. It is 
possible that a climate of fear and suspicion, which characterises some authoritarian 
societies undermines people’s willingness to freely express their views about governance 
and politics (see Moore 2005). Afrobarometer’s implementing organisation (i.e. the local 
partner) for Morocco has, for instance, cited the “fear of participating in surveys and 
expressing opinions about politics” as one of the main reasons for a relatively high refusal 
rate of 38 per cent in round six46. Fortunately, at the end of each interview, Afrobarometer 
requires the interviewer to assess the extent to which the respondent looked uneasy, 
suspicious, unfriendly and dishonest. I use these items in various robustness checks of the 
models estimated in this dissertation.  
 
Indeed, as Bratton (2005) has noted in response to a published critique of the analysis 
based on Afrobarometer data on Zimbabwe (Moore 2005), using interviewers’ 
assessment of each respondent is the best way to gauge the extent to which political fear 
influences public opinion in Africa. Bratton (2005) uses these data to show that fear and 
suspicion did not influence results obtained in Zimbabwe. In fact, those Zimbabweans 
“who said that open expression was unsafe were twice as likely to criticise the incumbent 
president…” (Bratton 2005:121). Furthermore, despite the repressions that regime critics 
were often subjected to, almost half of the respondents (44%) said they did not trust the 
ruling party, while a further 41% said they did not trust President Robert Mugabe. Bratton 
(2005:122) concludes that the safeguards that Afrobarometer provides, including 
“seeking respondents’ informed consent, allowing them to refuse to respond to particular 
                                                 
 
46 This is according to the codebook of round six survey data for Morocco. Available at: 
http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/data/round-6/mor_r6_codebook.pdf   accessed 20 August 2017   
94 
items or the whole survey, guaranteeing both anonymity and confidentiality and stressing 
the non-partisan identity of the survey organisation” go a long way towards putting 
apprehensive respondents at ease. 
 
The second weakness is that the number of corruption perception items has not been 
consistent across countries and rounds. For example, questions about perceived 
corruption among religious leaders and business people, which were included in round 
three were not asked in round six. In their place, Afrobarometer asked respondents to 
assess levels of corruption in education and healthcare facilities. Similarly, there are more 
questions on trust in institutions in round three than in round six. This implies that the 
additive indexes (e.g. corruption perception index, institutional trust index etc.) may 
contain slightly different items for each of the two data sets. Notwithstanding that equal 
and similar questions would have been desirable, one might argue that the additive scales 
formed out of unequal number of questions do not seriously undermine the overall 
substantive conclusions of this study to the extent that each corresponds to the concept 
being measured. 
 
Lastly, the infrastructural and topographical challenges of many African countries can 
compromise the quality of data. Poor road networks make it extremely difficult to reach 
all areas and the individuals selected. As Mattes (2008:116) has noted, “in mountainous 
Lesotho, for example, Afrobarometer researchers ride on horseback to conduct interviews 
in selected villages”. Lack of capacity of national statistics offices means that the 
sampling frame that Afrobarometer relies on may be outdated (see Mattes 2008). 
Fortunately, the sampling frames used in both rounds three and six were fairly recent (less 
than 10 years old in 70 per cent of the countries included in both samples). For instance, 
in Morocco, the sampling frame for round six was based on the 2014 national census data. 
The most recent census data for Niger was compiled in 2012 while Guinea and Benin’s 
census datafiles were updated in 2013. The oldest sampling frames were for Malawi, 
Sudan and Burundi, which were based on the 2008 census information 
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Chapter five 
Corruption and support for anti-corruption protests 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses exclusively on the effect of subjective perceptions of corruption and 
personal experiences of bribery on the propensity to engage in collective civic action 
against corruption. The main analysis juxtaposes the preference for the use of protests as 
a way of dealing with suspected acts of corruption with the preferences for other methods. 
This analysis relies on round three of the Afrobarometer surveys (18 countries) as a 
primary source of data. I use pooled data from round six (35 countries) to validate the 
model developed and tested using round three data set. As I have noted in section 4.3.1 
of chapter four, these data do not address actual participation in protests and 
demonstrations targeting corruption. As some scholars have argued, there could be a 
disjuncture between reported willingness to engage in civic action and taking part in it 
(see Norris et al 2006, van Zomeren et al 2012). This necessitates the comparison of the 
results regarding support for protests with the results on actual participation in protests 
and demonstrations. Indeed, according to Finkel and Muller (1998), utilising data on 
willingness or intentions to take part in protests with data on past protest behaviour can 
yield much more useful findings. Although the Afrobarometer did not ask about the main 
subject of the protest events that respondents attended, analysing the impact of corruption 
on the likelihood to have attended offers a layer of robustness for the results of the main 
analysis. 
 
To anticipate the findings, the notion that an increase in experience of paying bribes acts 
as a mobilising grievance received strong empirical backing. Bribery experience 
increases the support for anti-corruption protests as well as other citizens-centred anti-
corruption tactics, including ‘voting for anti-corruption champions’ and being personally 
involved in raising awareness about corruption. Finally, regular bribers are significantly 
more likely to have taken part in public protests and demonstrations in the year prior to 
the survey.  Regarding the effect of the perceived levels of corruption, the results suggest 
an inconsistent relationship. An increase in perceptions of corruption increases the 
relative probability to say that citizens should not worry as corruption issues will be 
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resolved without their involvement. It has no effect on support for anti-corruption 
protests. However, in the analysis of round six data, the variable emerges as a strong 
predictor of the propensity to say that nothing can be done about corruption and that 
citizens should engage in protests and demonstrations as a way to tackle corruption 
 
5.2. Control variables 
 
As intimated, the analysis examines the relationship between individual level measures 
of corruption on support for protest action against corruption. The operationalisation of 
these two predictors and the response variable has been discussed extensively in chapter 
four. Before reporting the results, it is important to provide a brief account of the variables 
that are likely to confound the estimated relationships. The model adjusts for the effects 
of the individual-level variables posited in the literature as the main antecedents of civic 
engagement, particularly protests. At the individual level, these can be grouped into 
grievances, resources and values (see Dalton et al 2007, van Stekelenburg and 
Klandermans. 2013, Klandermans and van der Toorn 2010). To account for the effect of 
socio-economic grievances, I include three variables that cover much of the spectrum of 
the economic deprivation concept: experiential poverty, personal living condition and 
relative living conditions. Experiential poverty is measured based on Afrobarometer’s 
lived poverty index (LPI) as described in chapter four. The personal living conditions is 
measured based on the item asking respondents to assess their present economic 
condition. Lastly, I consider respondents’ evaluation of their personal living conditions 
relative to other citizens as a measure of relative deprivation. It is important to note that 
the correlations between the variables are not strong enough to introduce collinearity 
problems in the regression models (r > 0.30 in both rounds three and six surveys).    
 
I use the index of institutional trust as a proxy for political grievances (see Dalton, van 
Sickle and Weldon 2010, Braun and Huttler 2016). This is made up of items asking how 
much trust a respondent has in the president/prime minister, parliament, the police, the 
army and the courts of law. Apart from acting as a control variable, the institutional trust 
variable enables us to explore the idea that corruption (especially bribery) erodes political 
legitimacy, increasing support for citizen-centred anti-corruption tactics (see page 51). 
The individual resources likely to influence support for anti-corruption protests are formal 
education attainment, membership in voluntary associations, generalised trust, a sense of 
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self-efficacy (i.e. internal efficacy) and interest in politics (Obserschall 1994, van 
Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013, Benson and Rochon 2004, Bauhr and Grimes 
2014). Lastly, in terms of the impact of ‘values’ and ‘norms’, the model is adjusted for 
tolerance for corruption. This is measured based on three questions about the extent to 
which citizens think incidents such as political patronage, nepotism and bribery are ‘not 
wrong at all’, ‘wrong but understandable’ or ‘wrong and punishable’.  
 
In addition to these variables, the model includes the usual demographic variables of age, 
gender and urban-rural status. Table A3 (in appendix 1) provide the exact wording of the 
items used to measure these variables and the Cronbach alpha values of the composite 
measures. 
 
5.3. Descriptive analysis  
 
When asked how they would react to suspected acts of corruption in schools and clinics, 
more than two-thirds of the 25,391 respondents said they would report these to the 
authorities. I label this group of respondents as the reporters. About 18 per cent of the 
respondents felt that there was nothing a citizen could do about suspected acts of 
corruption (hereafter, the acquiescents). Seven per cent said they would use their 
connections with influential people or offer tips and bribes (hereafter, the bribers); four 
per cent said they would not worry about the problem as it would eventually get resolved 
given enough time (hereafter, the carefrees). A small minority (2%) said they would resort 
to protests and demonstrations (hereafter, the protesters).  Figure 5.1 presents the average 
experience of bribery and average perception of corruption for each of these groups of 
respondents. The protesters’ group has the highest average score on both corruption 
perceptions and bribery experience variables. The bribers’ group registers the second 
highest score on both corruption variables. The carefrees, acquiescents and reporters’ 
have roughly equal average bribery experience and average perceptions of corruption.  
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Figure 5.1: Mean of bribery experience and corruption perceptions variables for each of the 
five categories of action against corruption 
 
 
Within individual countries, the relationship between the two corruption variables and 
preferred action against corruption does not mirror the pattern presented in Figure 5.1. In 
Senegal and Zambia for instance, the average bribery experience for those who prefer to 
acquiesce is much higher than the average for those who prefer to engage in protests. In 
sharp contrast, in South Africa and Nigeria, protesters have an average bribery experience 
that is more than four times the average experience of acquiescents or reporters. In Ghana, 
Kenya and Benin, the average bribery experience of protesters is roughly equivalent to 
the average bribery experience of the acquiescing group. These differences may indicate 
an influence of country-level conditions on the relationship between corruption and 
preferred action against it. The extent to which such differences are statistically 
significant will be explored in chapter six. In the interim, the estimated regression models 
will include countries as dummy variables (also known as fixed effects modelling) to 
adjust for the potential biasing effect of all observed and unobserved country-level 
processes. Further to that, I add the Afrobarometer’s ‘combined weighting factor’ which 
corrects for over/ under sampling within countries and equalizes the samples across 
countries. 
 
5.4. The multinomial logistic regression model of preferred action 
against corruption 
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Since the main response variable is a discrete choice set (i.e. unordered categorical 
variable), the analysis employs a multinomial logistic regression model and reports the 
relative probability of preferring a particular action against corruption. Towards the end 
of this section, two alternative estimations are employed as robustness checks. Since the 
objective of this chapter is to assess how preference for anti-corruption protests respond 
to changes in corruption, it would be more meaningful to contrast the preference for other 
actions with the preference for protests. However, given that two thirds of the 
Afrobarometer respondents would rather report suspected acts of corruption, using 
reporters as a reference category is more efficient from the statistical perspective47. This 
notwithstanding, I re-estimated the MNL model using different reference categories to 
ascertain whether results are sensitive to changes in the base outcome.  
 
The MNL model indicates that the perception of corruption has a statistically significant 
overall effect on preferred action against corruption allegations (X2= 136, df =4, 
p<0.001). A unit increase in perceptions of corruption initially increases the preference 
for using bribery and influential connections and being carefree rather than reporting. It 
reduces by more than 20% the relative risk of preferring to acquiesce rather than report 
corruption.  It has practically no effect on preference for protest action. However, when 
the highly significant bribery experience variable is added, the coefficient of corruption 
perceptions becomes non-significant except for the ‘acquiescents vs. reporters’ contrast, 
and this remains the case even as more control variables are added into the model. The 
interaction between the two corruption variables is not significant and was excluded in 
the results reported in Table 5.1.  
 
Table 5.1: Multinomial logistic regression predicting preferred action against corruption  
 Acquiescents Carefrees Bribers Protesters 
Experience of bribery 
0. 130 
(0.07) 
0.010  
(0.11) 
0.385*** 
(0.07) 
0.454*** 
(0.12) 
Corruption perceptions 
-0.137*** 
(0.04) 
0.149*   
(0.07) 
0.052 
(0.05) 
-0.042 
(0.09) 
Organizational membership 
-0.019 
(0.02) 
-0.123*** 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.057 
(0.03) 
Lived poverty 
-0.045 
(0.03) 
0.094 
(0.05) 
-0.043 
(0.04) 
0.009 
(0.07) 
                                                 
 
47 Indeed, the rule of thumb in multinomial logistic regression is that the reference category should be the response 
category with the highest frequency. 
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Tolerance for corruption 
-0.291*** 
(0.05) 
-0.724*** 
(0.09) 
-0.449*** 
(0.07) 
-0.215 
(0.12) 
Persons living conditions 
0.012 
(0.03) 
0.082 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.052 
(0.06) 
Relative living condition 
0.028 
(0.03) 
-0.062 
(0.05) 
-0.003 
0.04 
0.181** 
0.07 
Institutional trust 
-0.225*** 
(0.04) 
-0.228*** 
(0.06) 
-0.165*** 
(0.04) 
-0.203** 
(0.08) 
Education attainment 
-0.135*** 
(0.02) 
-0.111*** 
(0.03) 
-0.087*** 
(0.02) 
-0.011 
(0.03) 
Age 
-0.002 
(0.00) 
0.006 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.008 
(0.00) 
Female 
0.259*** 
(0.05) 
0.167 
(0.09) 
-0.052 
(0.07) 
0.086 
(0.12) 
Generalised trust 
-0.03 
(0.07) 
0.401*** 
(0.1) 
0.324*** 
(0.08) 
0.374** 
(0.14) 
Political interest 
-0.129*** 
(0.02) 
-0.035 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.205*** 
(0.06) 
Internal political efficacy 
 
0.044* 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.03) 
0.108* 
(0.05) 
Intercept  
-0.874 
 (0.137) 
-2.054  
(0.207) 
-1.640 
(0.175) 
-2.419 
(0.248) 
Notes: 
Reference category is ‘report corruption’ 
*= significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1% 
Note: country fixed effects included in regression but omitted from the table 
 
Before paying more attention to the impact of bribery experience, it is important to 
describe the effects of control variables, most of which, as we shall see are interesting in 
their own right. The demographic variables of age and gender have a statistically 
significant overall effect on preferred action against corruption. However, only the effects 
of age are significant for the contrast between protesters and reporters. The urban-rural 
status has no effect on the model (X2= 2.29, df =4, p= 0.6831) and has been excluded 
from the results shown in Table 5.1. Formal education attainment has a strong overall 
effect on preferred action against corruption. Further to that, an increase in education 
increases the odds of preferring to report relative to any other option. However, the effect 
is not significant for the protest-reporting contrast.  
 
The internal resources variable of political interest increases the relative probability of 
preferring to join anti-corruption protests. Importantly, adding this variable into the model 
reduces the impact of bribery experience on preference for protest but appears to have no 
effect on other contrasts. Those who feel that most people can be trusted are more likely 
to prefer to protest rather than report allegations of corruption. This effect is highly robust 
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to changes in the reference outcome. The strong positive effect of generalised social trust 
suggests, as expected, that social capital acts as an incentive for working with others to 
find solutions to the problem of corruption.  
 
Although tolerance for corruption has a strong overall effect on reactions to allegations 
of corruption (X2= 111.02, df. =4, p<0.001), it has no significant effect on the preference 
for protest relative to reporting. Instead, admitting that corruption is acceptable or 
understandable has a strong positive effect on the relative probability of preferring to use 
a bribe or influential connections as a countervailing measure against corruption. 
Furthermore, those who are most tolerant of corruption are also significantly more likely 
to say that nothing can be done about suspected acts of corruption or that they wouldn’t 
worry as corruption can be solved without their involvement. It seems therefore that those 
who are most tolerant of corruption are unlikely to support collective anti-corruption 
efforts. Instead, they are more likely to draw upon clientelistic networks or offer bribes 
when they require a solution to public goods problems.  
 
Net of the effects of the other variables, an increasingly negative evaluation of one’s 
living condition relative to that of fellow citizens’ increases the likelihood of preferring 
to protest rather than report allegations of corruption (z = 2.87). Nevertheless, subjective 
evaluations of personal living condition and experiential poverty (i.e. LPI) have non-
significant but positive effects. The proxy for political grievances, institutional trust, has 
a significant overall effect on action against corruption. Moreover, institutional trust 
significantly increases the likelihood of preferring to report rather than join protests or 
use clientelistic networks. Most importantly, a unit increase in institutional trust reduces 
the probability of saying that nothing can be done about corruption. The overall message 
is that people who prefer to report corruption have higher confidence in state institutions 
than those who prefer other ways of dealing with corruption. The negative effect of 
institutional trust on the relative willingness to join protests supports the well-established 
idea in the literature that those who have lost confidence in state institutions and the rule 
of law are likely to be attracted to contentious politics to express their dissatisfaction 
(Booth and Seligson 2009, Dalton, van Sickle and Weldon 2010, Klandermans, Roefs 
and Oliver 1998).  
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The results reported so far do not change when the institutional trust variable is replaced 
with subjective evaluations of government effectiveness. The important finding here is 
that the perception that the government is effective in handling various problems, 
including among others, corruption, unemployment, crime, inequality and HIV/AIDS, 
also increases the likelihood of preferring to report corruption. When institutional trust 
and perceived effectiveness of the government are both entered into the model, they keep 
their negative signs but lose significance in the protest-report and bribery-report contrasts. 
Following Bauhr (2016) and Peiffer and Alvarez (2015), I used the item about the 
effectiveness of the government in tackling corruption instead of the additive indexes of 
institutional trust and government effectiveness. The results are not affected; those who 
think the government is effectively handling corruption are more likely to report than take 
any of the other actions. 
 
Overall, the consistently negative effect of institutional trust on the relative probability of 
joining protests contradicts the findings of Peiffer and Alvarez (2015) who noted that 
confidence in the anti-corruption efforts of the government increased the willingness to 
use civic action to challenge corruption in non-OECD settings, which included African 
countries. The results are more in line with what they found when they analysed their 
OECD sample. In that sample, perceived effectiveness of the government in tackling 
corruption reduced the overall willingness to get personally involved in civic action 
against corruption. In particular, it reduced the willingness to join protests and 
demonstrations.  
 
Having discussed the influence of control variables, the rest of this chapter offers a more 
in-depth analysis of the effect of personal experience of bribery. Holding all variables at 
their mean values, a positive change from having an average experience with bribery 
increases the probability of preferring to join protests by 0.011 (p< 0.01). The same 
change increases the probability of preferring to draw on influential connections by 
almost twice the amount (0.026, p<0.001). The fact that the average marginal effect of 
the experience of bribery on the preference for the use of bribes and influential 
connections is higher than that of the preference for protest should not come as a surprise. 
Indeed, one would expect the regular paying of bribes to reinforce the perception that 
individual solutions actually work (see Seligson 2006:401). The important practical 
implication of this finding is that regular bribers are increasingly likely to choose to pay 
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a bribe or approach influential people (e.g. local political leaders, business-people, 
traditional authorities, religious leaders, etc.) when they face problems in their 
communities and personal lives. This is likely to perpetuate corruption.   
 
To capture the differential effects of the increase in the frequency of bribery, I plot 
predicted probabilities of each of the five reactions to allegations of corruption at specific 
values of the bribery index (see Figure 5.2). When no bribe has been paid in the past year 
(i.e. point zero on the graph), the probability of being willing to join protests is almost 
zero. In sharp contrast, the probability of preferring to report or acquiesce is highest for 
an individual with no bribery experience. The predicted probability of reporting or 
acquiescing declines steadily as the experience of bribery accumulates. It would seem 
therefore that the majority of those who prefer to report or say that nothing can be done 
did not have much, if any direct experience with bribery, and that having this experience 
would increase their likelihood of choosing to either join protests or pay bribes as a 
response to corruption allegations.  
 
Figure 5.2: Probability of different actions against corruption at different values of the 
frequency of bribe payment  
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Indeed, a respondent who has the highest experience of paying bribes is predicted to have 
a 40 per cent probability of preferring anti-corruption protests. On the other hand, the 
same individual has less than 5 per cent chance of preferring to report or say that nothing 
can be done about corruption. Although these results are instructive, a caveat is in order; 
the predicted estimates for the protest category are less reliable at higher values of bribery 
payment due to insufficient data. Overall, the analysis indicates that bribery increases the 
individual preference for using protests and influential connections (and bribery) to 
address corruption allegations while, at the same time, reducing the preference for other 
ways of addressing corruption. It is important to note that the relative probability of 
preferring to use every other action besides protesting declines at some point in the 
progression of bribery experience. The diminishing probabilities of preferring other forms 
of action against corruption indicate that protest is likely to be the most preferred reaction 
against corruption allegations for citizens with very high experience of corruption.  
 
In summary, the results show that individuals who are increasingly being exposed to 
bribery are less likely to report corruption allegations or say that nothing can be done 
about it. When such individuals suspect that corruption is taking place, they are more 
likely to initiate a protest or use their patron-client relations to address the problem. In 
general, therefore, bribers are significantly more likely to resort to extra-institutional 
methods to address public goods’ problems. Importantly, the effect of bribery experience 
as a grievance seems to be independent of other socio-economic and political grievances, 
personal values and resource mobilisation variables. That is, the experience of bribery 
increases the potential for anti-corruption collective action in spite of the impact of other 
predictors of civic engagement.  
 
5.5. Robustness checks 
 
Multinomial logistic models (MNL) impose the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA) assumption. This implies in the context of this study that preference for a particular 
action is assumed to be independent of the preference for each of the four other types of 
actions against corruption. The results of the ‘suest-based’ Hausman test indicate that the 
MNL model presented in the foregoing section violates the IIA assumption in two of the 
five tests. Nevertheless, according to Cheng and Long (2007), tests of IIA are not always 
accurate or even useful. Freese and Long (2014) discourage their use altogether. This 
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notwithstanding, and because violations of the IIA assumption may lead to incorrect 
estimates, I employ the generalized ordered logit (gologit) estimation as the first 
robustness check of the MNL results. This is a robust yet computationally less intensive 
method of modelling unordered categorical data (William 2016). The results of the 
gologit model are highly consistent with those yielded by the MNL, and indicate that in 
general, the odds of preferring higher categories of action against corruption (with protest 
being the highest category) increase as the experience of bribery accumulates (see Table 
5.1A in Appendix 2).  
 
Another strategy involves creating a dichotomous variable out of the five-category ‘action 
against corruption’ item. To this end, I group all the four non-collective action categories 
into a single category and label it zero while the option for joining protests is labelled 
one. Due to the very low percentage of the respondents who preferred to engage in 
protests (2% of the sample), using the familiar binary logit regression may yield 
unreliable parameter estimates (see Allison 2012). This calls for a technique that accounts 
for the rarity of the event being modelled. Thus, I employ the complementary log-log 
regression as it is more suitable for modelling this type of data. The results shown in 
Table 2 are identical to those yielded by the MNL and gologit models. 
 
Table 5.2: Complimentary log-log regression model predicting preference for anti-
corruption protests 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
              
Experience of bribery 0.330 0.111 2.96 0.003 0.112 0.549 
Corruption perceptions -0.036 0.087 -0.41 0.682 -0.207 0.135 
Organizational membership 0.069 0.03 2.3 0.021 0.01 0.128 
Lived poverty 0.006 0.068 0.09 0.927 -0.127 0.14 
Tolerance for corruption -0.013 0.117 -0.11 0.915 -0.242 0.217 
Persons living conditions -0.069 0.056 -1.23 0.219 -0.18 0.041 
Relative living condition 0.178 0.063 2.84 0.005 0.055 0.301 
Institutional trust -0.107 0.074 -1.44 0.149 -0.251 0.038 
Education attainment 0.037 0.032 1.15 0.250 -0.026 0.099 
Age -0.015 0.005 -2.93 0.003 -0.025 -0.005 
Female 0.057 0.115 0.49 0.622 -0.168 0.281 
Generalised trust 0.272 0.131 2.07 0.038 0.015 0.529 
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Political interest 0.217 0.059 3.67 0.000 0.101 0.333 
Internal efficacy 0.101 0.048 2.13 0.033 0.008 0.194 
Intercept -3.079 0.234 -13.17 0.000 -3.538 -2.621 
Dependent variable is preference for protests 
Note: Country fixed effects included in regression modelling but omitted from the table 
 
An increase in the frequency of paying bribes has a very strong positive effect on the log-
odds of preferring to engage in protests, while the coefficient of popular perceptions of 
corruption remains non-significant. As a further robustness check, I have also employed 
the computationally intensive firthlogit transformation. By penalising the likelihood 
function, firthlogit tends to yield less biased regression estimates, and it is sometimes seen 
as the most stable estimation for extremely skewed binary outcomes. While the results 
are substantively similar to those yielded by complimentary log-log model, the parameter 
estimates of the experience of bribery are larger (see Table 5.2A in appendix 2). These 
minor differences notwithstanding, the three models communicate a coherent message: 
an increasing frequency of paying bribes increases the preference for anti-corruption 
protests. 
 
As intimated in chapter four, one of the main challenges of asking citizens about their 
potential reaction to corruption is that they can offer answers that conform to social 
expectations. In this context, it is possible that a majority of the 69 per cent of those who 
said they would lodge a complaint misrepresented their attitudes by giving a response that 
sounded like the type of thing ‘good citizens’ should say when suspecting corruption. 
This social desirability bias can get worse if the same people also underreported their 
involvement in bribery. There is no easy way to address this concern in a study that uses 
secondary data. However, because literature shows that social desirability is stronger 
among educated respondents (see Tourangeau and Yan 2007, Bernstein, Chadha and 
Montjoy 2001), I repeated all the analyses on a sample that excluded respondents who 
have at least some college education. These procedures did not alter the effect of bribery 
on action against corruption, particularly preference for anti-corruption protests.48 
 
                                                 
 
48 Using round three data, Justesen and Bjornkorv (2015) observed that excluding respondents with secondary and/or 
tertiary education does not alter the parameter estimates of effect of self-reported poverty on bribery.  
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It is also possible that despite assurances of confidentiality and anonymity, some of the 
respondents who thought their government had sponsored the survey (48 per cent of the 
sample) did not give an honest opinion about what they would do if they suspected that 
corruption was taking place in schools and clinics. Furthermore, some of these individuals 
may not have been honest about taking part in bribery as this is a criminal offence in all 
the eighteen countries in the sample. Estimating the models on a sub-sample that excludes 
respondents who thought their government was the main sponsor of the survey does not 
significantly change the parameter estimates of the experience of bribery, even though it 
changes their standard errors due to the reduction in sample size. Additionally, simply 
adding this variable as a control instead of using it as a filter does not change the results.  
 
Apart from social desirability, the data might suffer from what is known as a response set 
bias. This is because the survey item about reactions to corruption was asked as part of a 
set of five similarly worded questions regarding citizens’ reactions to a range of 
institutional dysfunctions (e.g. encountering delays in the processing of one’s passport of 
permit, being wrongfully arrested etc.). For various reasons, some of the respondents 
might have given the same answers for each of the five questions. However, frequency 
distributions of the responses to each of the five questions are quite different. For 
example, the proportion of respondents preferring to report corruption ranges from 50 per 
cent if they ‘waited for a permit but kept encountering delays’ to 80 per cent if someone 
tried to ‘seize their family’s land’.  Nevertheless, the most effective way to rule out the 
possibility of response set bias is to utilise a question that was not asked as part of a ‘set’. 
The sixth round of Afrobarometer surveys provides such an item. I use this item as a 
response outcome in a regression model whose results I use to ‘validate’ the effect of 
bribery on support for anti-corruption protests. This is one of the toughest robustness 
checks because the round six data set contains more than three times the number of 
observations used to establish the consistently positive effect of the experience of bribery. 
 
5.5.1. Support for other forms of civic action against corruption 
 
As indicated in chapter four, round six surveys asked what respondents thought was the 
most effective thing that ‘ordinary people like you can do to help combat corruption’. 
Most of the respondents mentioned reporting the corrupt practices (29%) or refusing to 
pay bribes (25%). One in four respondents felt that there was nothing civilians could do 
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to challenge corruption. Voting for clean candidates was mentioned by seven per cent of 
the respondents while speaking out (e.g. by calling a radio programme or writing a letter 
to the newspaper) was approved by 5 per cent of the respondents. Another 5 per cent felt 
that joining or supporting organisations that are fighting corruption could be the most 
effective thing to do. The least popular strategies were joining public protests (2%) and 
signing a petition calling for tougher sanctions against corruption (1.52%). Figure 5.3 
illustrates these frequency distributions. 
 
Figure 5.3: What is the most effective thing that an ordinary person like you can do to the 
help combat corruption in this country? 
 
 
Since estimating and interpreting the results of a multinomial logistic regression model 
with a nine-category outcome is cumbersome, and likely to consume too many degrees 
of freedom, I merge the options ‘speak about the problem’ with ‘talk to friends’ and label 
the resulting response category as ‘raise awareness’.49 I also merge ‘sign petitions’ with 
‘support anti-corruption organisations’ into a single category. This leads to a new seven-
category variable in which about 6 per cent of the respondents prefer to sign a petition or 
support anti-corruption organisations, while 8 per cent prefer to raise awareness about 
corruption. The frequency values of the other response options remain the same.  
 
                                                 
 
49 Indeed, according to Hough (2017:153), in the field of anti-corruption, awareness-raising “comes from finding 
innovative ways of either getting the public to think about corruption or making people more conscious of their 
rights” 
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Descriptive analysis shows a modest variability in support for different methods of 
tackling corruption across the African continent. The option to join protests and 
demonstrations is least preferred in Swaziland and Guinea where it was mentioned by 
less than one percent of the respondents and most preferred in Morocco, where nine 
percent of the respondents saw it as the most effective anti-corruption tactic. The option 
to ‘vote for clean parties and candidates’ ranges from 20 per cent approval rate in Nigeria 
to only one percent in Lesotho and Madagascar. With approximately 14 per cent of the 
respondents preferring to raise awareness about corruption, Nigeria takes the first spot on 
the ‘awareness’ option while Zimbabwe occupies the last position with only four percent 
preference rate. The preference for signing a petition or being actively involved in anti-
corruption organisations is highest in Lesotho (17%) and lowest in Egypt (2%). On the 
other hand, Lesotho registers the lowest support for ‘refuse to pay bribes’ option while 
the highest support is found in Madagascar (41%), Tanzania (41%) and Egypt (42%). 
Lastly, Botswana ranks the highest in the preference for reporting corruption (55%) while 
Nigeria ranks the lowest (15%). The response option ‘do nothing’ is most common in 
Sierra-Leone where it was mentioned by 45 per cent of the respondents and least popular 
in Botswana where it was approved by only 10 percent.  
 
Regressing this seven-category variable against the variables 50  used in the models 
estimated in the previous section yields results that are broadly consistent with the main 
narrative in that section. Holding other variables at their mean values, the relative 
probability of supporting anti-corruption protests rises with an increasing frequency of 
paying a bribe. Furthermore, an increase in frequency of paying a bribe increases support 
for raising awareness or voting for clean political parties relative to reporting corruption. 
On the contrary, an increase in the experience of bribery decreases the relative probability 
of thinking that reporting corruption or refusing to pay bribes is the most effective thing 
citizens can do about corruption. Similarly, the likelihood of saying that there is nothing 
ordinary people can do declines as the experience of bribery accumulates (see Table 5.3A 
in appendix 2). To get a more nuanced picture of the effect of the experience of bribery, 
I plot changes in the probability to prefer each of the seven anti-corruption tactics at 
                                                 
 
50 Round six does not have questions about corruption tolerance and generalised trust 
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different values of the experience of bribery variable. The two panels shown in Figure 
5.4 present the results of this procedure. 
 
Figure 5.4: Predicted probability of different actions against corruption at different points in 
the frequency of bribe payments (Round 6 data) 
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Panel 1 in Figure 5.4 shows that overall, as the experience of bribery increases, the 
predicted probability of saying that ‘ordinary people cannot do anything against 
corruption’ or that ‘they should refuse to pay bribes’ declines. However, contrary to the 
results based on round three, the predicted probability of saying people should report 
corruption does not decline after the first experience of paying a bribe. This means that it 
might take several encounters with demands for bribes before a payer’s confidence in the 
ability of public institutions to address corruption declines. This variation 
notwithstanding, the message is the same as the one in the previous section; those for 
whom corruption is a more regular experience (i.e. whom corruption is endemic) are 
highly unlikely to see reporting as a viable anti-corruption strategy. 
 
The results shown in panel 2 suggest that generally, the probability of selecting response 
categories ‘raise awareness’, ‘vote for clean candidates and ‘join protests’ rises as the 
experience of bribery increases. For the ‘sign petitions or support anti-corruption 
organisations’ option, the relationship changes its positive trajectory to negative as 
bribery experiences accumulate. Apart from this strong non-linearity, those who do not 
have any direct experience with corruption have a higher probability of preferring this 
option compared to the other forms of civic engagement against corruption. These results 
indicate quite strongly that individuals with high experience of bribery are less likely to 
see offering support for anti-corruption organisations or signing a petition as viable 
strategy against endemic graft.      
 
Apart from acting as a robustness check, analysing round six data reveals more interesting 
nuances about the nature of the impact of direct exposure to corruption. The declining 
probability of refusing to pay a bribe as personal experience of bribery increases is highly 
consistent with the rising probability of using bribes and influential connections as the 
experience of bribery accumulates as reported on page 104. Simply put, an individual 
with the highest personal experience of bribery has the lowest probability of refusing to 
pay a bribe (round six data) and the highest likelihood of using bribery and influential 
connections when she needs to solve a public-goods problem (round three data).  
 
This finding casts light on Persson, Rothstein and Teorell’s assertion that, “while it is 
important not to overlook the masses of people who are collectively rising in defiance of 
corrupt and abusive governments around the world, in their individual encounters with 
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public officials, the majority of citizens in the end still seem to perpetuate rather than fight 
corrupt exchanges…” (Persson, Teorell and Rothstein 2013:455). Indeed, to the extent 
that regular bribers are unlikely to see refusal to pay bribes as the solution to corruption, 
and by extension more likely to continue to pay a bribe, the results can be interpreted 
through the pessimistic (i.e. collective action) lens that Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 
have popularised. As intimated on page 31, residents of highly corrupt societies, 
especially those who are regularly being involved in corruption, appreciate the ‘problem-
solving’ function of bribery. They know that refusing to pay often means going without 
the public good or service that petty corruption or connections with influential individuals 
secures for them (see Hope 2014). What is more, as Persson, Teorell and Rothstein 
(2013:463) observe, “the amounts paid to venal officials are often surprisingly small 
compared to the sorts of relative, short-term gains realised by those who pay the bribes”.  
 
What previous studies have not revealed and, indeed what acts as a basis for optimism is 
the fact that regular bribers are also likely to see citizens’ centred interventions as 
effective means of tackling corruption. Moreover, if presented with the choice between 
refusing to pay a bribe and taking part in anti-corruption protests and demonstrations, 
bribers are significantly more likely to prefer the latter. Taken together, these results 
imply that seeing corruption as a problem-solving device should not be interpreted as a 
sign of ‘resignation’ or cynicism. It does not imply that victims of corruption will shy 
away from using other means available to them to express their discontent. While most 
ordinary Africans with an experience of paying bribes are unlikely to resist demands for 
bribes or report incidences of corruption, they are much more likely to support citizens’ 
efforts to bring corruption under control. This study is the first to articulate this finding.   
 
Another nuance that this analysis adds to the link between corruption and anti-corruption 
civic action is that there is an order in the way bribery influences the support for anti-
corruption collective action. There are most favourable and least favourable forms of civic 
engagement against corruption conditional on changes in the frequency of bribe 
payments. Holding other variables at their mean values, frequent bribers are most likely 
to prefer to raise awareness about corruption before opting to vote for a different political 
party or candidate and eventually taking to the streets. This is understandable if we 
consider the differential costs implications of each of these forms of collective action. 
Signing a petition, raising awareness and voting for anti-corruption champions are less 
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costly forms of civic engagement than taking part in protests and demonstrations (which 
often turn violent in many parts of Africa). This finding is consistent with the findings of 
Klandermans and van Stekelenburg (2014) who demonstrate that individuals gravitate 
towards activities that help redress their grievances at affordable costs. Costlier forms of 
collective action are chosen as the last resort.  
 
The results of the multinomial logit model based on round three data suggested that an 
increase in corruption perceptions increases the relative likelihood of saying that people 
should not worry about corruption as ‘things will be resolved given enough time’. The 
model based on round six also indicate, curiously, that an increasing perception of 
corruption has a very strong positive effect on the relative probability of saying that 
nothing can be done about corruption. In fact, when the reference category is changed to 
‘nothing can be done’, the results show that acquiescing becomes the most preferred 
choice as the perceptions of the level of corruption increase.  
 
This is further confirmed by running a complementary log-log regression model 
predicting the probability of selecting the option ‘nothing can be done’ against the other 
options combined (see Table 5.3). This model suggests that a rising corruption perception 
has a strong positive effect on the likelihood of saying that nothing can be done about 
corruption. It is worth pointing out that the coefficient of the experience of bribery 
remains highly significant and negative, indicating that overall, an increasing frequency 
of paying bribes reduces the likelihood of saying that there is nothing citizens can do 
about corruption.  
 
Table 5.3: Complementary log-log regression model predicting ‘nothing can be done 
about corruption’  
Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
z P>z [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Experience of bribery -0.204 0.045 -4.550 0.000 -0.291 -0.116 
Corruption perceptions 0.146 0.019 7.570 0.000 0.108 0.183 
Institutional trust -0.026 0.014 -1.830 0.068 -0.055 0.002 
Relative living condition -0.062 0.013 -4.840 0.000 -0.087 -0.037 
Persons living conditions -0.053 0.012 -4.520 0.000 -0.075 -0.030 
Lived poverty -0.004 0.003 -1.490 0.136 -0.010 0.001 
Education attainment -0.074 0.006 -11.960 0.000 -0.086 -0.062 
Female 0.061 0.023 2.640 0.008 0.016 0.106 
Age 0.000 0.001 0.570 0.571 -0.001 0.002 
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Political interest -0.094 0.011 -8.540 0.000 -0.116 -0.073 
membership -0.097 0.013 -7.360 0.000 -0.122 -0.071 
       
Intercept -0.998 0.094 -10.640 0.000 -1.182 -0.814 
Notes: Dependent variable is ‘nothing can be done about corruption’. Country fixed 
effects included in modelling but omitted from the table. Model based on round six data. 
 
This highly divergent effects of the subjective perceptions of corruption and personal 
experience of bribery have not been articulated in studies on individual level outcomes of 
corruption in the African continent. So far, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
bureaucratic corruption provides a stronger motivation for civic engagement than grand 
corruption (for which the perception of corruption index is regarded as a proxy). 
 
It is worth mentioning that this study is not the first to find that an increase in perceptions 
of corruption has a corrosive but inconsistent effect on willingness to challenge 
corruption. Peiffer and Alvarez concluded that although corruption “perceptions have 
inconsistently estimated direct effects on the dependent variables …perceived systematic 
corruption works to reduce willingness to engage in activism in the non-OECD setting” 
(Peiffer and Alvarez 2015:12-13). The analysis in chapter six reveals one of the main 
reasons an increase in perception of corruption has an inconsistent effect at individual 
level.  
 
5.5.2. Bribery and actual participation in protests and demonstrations 
 
Across the 18 African countries, only 14 per cent of the respondents reported taking part 
in the protests that occurred a year prior to the survey. The rarity of the self-reported 
protest action corresponds with the strikingly low preference for anti-corruption protest 
reported in previous sections. It is also in line with a large literature on collective action 
suggesting that taking part in protests is an uncommon phenomenon (Lichbach 1998). 
The so-called five per cent rule by Lichbach (1995,1998) maintains that not more than 
five per cent of the population participate in protests and rebellions at least ninety-five 
per cent of the time. As he argues, “because the percentage of people mobilised into 
collective dissent is almost always small, the study of collective dissent involves the study 
of minorities and not the majority, irregularities and not regularities” (Lichbach 
1995:126). 
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The data however suggests that the propensity to take part in protest differs widely across 
African countries. South Africa had the highest percentage of respondents reporting to 
have taken part in protests (24%), followed by Mozambique (23%) Namibia (19%), 
Botswana (18%), Tanzania (17%) and Nigeria (15%). Taking part in protests was less 
frequent in Lesotho (4%), Mali (6%), Cape Verde (8%), Ghana (8%), Malawi (8%) and 
Zimbabwe (8%). The protest rates in the remaining six countries fell between these 
extremes. These participation rates correspond with objective country-level data on the 
rates of protests in Africa. For instance, according to the African Development Bank, 
between 2013 and 2015, South Africa experienced the highest number of protests in 
Africa while Lesotho experienced the lowest (AfDB 2015). The lack of accountability, 
transparency and corruption are cited as some of the major factors in Africa’s mass 
uprisings (AfDB 2015, Branch and Mampilly 2015).  
 
I estimate a fixed effects complimentary log-log regression model to ascertain the effect 
of corruption perceptions and experience of bribery on propensity to take part in actual 
protests and demonstrations. Since this section is designed mainly as a robustness check 
of the results in previous sections, the analysis focuses on the effect of these two 
corruption variables, more especially the experience of bribery which emerged as highly 
significant in the models presented in previous sections. Although the quadratic terms for 
each of these variables were estimated to check for non-monotonic relationships, only the 
statistically significant bribery quadratic term was retained.  
 
Consistent with the results of the previous section, the perception of corruption has a non-
significant effect on the odds of having taken part in past protests and demonstrations.  
The experience of bribery has a strong positive effect. Additionally, the quadratic term of 
the frequency of bribery is negative and statistically significant, indicating a concave 
relationship between bribery experience and the probability of taking part in protests (see 
Table 5.4).  
 
Table 5.4: Complimentary log-log regression of protest participation 
  Robust 
Coef. 
  
Std. Err. 
  
z 
  
P>z 
 [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
      
Experience of bribery 0.823 0.117 7.03 0.00 0.593 1.052 
Quadratic term of bribery -0.279 0.065 -4.31 0.00 -0.405 -0.152 
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Corruption perceptions 0.027 0.037 0.73 0.46 -0.045 0.099 
Organizational 
membership 0.175 0.011 16.12 0.00 0.154 0.197 
Lived poverty 0.060 0.026 2.29 0.02 0.009 0.112 
Tolerance for corruption -0.062 0.051 -1.23 0.22 -0.162 0.037 
Persons living condition 0.006 0.022 0.27 0.79 -0.038 0.05 
Relative living condition -0.037 0.025 -1.5 0.14 -0.085 0.011 
Institutional trust -0.011 0.031 -0.36 0.72 -0.072 0.049 
Education attainment 0.047 0.013 3.57 0.00 0.021 0.072 
Age -0.004 0.002 -2.07 0.04 -0.008 0.00 
Female -0.260 0.045 -5.74 0.00 -0.348 -0.171 
Generalised trust 0.020 0.059 0.16 0.87 -0.106 0.126 
Political interest 0.250 0.026 9.58 0.00 0.199 0.302 
Internal political efficacy -0.021 0.018 -1.17 0.24 -0.057 0.014 
Rural 0.071 0.048 1.48 0.14 -0.023 0.166 
Intercept -2.281 0.141 -16.14 0.00 -2.556 -2.00 
Notes: country fixed effects included in regression modelling but omitted from the table 
 
The results indicate that an increasing experience of bribery has a strong positive effect 
on the probability of taking part in protests. This is consistent with the interpretation that 
the experience of paying bribes is, indeed, a mobilising grievance as established in 
previous sections. Nevertheless, the negative quadratic term adds a caveat to this 
interpretation. It seems that a much more regular encounter with bribery has a corrosive 
effect on the propensity to take part in protests and demonstrations. But it should be 
emphasised that although the effect tapers off at high values of the bribery variable, it still 
remains very high as shown in Figure 5.4. It is worth pointing out that this strong effect 
of the bribery experience variable can also be detected when round six data are used. 
Importantly, the quadratic term of bribery is also significantly negative in the regression 
models based on round six data. (see Figure 5.4). This implies that the non-linear effect 
of bribery experience on propensity to join protests and demonstrations may not be an 
artefact of a specific data set. 
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Figure 5.5: The differential impact of bribery experience on probability of protest participation 
in rounds three and six 
 
 
Although the multinomial regression model presented in the previous section and the 
logistic model of past participation in protests are not entirely comparable, it is 
remarkable that the effect of bribery comes out so significant in both. This is because 
collective action scholars often point to the discrepancies that arise when models that 
predict people’s intentions are compared with those on actual behaviour. In fact, studies 
conducted in Europe show that people who expressed support for protests do not always 
follow through with corresponding action.  Klandermans and Stekelenburg (2014) for 
instance found that only two out of five Dutch citizens who supported protest action 
against the proliferation of nuclear weapons actually took part in the anti-nuclear protests. 
According to Zomeren et al (2008:510) the disjuncture between intentions and actual 
behaviour arises because “compared with intentions, behaviour is subject to interference 
from additional random or systematic factors”.  
 
5.6. Conclusion 
 
Using citizens’ preferred actions against corruption as the main dependent variable, this 
chapter examined the mobilisation impact of the perceptions of corruption and personal 
experiences of bribery. The results show that on average, regular bribers prefer the use of 
protests to address corruption and that they do take part in actual protests and 
demonstrations. The generally positive effect of the experience of bribery survives 
various empirical conditions. It is detectable when the model is tested on a dataset that 
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has more than three times the number of individuals. Importantly, an increase in the 
experience of bribery increases support for forms of civic action against corruption other 
than protest. This increases our confidence in the view that having to pay a bribe provokes 
willingness to get personally involved in efforts to bring corruption under control. This 
consistency in the effect of the bribery variable is noteworthy if one considers that such 
minor issues as the features of survey design can introduce significant variance between 
surveys measuring the same attitudes (see Zaller and Feldman 1992).  
 
Further analysis of the data shows that an experience with bribery increases the 
probability of actually joining protests only up to a certain point, after which the effect of 
additional payments tapers off. This corresponds to the interpretation that individuals for 
whom corruption has become a routine could be slightly less willing to participate in 
collective dissent. The results of the protest participation model should be cautiously 
interpreted since we do not know whether the protests that a respondent attended were 
about corruption or governance issues more broadly.   
 
The analysis has shown that perceptions of corruption have an inconsistent but largely 
corrosive effect on support for citizens-centred anti-corruption efforts. The next chapter 
probes this finding further by allowing the effect of corruption to vary cross-nationally 
— something that several studies on anti-corruption civic engagement do not employ (see 
for example, Peiffer and Alvarez 2015). Indeed, I should point out that controlling for 
country-level effects rather than specifically modelling for them is one of the weaknesses 
of the analysis in this chapter, and much of the analysis of public opinion data on Africa. 
The multilevel technique employed in the next chapter was unsuitable for analysis of 
round three data due to the limited higher-level units (i.e. 18 countries).  
 
Seen from the grievance perspective, the highly consistent mobilising effect of the 
experience of bribery seems to stand in sharp contrast to Uslaner’s (2008) assertion that 
petty corruption is not a source of anger and frustration for ordinary people. As he notes, 
“the sort of corruption that engulfs ordinary citizens–petty corruption — is not as morally 
troubling as the grand thievery of the rich and powerful” (Uslaner 2008:244). “It is the 
high-level corruption— among government officials and business people— that makes 
ordinary people disaffected” and willing to challenge it (Uslaner 2008:123).  
119 
Chapter six 
 Contextual analysis of collective civic action against 
corruption 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter shifts attention to the cross-national variability in support for citizen-centred 
and collective action methods of tackling corruption. Using multilevel regression models, 
the analysis explains why individual-level corruption might work differently across 
African countries, acting as a catalyst for collective action in some countries and a 
demobilising force in others. Employing a multilevel regression technique, which models 
the impact of observed and unobserved context-level factors, this analysis departs from 
the way in which the majority of corruption studies in Africa have been conducted. The 
analysis draws upon the sixth round of the Afrobarometer surveys.  
 
To preview the results, there is a negligible contextual variability in the effect of the 
experience of bribery. This means that contextual heterogeneity is unlikely to have a 
significant impact on the association between direct experience of bribery and support for 
anti-corruption collective action. On the contrary, the variability in the effect of 
corruption perceptions can be explained, to a large extent, by observed and unobserved 
country-level processes. For instance, an increase in the perception of corruption is more 
likely to increase support for collective action in poor, ethnically divided and clientelistic 
societies. Curiously, the context-level measure of corruption does not influence the 
impact of individual-level corruption variables.  
 
Nevertheless, the national context characterised by poor control of corruption reduces 
support for collective action for individuals who do not believe that ordinary people can 
fight corruption. But curiously, those who strongly believe in the ability of citizens to 
fight corruption are impervious to the corrosive effects of the context characterised by 
extremely high levels of corruption. Further to that, and most importantly, individuals 
who believe that ordinary people can make a difference in anti-corruption become 
increasingly likely to support collective action as their perceptions of corruption increase. 
The practical and theoretical implications of this resiliency to the corrosive effects of 
corruption are teased out in the conclusion. 
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This chapter is organised as follows. The next two sections offer a summary of the model 
specification and estimation procedures. The results section briefly discusses the 
individual level effects before turning to the contextual effects— the thrust of this chapter. 
It is important to clarify that the reason for focusing on corruption perceptions (rather 
than experiences of bribery) is based on the need to explain the strong contextual effect 
of the perception of corruption. A similar logic underpins the focus on the contextual 
analysis of collective efficacy to fight corruption, which I also consider as the measure of 
generalised interpersonal trust. Towards the end, the chapter examines the role of 
ethnicity in the support for anti-corruption collective action. The results suggest that an 
increasing sense of ethnic marginalisation increases the preference for collective action 
against corruption. Furthermore, increase in ethnic identification increases the support for 
collective action strategies of anti-corruption.      
 
6.2. Model specifications and expectations 
 
As indicated in chapter four, this contextual analysis focused on the following country-
level variables: national-level poverty rate, country-level measure of corruption (i.e. WGI 
control of corruption indicator), civil society robustness, poverty at country level, 
clientelism at country level and ethno-linguistic fractionalisation. Support for collective 
action against corruption was expected to decline as the context-level corruption 
increases. Second, a national context characterised by a strong network of civil society 
organisations was expected to increase support for collectively oriented strategies of 
tackling corruption. Third, country poverty level was expected to reduce the cross-
national variability in support for collective action strategies. Fourth, increase in 
clientelism was expected to increase the support for anti-corruption collective action.  
 
In addition to explaining country-level differences in support for anti-corruption 
collective action, I expected these variables to moderate the effects of the main individual-
level predictors, namely corruption perceptions and bribery experiences. For instance, 
individuals who perceive high levels of corruption were expected to have lower 
propensity to support collective action if they lived in highly corrupt societies. 
Furthermore, in places where civil society is robust, an increase in perception of 
corruption or experience of bribery was to increase the propensity to support anti-
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corruption collective action. I expected individuals living in poor countries to be more 
willing to challenge corruption as their perceptions of corruption or experience of bribery 
accumulated. An increase in the non-universalist distribution of public goods was 
expected to increase the positive effect of these two individual-level corruption variables.  
 
As I have noted in chapter two, endemic corruption is regarded as a co-ordination 
dilemma (i.e. an assurance problem). This means that when corruption is high, the average 
belief in citizens’ ability and willingness to challenge it is likely to be low since most 
people think that the system will not respond when citizens try to exert influence on it 
(Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013). Afrobarometer allows us to test this proposition 
using an item that enquires about respondents’ belief that ordinary people can challenge 
corruption. Scholars have used this question as a measure of both collective efficacy 
(Isbell 2017) and generalised interpersonal trust (Bauhr 2016). To the extent that the 
concepts of collective efficacy and generalised trust are intertwined, being the core 
elements of social capital (see Sampson and Graif 2009), I consider this item as a measure 
of both, and use the concepts of trust and collective efficacy interchangeably throughout 
this analysis.51  
 
Apart from the key variables of corruption perceptions and bribery experiences, I also 
include, where possible, the individual-level control variables that came out significant in 
the models presented in the previous chapter. I add to this list of controls four survey 
items capturing the various dimensions of the concept of ‘democratic values’. These items 
represent attitudes towards vertical accountability. The first one measures support for 
unconditional involvement of citizens in efforts to hold the government accountable. The 
second one measures the extent to which respondents believe democratic citizens ought 
to question (or criticise) the government. The third one is about the belief that the media 
should constantly investigate and report on government mistakes and corruption versus 
the idea that too much reporting on corruption only harms the country. The last one is the 
classic measure of the support for democracy (see Mattes and Bratton 2007, Bratton and 
                                                 
 
51 The analysis of Sampson and Graif (2009) demonstrates that collective efficacy is indeed empowered by 
generalised interpersonal trust and vice versa. They see collective efficacy as “the combination of trust and shared 
willingness of residents to intervene in social control” (Sampson and Graif 2009:184). Ansari (2013) also argues that 
the concepts of bridging social capital (especially generalised trust) and collective efficacy are complimentary and 
overlapping. 
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Mattes 2001, Diamond 2001); it asks respondents to choose between three statements as 
follows: 1) whether democracy is always preferable to any kind of government; 2) in 
some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable, and 3) For 
someone like me, it does not matter what kind of government we have. An individual 
who has democratic values agrees that democracy is always preferable to any kind of 
government, believes that media should always probe corruption, citizens should always 
question the decisions of government and that citizens ought to always be involved in 
government processes. I expect such an individual to support citizens-centred and 
collective action methods of anti-corruption. 
 
 6.3. Estimation techniques and issues  
 
Due to the large within country samples (compared to the number of countries), most 
multilevel analyses of cross-national public opinion surveys tend to estimate individual-
level effects more reliably than their country-level counterparts (see Bryan and Jenkins 
2015, Hox 2010, Heck, Thomas and Tabata 2012). For this reason, most scholars accept 
a 10 per cent significance rate for higher-level variables and the nominal 5 per cent for 
their lower level counterparts (see Dahlberg and Solevid 2016). I follow this convention. 
Allowing the effects of individual-level predictors to vary across higher-level units 
introduces two extra parameters into the model, namely the variance of the slope and the 
covariance of the slope and the intercept. When the number of countries is small, which 
is the case in this analysis, these extra parameters can consume too many degrees of 
freedom, thereby reducing the predictive power of the model. In this regard, I follow 
Heck, Thomas and Tabata’s (2012) recommendation to examine the random effects of 
key individual-level predictors one at a time. Lastly, I follow the standard practice of 
testing for the random effects separately before adding country-level variables and cross-
level interactions.  
 
As a reminder, I rely exclusively on the 6th round of the Afrobarometer surveys. Because 
of the nominal nature of the item measuring the dependent variable (see page 110), 
multilevel multinomial logit regression is the most appropriate statistical technique. 
However, this modeling strategy proved too complex and indeed failed to converge due, 
in part, to the small frequencies of some of the response options (e.g. join protests). An 
additional source of convergence problems was that typically, multilevel multinomial 
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regression models require a large number of observations at macro-level (at least 50 
observations), whereas the Afrobarometer data set provides only 35 countries. One 
solution is to pay a small price of model misspecification that could result from changing 
the nine-category item into a dichotomous measure. To this end, I group the response 
categories ‘refuse to pay bribes, report corruption’ and ‘do nothing’ and assign them a 
value of zero and assign the remaining collectively-orientated categories, the value of 
one. The values of the resulting binary response variable can be construed as representing 
on one hand individual strategies against corruption (i.e. refuse to pay bribe, report 
corruption and do nothing) and on the other hand, collectively-oriented strategies (raise 
awareness, sign petitions, join protests and vote for clean candidates and parties). 
 
Although reducing these response categories into a binary variable is based on practical 
(i.e. software and statistical) limitations, there is some evidence that the collectively 
oriented strategies ‘hang’ together at country-level. There is a modest positive correlation 
between the random effects of ‘join protests’, ‘sign petitions’ ‘raise awareness’ and ‘vote 
for clean candidates’. These are all negatively correlated with the response categories of 
‘do nothing’ and ‘report corruption’. The three strongest correlations are between ‘join 
protests’ and ‘vote clean candidates’ (r=0.659), followed by ‘sign petitions’ and ‘raise 
awareness’ (r=0.644), ‘vote clean candidates’ and ‘raise awareness’ (r=0.592) and finally, 
‘sign petitions’ and ‘join protests’ (r=0.522)52. These indicate that, at the country level, a 
preference for one of these strategies (relative to ‘do nothing or report corruption) rises 
with an increase in preferences for others.  
 
About one in four respondents prefer collectively oriented strategies for tackling 
corruption. Because of this low rate of support for collective action, I employ a multilevel 
complementary log-log regression model instead of the familiar logistic transformation. 
As highlighted in chapter five, the complementary log-log transformation is the best 
alternative to the more commonly used binary logit and probit transformations when one 
of the categories in the dichotomous variable has very low values (typically less than 75 
per cent).  
                                                 
 
52 This unconditional multinomial multilevel regression model was estimated in Mlwin programme. Since the 
estimates obtained by maximum likelihood methods can be biased when the higher-level units are small, I first 
employed quasi-likelihood (RGLS, PQL, 2nd order linearisation) and the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
method to obtain more credible estimates in Mlwin.  
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 6.4. Results 
 
Although 14 countries have above-average support for collective action, only 11 have 
mean values that differ significantly from the overall average at the five per cent level. 
These are countries whose precision weighted estimates (and confidence intervals) lie 
completely above the horizontal line that crosses through zero in Figure 6.1. Given that 
this zero-line represents a negative value (i.e. the value of the overall intercept is 
negative), most people in countries whose residual values are around zero and those that 
are below it support non-collective action strategies such as reporting corruption or saying 
that nothing can be done about corruption. Collective demand for accountability is only 
supported in less than a third of the countries in the sample. 
 
Figure 6.1: Precision-weighted estimates of support for anti-corruption collective action with 
95% confidence intervals 
 
 
Nigeria and Sudan have the strongest support for collective action against corruption 
while Tunisia and Madagascar register the lowest. Considering that Nigeria and Sudan 
are regarded as some of the most corrupt countries in the world (see Transparency 
International 2016), their citizens’ strong approval of collectively oriented methods 
challenges the notion that residents of countries where corruption is systemic are 
automatically less likely to challenge corruption. However, support for collective action 
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is not particularly high in countries that Transparency International considers as relatively 
clean either (e.g. Mauritius or Botswana). Taken together, these preliminary results 
suggest that what experts tell us about a country’s level of corruption may not, on its own, 
justify conclusions about ordinary people’s attitudes towards anti-corruption 
mobilisation. Indeed, as the we shall see, the context-level measure of corruption has does 
not account for country-level variability in support for collective action against 
corruption. Given the large average support for collective action against corruption in 
Nigeria, it is wise to check whether it exerts undue influence on the models. I replicated 
all the findings in this chapter using samples that exclude Nigeria. This does not change 
the results.53 
 
Table 6.1A in appendix 3 presents the results of the multilevel complimentary log-log 
models. Model 1 indicates that men and younger people are significantly more likely to 
think that collective civic action is the most effective strategy against corruption. In terms 
of resource mobilisation variables, the increasing frequency of using traditional news 
media (i.e. radio) has a weak positive effect. Curiously, an increase in the frequency of 
using the internet has a negative but non-significant effect on the likelihood to support 
collective action. The coefficient of membership in voluntary associations is highly 
significant and positive as it was the case in the models reported in chapter five. Having 
attended protests and demonstrations in the past year increases the preference for 
collective action strategies, confirming the positive effect that the individual experience 
of civic engagement has been found to exert on attitude towards collective action (see 
Gibson 1997; Ostrom 2000). 
 
Regarding the impact of democratic norms and values, the results are inconclusive. The 
item probing attitudes about citizens’ right to question political authority is highly non-
significant (z = 0.63) and has been excluded in the models shown in Table 6.1A. Also, 
there is no statistically significant difference in support for anti-corruption collective 
action between those who support citizens’ involvement in accountability efforts and 
those who don’t. Furthermore, there is no difference between individuals who feel that 
                                                 
 
53 Another alternative is to ‘absorb’ the outlier into a dummy variable and run the model on the rest of the data. These 
holds ‘Nigeria’ estimates at the average values and fits the model on the rest of the data. This alternative strategy was 
performed in Mlwin programme. The results remain the same.  
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democratic rule does not matter and those who think democracy is always preferable to 
any kind of government. Instead, it is those who think that non-democratic alternatives 
are sometimes preferable who are likely to support collective action against corruption. 
Lastly, the respondents who agree and strongly agree that media should constantly 
investigate, and report on government mistakes and corruption are significantly less likely 
to support collective action against corruption.  
 
Before proceeding with the rest of the analysis, there is a need for further reflection on 
the above-mentioned results. The positive effects of membership in voluntary 
associations, previous involvement in collective action and access to news media are all 
consistent with the predictions of the resource mobilisation and civic culture hypotheses 
(see Mungiu-Pipiddi 2013). Drawing from Tocqueville, Mungiu-Pippidi (2013:104) 
considers these as some of the main components of the “normative constraints that 
empower ethnical universalism”. The fly in this civic culture ointment though is the non-
significant effect of access to the internet as well as the largely negative effect of various 
measures of democratic values. The verdict seems to be that democratic values (or civic 
culture) plays a minor, if any, role in anti-corruption mobilisation in Africa. That is, in 
Africa, support for anti-corruption collective action is not strongly rooted in civic culture. 
I return to the issue of democratic citizenship in the analysis in chapter eight. 
 
An increase in perceived collective efficacy to fight corruption (or generalised trust) has 
a strong positive effect, indicating that all else being equal, those who believe that 
ordinary people can help combat corruption are significantly likely to support civic 
engagement. The main effect of popular perceptions of corruption is rather inconsistent. 
I noted in chapter five that the perception of corruption being widespread seems to have 
both a corrosive and mobilisation effect. In the current model, the perception of corruption 
variable starts off with a positive coefficient which becomes negative when we control 
for its highly significant and positive interaction with collective efficacy/ generalised 
trust. This implies that an increasing confidence in the ability of ordinary people to fight 
corruption reduces the corrosive effect of the perception of corruption. I elaborate on this 
interaction in section 6.4.2.  
 
Consistent with the results in the previous chapter, the average effect of the experience of 
paying bribes is significantly positive, indicating that the mobilising impact of bribery 
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survives different model estimations and specifications’ procedures. This analysis also 
suggests that an increasing experience of paying bribes has the strongest effect among the 
poorest individuals. Figure 6.2 depicts this interaction. In this graph, the line labelled as 
‘least poor’ represents respondents whose self-rated poverty scores fall within the lowest 
25 per cent on the poverty scale. A majority of the individuals (75%) in this category did 
not go without any of the basic necessities mentioned in the items comprising the lived 
poverty index (LPI). An increase in the experience of paying bribes doesn’t change this 
group’s probability to support collective action strategies. 
 
Figure 6.2: An interaction between self-rated poverty and experience with bribery (with 95% 
confidence intervals) 
 
 
The group labelled ‘average poor’ comprises respondents whose self-rated poverty scores 
approximate the middle point of all scores. Finally, the line labelled as ‘most poor’ 
represents respondents whose poverty scores make up the top 25 per cent of the poverty 
index. For this group, a positive change from lowest to the highest experience with paying 
bribes increases the probability of preferring collectively oriented methods by up to 16 
percentage points. The results indicate therefore that accumulated experience of bribery 
has a strong influence on poor people’s propensity to support anti-corruption collective 
action. This finding has not previously been demonstrated in an African context. 
 
128 
6.4.1. The contextual effect of corruption perceptions 
 
Allowing the effect of bribery to vary across countries does not substantially improve the 
model. Specifically, it does not alter the significance and size of the within-country effect. 
It seems therefore that the characteristics of countries do not influence differences in 
support for anti-corruption collective action between those who pay bribes and those who 
don’t. An increase in the experience of paying bribes is therefore likely to influence the 
propensity for collective action in roughly similar ways across the African continent. The 
effect of corruption perceptions, on the other hand, is largely contingent upon where 
corruption is being perceived. As shown in model 2 in Table 6.1A (in appendix 3), the 
fixed coefficient of the perceptions of corruption becomes non-significant when the 
variable is allowed to have a separate effect on each of the 35 countries in the data set. 
This implies that how the perception of corruption influences attitudes towards the role 
of citizens in anti-corruption efforts depends, to a large extent, on unobserved country-
level processes. Although the reduction in fit statistics (i.e. BIC and AIC) suggest that the 
random coefficient model is the better fit of the data, the between variance of this model 
increases substantially. This means that adding a differential slope of corruption 
perceptions increases the unexplained heterogeneity between countries in support for 
anti-corruption collective action. 
 
Figure 6.3 represents the covariance plot of the country-level residuals of the slope of 
popular perceptions of corruption and the country-level deviations of the overall intercept. 
The vertical line represents the overall average effect of the preference for collective civic 
action against corruption while the horizontal line represents the average effect of the 
perception of corruption. Countries that lie closer to the horizontal line have parameter 
estimates that are more similar to the overall effect of the perception of corruption (e.g. 
Togo, Lesotho and Tanzania). An increase in corruption perceptions has a positive effect 
in slightly over a third of the African countries (i.e. 13 of the 35 countries). The countries 
shown in the top-left corner of this covariance plot have a below-average support for 
collective action methods but a higher-than average effect of corruption perceptions. 
These are the countries in which small increases in corruption perceptions can have a 
strong positive effect on anti-corruption mobilisation. Namibia is a notable exception in 
that an increase in perceptions of corruption compounds the already high propensity to 
support anti-corruption civic engagement. 
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Figure 6.3: Intercepts and slope residuals for the relationship between the perception of 
corruption and support for anti-corruption collective action  
 
 
South Africa, Egypt, Tunisia and Madagascar are some of the countries with negative 
slope residuals of the perception of corruption. This corrosive effect of corruption 
perceptions may come as a surprise considering the numerous violent protests that have 
been staged in the name of anti-corruption and poor public services in South Africa. 
Furthermore, given the high premium placed on the mobilising effect of corruption during 
the Arab Spring, it is surprising that the effect of corruption perceptions appears to be 
negative in Tunisia and Egypt. Indeed, Beyerle (2014) and Vogl (2012) identify anger 
and frustration over corruption as the main drivers of the 2011-2012 mass uprisings in 
both countries. Given that civic action successfully brought down dictators in these 
countries, one would expect an increase in perceptions of corruption to have a positive 
correlation with the support for citizen-centred anti-corruption efforts. 
 
The ability to include country-level variables that comes with the use of multilevel models 
has two advantages. The first one is that simply adding these variables enables researchers 
to explain the significant cross-national variability of the outcome variable. The second 
advantage is that by specifying cross-level interactions, researchers can explain the 
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significant contextual effects of the individual-level predictors (Snijders and Bosker 
2012). Model 3 in Table 6.1A controls for the effects of our four country-level variables. 
First, as intimated previously, the context-level measure of corruption (i.e. CCI) is not 
statistically significant, even when it is entered as the only country-level covariate54. The 
strength of civil society, mean poverty rate and political clientelism have statistically 
significant coefficients. In light of the strong effect of individual-level poverty, the highly 
significant effect of mean poverty rate suggests that poverty has a strong effect both 
within and across African countries. When the mean poverty rate is added as the only 
higher-level variable, it explains nine per cent of the cross-national variability in average 
support for collective action methods of tackling corruption. Together, the four country-
level variables explain 22 percent of the cross-national variability. 
 
The cross-level interaction of CCI and perceptions of corruption is negative but non-
significant. However, the interaction between perceptions of corruption and state-level 
clientelism is significantly positive, suggesting that clientelism reduces the corrosive 
impact of corruption perceptions. Figure 6.4 depicts this interaction55. In this graph, the 
line labelled ‘low corruption perception’ represents the respondents whose corruption 
perception score falls within the lowest 25 percent on the corruption perceptions scale. 
The ‘average perception’ category depicts a respondent whose score falls within 50 per 
cent of all scores. Finally, ‘the high corruption perception’ category represents an 
individual whose score falls within the highest 10 percent. A respondent who has had the 
highest perception of corruption has a 20 per cent probability of supporting collective 
action strategies if she lives in Ghana, where V-DEM experts opine that most of the public 
spending is intended to benefit all communities within a society (the lowest clientelism 
score of -4). This probability rises to 28 per cent if the respondent lives in Kenya, where 
V-DEM experts consider the provision of most public goods to be handled through 
clientelistic networks (score of -1). Finally, the same respondent has a 34 per cent 
probability if she lives in Sudan, where almost all public spending is narrowly targeted to 
specific subnational groups to the exclusion of others (highest clientelism score of 0).  
                                                 
 
54 Entering country-level variables one at the time helps to identify variables that may be non-significant because the 
model is unable to detect the effect (i.e. lacks power to detect the genuine effects). This is a common problem in 
multilevel models with small number of higher level units (i.e. where N<100). 
55 The clientelism variable was obtained from the Varieties of Democracy Project. Originally, the score ranges from 
zero to four. I have reversed the scores so that zero represents more clientelism and -4 represents low clientelism. 
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Figure 6.4: How political clientelism moderates the effect of popular perceptions of corruption 
(80% confidence intervals) 
 
Note: For ease of interpretation the scale of state-level clientelism variable has been reversed so 
that higher numbers indicate more clientelism  
 
Furthermore, the results suggest that in societies where state-level clientelism is perceived 
to be low (e.g. Ghana, Botswana), respondents with different corruption perception scores 
have roughly the same probability of supporting citizen-centred methods of tackling 
corruption. On the other hand, in countries like Kenya and Sudan where clientelism is 
perceived to be high, those who feel that corruption is rampant are significantly more 
likely to support collective civic action compared to individuals with low perceptions of 
corruption.  
 
The interaction between political clientelism and poverty is statistically significant and 
positive, suggesting that the context of political clientelism may not pacify poor people. 
Holding other variables at their mean values, in Kenya the poorest people (lowest 25 
percent in the LPI measure) have a 28 per cent probability of supporting collective action. 
This probability drops to 19 per cent when we move to Ghana, where political clientelism 
is thought to be very low. Taken in conjunction with the results reported in the foregoing 
paragraphs, we can conclude that the context characterised by non-universalist 
distribution of public goods increases the propensity to engage in collective action against 
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corruption among poor people as well as individuals with very high corruption 
perceptions. These results are consistent with the grievances interpretation. The personal 
discontent engendered by the divisive nature of political clientelism increases the 
willingness to support extra-institutional methods of political expression as individual-
level poverty as well as perceptions of corruption increase. 
 
Model 5 (in Table 6.1A) shows the cross-level interaction of mean poverty rate and 
perceptions of corruption and suggests that individuals who think corruption is 
widespread are more likely to support citizen-centred and collective action methods when 
they live in poorer countries than their relatively richer counterparts. Respondents with 
the highest perception of corruption have significantly higher probability of supporting 
anti-corruption collective action if they live in Liberia (which has the highest mean 
poverty rate) rather than Mauritius (which has the lowest mean poverty rate). It is 
important to stress that controlling for this cross-national interaction term makes the main 
effect of the perception of corruption variable to drop out of significance. This change is 
consistent across various model specifications. In fact, I removed the interaction between 
perceptions of corruption and collective efficacy to see whether the large reduction in 
coefficient size and statistical significance was caused by ‘overloading’ the corruption 
perceptions’ variable. When this is done, the main effect of the perceptions of corruption 
variable remains non-significant and negative. This provides very strong evidence that 
country-level poverty shapes the nature of the relationship between perceptions of 
corruption and support for anti-corruption civic engagement.    
 
As a robustness check, I tested the moderating effect of country-level economic 
conditions using per capita GDP instead of the mean poverty rate. The results mirror those 
obtained when the mean poverty rate is used.  An increase in the log of GDP has a strong 
positive effect on the probability of supporting collective action methods (remember 
increase in mean poverty rate has a strong negative effect). Although the interaction term 
is non-significant at 5 per cent level, it has a negative sign which corresponds with the 
positive sign of the interaction term in model 5.  
 
Overall these results communicate two coherent messages. First, the material condition 
of a country explains a significant chunk of the variability in support for collective action 
against corruption. Second, those Africans who perceive high levels of corruption are 
133 
more likely to get involved in anti-corruption efforts when their countries’ economic 
conditions are hard. In this regard, the results are consistent with the grievances 
interpretation of the effect of the perceptions of corruption. Perceiving high levels of 
corruption may generate more discontent  in countries where most people experience high 
levels of poverty.  
 
Lastly, it is important to report that the interaction between perceptions of corruption and 
the strength of civil society is non-significant. This means that country-level differences 
in associational density do not significantly account for the differential effects of the 
perceptions of corruption on support for anti-corruption civic engagement. Holding other 
variables constant, perceptions of corruption are likely to have the same effect in South 
Africa (very strong civil society) as they do in Madagascar (weak civil society).   
 
6.4.2. The dividend of generalised interpersonal trust  
 
As indicated in previous sections, there is a positive and statistically significant 
interaction between the perception of corruption and collective efficacy (or generalised 
interpersonal trust). I interpret this as indicating that those who believe in the ability of 
ordinary people to make an impact are significantly likely to support anti-corruption 
collective action when they perceive high levels of corruption. Figure 6.5 represents a 
plot of the marginal effects of this interaction. For those with the strongest belief in 
people’s ability to fight corruption, the marginal probability of preferring collective action 
strategies increases from 0.20 to about 0.85 as corruption perceptions variable changes 
from lowest to highest values.  
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Figure 6.5: The effect of collective efficacy conditional on perceived levels of corruption (with 
95% Confidence Intervals) 
 
 
 
These results are sensible from the rational choice perspective. Indeed, rational choice 
would predict that an individual who trusts others to make a difference would support 
citizen-centred anti-corruption tactics as her perception of the level of corruption 
increases. However, the results can also be interpreted in terms of the grievance 
mechanism. As Klandermans (2015) has argued, while a sense of collective efficacy 
makes people feel more effective in challenging their collective disadvantage (rational 
choice mechanism), it also makes them feel angrier (grievance mechanism); hence, “the 
more efficacious people feel, they angrier they will be; both efficacy and anger will 
strengthen people’s motivation to take part in collective action” (Klandermans 2015:206). 
 
There is a strong country-to-country variability in the effect of perceived collective 
efficacy to fight corruption. This shows, in light of this variable’s strong average effect 
that differences in support for collective action between individuals with different levels 
of collective efficacy are shaped by both who they are and where they live. It turns out 
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that an increase in perceived collective efficacy has the strongest impact in countries with 
a low average support for collective civic action. This means that small increases in the 
belief that ordinary people can fight corruption can make a large difference in support for 
collective action against corruption in places where a large majority of people do not 
consider citizen centred approach as the best solution against corruption (e.g. in Sierra 
Leone, Guinea, Senegal and Swaziland).  
 
The general context of corruption significantly moderates the relationship between the 
belief that people can fight corruption and the support for collective action against 
corruption. Figure 6.6 provides a further insight into this interaction. As the graph 
demonstrates, the cross-level interaction is more statistically distinguishable at higher 
values of the control of corruption indicator (CCI). The line labelled as lowest trusters 
represents individuals who strongly disagreed that ordinary people can fight corruption. 
They constitute 22 per cent of the overall sample. The individuals who strongly agreed 
(24 per cent) are represented by the line labelled ‘highest trusters’. Increase in corruption 
has a strong corrosive effect on lowest trusters compared to their high trusting 
counterparts.   
 
Figure 6.6: Cross-level interaction of control of corruption and the belief that people can fight 
corruption (with 80% confidence intervals) 
 
Note: For ease of interpretation the scale of the control of corruption indicator has  
been reversed so that higher numbers indicate more corruption  
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Indeed, there is a steep decline in the low trusters’ probability of supporting collective 
action strategies as we shift from low corruption societies (e.g. Cape Verde and 
Botswana) to countries with very high CCI scores (e.g. Sudan and Zimbabwe). On the 
contrary, as the graph demonstrates, high trusters’ support for collective action is largely 
resilient to the corrosive effects of their countries’ poor corruption control; the line 
representing this group remains flat as we move from the lowest to the highest values on 
the control of corruption index. The point that is worth being emphasised is that those 
who think others have an interest in contributing to the public good of a clean government 
have a significantly high propensity to support citizen-centred strategies when they live 
in societies struggling to control corruption.  
 
Given that high trusters are significantly more likely to support collective action when 
they perceive corruption to be pervasive as shown in Figure 6.5, it would seem 
appropriate, considering the results shown in Figure 6.6 to refer to them as ‘principled 
principals’. This is if one defines ‘principled principals’ as those individuals who, 
embodying public interest, are willing to hold the government accountable regardless of 
the institutional settings in which they operate. Besides the fact that high trusters support 
citizens’ efforts against corruption when they perceive the vice to be widespread (see 
Figure 6.5), their attitudes regarding anti-corruption are not contingent upon their social 
and political environments as shown in Figure 6.6. These are the individuals who can 
potentially overcome the co-ordination dilemmas that permeate high corruption societies.   
 
It is important to explain why the strong belief in citizens’ ability to combat corruption is 
resistant to the corrosive effects of both individual and context-level corruption. One 
explanation is that the individuals described as high trusters in Figure 6.6 are ‘activists’. 
As Kuran (1995) contends, activists are idealists and ‘dreamers’. Relative to most people, 
activists are insensitive to prevailing political dynamics; “they are inclined to speak their 
minds even at the risk of severe punishment” (Kuran 1995:50). They tend to show greater 
sense of independence from social norms and the expectations of others. Importantly, 
most activists believe in political action and in the ability of the ordinary people (like 
themselves) to take control and make a difference. As a result, they are more likely to 
over-estimate their ability or that of ordinary people to overcome obstacles. The 
optimistic character of activists lowers their risk threshold (Kuran 1995). While the views 
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of activists are more idealistic, the attitudes and behaviours of (the generally far more 
numerous) non-activists are conditional on the prevailing social and political conditions. 
Being more sceptical, the pessimistic attitudes of most non-activists often change when 
others have lowered the cost of collective action “or raised the benefit of participation” 
(Kuran 1995:51). This interpretation means therefore that in the context in which 
corruption is systemic, rational choice institutionalism more accurately predicts the 
attitudes of non-activists towards anti-corruption collective action.  
 
Another explanation entails how we understand generalised interpersonal trust, especially 
as it relates to collective action and the control of corruption. Many of the scholars who 
claim that corruption erodes generalised interpersonal trust employ the rational-choice 
perspective, arguing that trust is linked “to the political conditions of a country” (Graeff 
and Svendsen 2012:2843). Generalised trust is understood to be a reflection of the 
personal evaluation of the ability of public institutions (especially law enforcement 
agencies) to sanction opportunistic or criminal behaviour (Newton 2001, Beugelsdijk 
2008, Rothstein 2013, Rothstein 2011b). But, Fukuyama (1995) and Mansbridge (1999) 
among others, view generalised interpersonal trust from a moralistic perspective.  
 
Uslaner (2002, 2008) makes a sharp distinction between experienced-based (or strategic) 
trust and altruistic trust (or moralistic trust). The former is based upon “responses to how 
others have treated you and your interactions with others in your social network and the 
organisations you join” (Uslaner 2008:290). It fluctuates based on the performance of 
public institutions. On the contrary, altruistic trust is “a value that we learn early in life 
and that is largely resistant to bad experiences—or good ones” (Uslaner 2008:290). It is 
a generally positive view about human nature (Uslaner 2002). “In altruistic trust” Jane 
Mansbridge (1999:290) argues, “one trusts the other more than is warranted by the 
available evidence, as a gift, for the good of both the other and the community”. The 
group of individuals represented by the line labelled ‘high trusters’ in Figure 6.6 could 
be described as altruistic trusters to the extent that their belief in people’s ability to co-
operate is not contingent upon the performance of public institutions. They are likely to 
maintain a comparatively high propensity to co-operate even when a large number of 
actors are likely to defect. Indeed, Uslaner (2008:7) maintains that such people are likely 
to “get involved in their communities, even if they don’t expect reciprocity and even if 
they have found some people less than trustworthy”.  
138 
 
In line with how moralistic trust works, there is no statistically significant interaction 
between the strength of civil society and the belief that ordinary people can overcome 
corruption.56 In other words, being rooted in personal values, a strong belief in the ability 
of people to contribute to public goods is independent of the assurance process emanating 
from strong associational density. Indeed, Welzel (2010) has noted that self-expression 
values, for which generalised interpersonal trust is a major component, is strongly 
associated with collective action even where civil society is oppressed. As he concludes, 
this “suggests that when self-expression values are strong, they are so deeply internalised 
that acting for them is intrinsically valuable, even in the face of repression” (Welzel 
2010:171).  
 
People who have high levels of trust infer from their own trustworthiness. They believe 
that “most people share the same fundamental values, though not necessarily the same 
ideology and that people are not predisposed to take advantage of others. So, “it makes 
sense to them that one give others the benefit of the doubt” (Uslaner 2002:79:80).  In this 
regard, their assessment of the ability of ordinary people to fight corruption is based on 
who they are rather than where they live. Conversely, low trusters’ assessment is likely 
to be premised on what their institutional environment looks like. If this interpretation is 
correct, one would expect the low trusters’ probability to support collective action to be 
strongly conditional on country-level factors. Indeed, analysing differences between 
countries as a function of a change in the belief that people can fight corruption offers 
evidence that is consistent with this proposition. As the trust variable shifts from the 
lowest to the highest values, the cross-national variability in the likelihood to support 
collective action decreases. Figure 6.7 shows how country-level variance changes as a 
function of the trust/ collective efficacy variable. Overall, the graph indicates that 
unobserved country-level factors have a stronger impact on low trusters than on high 
trusters’ support for anti-corruption collective action.  
 
                                                 
 
56 Newton (2001) also found a weak relationship between membership in voluntary associations and trust at the 
individual level. 
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Figure 6.7: Between-country variance as a function of interpersonal trust/ collective efficacy to 
fight corruption 
 
 
 
Indeed, this graph supports Uslaner’s (2002, 2008) and Mansbridge’s (1999) argument 
that generalised trust has weak institutional foundations. And the message it 
communicates is consistent with the conclusions based on Figure 6.6; differences 
between countries are wider for low trusters than they are for their high trusting 
counterparts. In other words, regardless of where they live, high (i.e. moralistic) trusters 
have more similar opinions about the role of citizens in the fight against corruption.  
 
The main implication of these results is that in places where corruption is low, those who 
lack faith in others are likely to think and behave more like their high trusting counterparts 
in public goods settings. On the other hand, in highly corrupt settings, people willing to 
contribute to the public good of anti-corruption are likely to be few. Corruption makes 
most people in these countries to be “cynical about their own capacities to act on public 
goods… [it] diminishes the horizons of collective action…” (Warren 2015:45). The large 
number of individuals willing to contribute to public goods (i.e. experiential and 
moralistic trusters) is one of the main reasons why studies consistently find that countries 
with low levels of corruption register higher levels of co-operative norms. Because 
countries that have a better control of corruption have a relatively large number of people 
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willing to contribute to public goods (including challenging corruption), they stand a 
better chance of fighting corruption than countries in which corruption is relatively 
widespread.  
 
6.4.3. Ethnicity and ethnic diversity 
 
To probe the impact of ethnicity on support for anti-corruption collective action, I add to 
model 1 shown in Table 6.1A two individual-level variables, namely ethnic identification 
and ethnic discrimination. I also add Alesina et al’s country-level measure of ethnic 
diversity, ethno-linguistic fractionalisation (ELF). The survey question about the extent 
to which respondents think their governments discriminate against members of their 
ethnic groups was not asked in some countries. As a result, the analysis in this section is 
limited to the 30 countries in which data are available. Table 6.1 shows the parameter 
estimates of the strength of ethnic identification, perceived ethnic marginalisation, the 
two individual-level corruption variables and the interaction between perceptions of 
corruption and ethnic marginalisation. The second part of the table shows the cross-level 
interaction between perceptions of corruption and ethno-linguistic fractionalisation. The 
complete results are shown in Table 6.2A in appendix 4. 
Table 6.1: Multilevel complimentary log-log regression model showing the effect of 
ethnic identification, perceived ethnic marginalisation and ethnic diversity at country 
level 
 Model A Model B 
Perceived ethnic group marginalisation  0.142*** 
(0.03) 
0.079*** 
(0.01)    
Strength of ethnic identification -0.031** 
(0.01) 
-0.031**  
(0.01)    
Experience of bribery 0.120** 
(0.06) 
0.118* *  
(0.06)    
Corruption perceptions 
 
-0.101** 
(0.05) 
0.149    
(0.10)    
Individual-level interaction   
Corruption perceptions x. perceived ethnic 
marginalisation  
-0.040** 
(0.02 
         
Individual controls  YES YES 
Country-level variables and cross-level interactions 
State-level clientelism  0.037    
(0.09)    
Ethno-linguistic Fractionalisation  0.225    
(0.35)    
Corruption perceptions x. ethno-linguistic 
Fractionalisation  
 -0.379**  
(0.12)    
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Intercept 
 
-1.659*** 
(0.12) 
-1.423*** 
(0.24)    
Variance of the intercept 0.111 
(0.03) 
  0.094 
(0.03)            
   
Notes: 
Complete results shown in Table 6.2A in appendix 4 
Dependent variable is support for anti-corruption collective action 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***= p< 0.01, ** = p<0.05, 
 *= p<0.1 (considered for country-level variables and cross-level interactions only) 
 
The model suggests that the perception of ethnic discrimination has a strong, positive and 
statistically significant effect on the probability of supporting collective action against 
corruption. An increase of one standard deviation in the perception of ethnic group 
marginalisation increases by 0.014 the probability of supporting anti-corruption collective 
action. In addition, a change from preferring to be identified only as a member of a larger 
political community (e.g. Ghanaian, Zambian etc.) to preferring to be identified only with 
a specific ethnic group (e.g. Ashanti, Bemba etc.) increases the support for collective 
action. However, the non-significant interaction between these variables suggest that a 
combination of strong ethnic group identification and the perception of ethnic 
discrimination may not conspire to increase or decrease support for anti-corruption 
mobilisation.  
 
This section’s main objective is to examine how ethnicity and ethnic diversity moderate 
the effect of the exposure to corruption, especially perceptions of corruption. To this end, 
I examine the interactions between each of the three ethnicity variables and the corruption 
perceptions variable.  The interaction between corruption perceptions and the strength of 
ethnic affiliation is not significantly different from zero. Before I examine the interaction 
between ethnic marginalisation and corruption perceptions, it is important to comment on 
their correlations. This is because one might argue that the perception of ethnic 
marginalisation and the perception of corruption proxy for the same underlying construct, 
and that the resulting interaction is meaningless. The low correlation coefficient between 
the two variables (r= 0.19, p<0.001) provisionally rules out the possibility that both 
variables are empirically indistinguishable.57 Apart from this, there is a case to be made, 
                                                 
 
57 However, the results could be driven by Swaziland, whose correlation coefficient (r= -0.57). In all countries except, 
the two variables share positive correlations with values below r= 0.30. I tested the effect of this interaction in models 
that included and excluded Swaziland and found that the results are identical is strong and negative  
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as shown in chapter three, that perception of ethnic discrimination and perceptions of 
corruption may not be measures of the same construct. Not all individuals with high 
corruption perceptions see corruption as being associated with ethnic marginalisation.  
 
The interaction between the perception of ethnic grievances and the perception of 
corruption is negative, indicating that on average, an increase in corruption perceptions 
reduces the positive effect of the perceived ethnic discrimination. As indicated in section 
3.1.4 of chapter three, there is an expectation that perceptions of corruption will 
exacerbate a sense of ethnic exclusion (also see Githongo 2006). In this regard, an 
intuitive finding would have been a positive interaction between the perceptions of 
corruption and ethnic-based discrimination.   
 
A graphical display in Figure 6.8 deepens our understanding of this interaction. The 
graph suggests that individuals who think that their ethnic groups are mistreated have a 
consistently high probability to support collective civic action regardless of the changes 
in their perceptions of corruption. On the other hand, those who feel that the state never 
treats members of their ethnic groups unfairly are most likely to support collective efforts 
as their perceptions of corruption increase. As the graph shows, at high values of the 
corruption perceptions variable, those who feel that their ethnic groups are marginalised 
and those who do not hold such discontents have roughly the same propensity to support 
collective civic engagement. This means that a sense of discontent that the perception of 
corruption triggers does not amplify the already strong mobilisation effect of ethnic 
marginalisation, contrary to the conjecture advanced in chapter three.  
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Figure 6.8: The effect of perceived ethnic marginalisation conditional on perceived levels 
corruption (with 95% confidence intervals) 
 
 
As intimated on page 126, most Nigerian citizens express extremely high support for 
citizen-centred anti-corruption tactics. A quick descriptive analysis of the ethnic 
marginalisation variable shows that the majority of Nigerians also feel that the state 
discriminates against their ethnic group. In this regard, Nigeria is the only country in this 
data set where more than 70 per cent of the respondents feel that the government 
discriminates against members of their ethnic group. The second country with most 
ethnically marginalised citizens is Togo, where 40 per cent of the respondents felt that 
the state discriminates against their ethnic group members. Since Nigeria occupies 
extreme values on both dependent and independent variables, it is possible that it is 
driving the results described in the foregoing paragraphs. When the models shown in 
Table 6.2A are re-estimated on the data that excludes Nigeria, the ethnic marginalisation 
variable retains its very strong positive effect. The coefficient of the interaction between 
corruption perception and ethnic marginalisation remains negative but only marginally 
significant (z= -1.90).  
 
The interaction between ethnic diversity (ELF) and perceptions of corruption is highly 
significant (even in the sample that excludes Nigeria). The negative sign of the interaction 
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term suggests that an increase in perceptions of corruption has a more corrosive effect in 
ethnically diverse societies. This means that in countries such as Kenya, Nigeria and 
Cameroon (highest ELF scores), individuals who are average on all attributes except their 
high corruption perception are less likely to support collective action methods. In 
Burundi, Lesotho and Swaziland (lowest ELF scores), the same type of individuals are 
expected to have a strong propensity to support anti-corruption collective action.  
 
 6.5. Anti-corruption collective action in context: discussions and 
conclusion 
 
The regression models presented in this chapter confirm what was established in chapter 
five, namely that bribe payers are significantly more likely to challenge corruption 
through citizen-centred and collective action strategies. More importantly, the results 
suggest that when corruption is direct and personal, poor Africans are more likely to 
prefer collective action as a way of challenging corruption. The inconclusive results 
concerning the effect of democratic values leaves the grievance model as the strongest 
explanation for citizens’ willingness to oppose corruption. The impact of the perception 
of ethnic marginalisation on support for collective action adds more weight to the 
grievance argument. Without appealing to the grievance model, it is difficult to explain 
why the perception of corruption makes individuals who never feel that the government 
unfairly targets their ethnic groups to become just as likely to support collective action as 
those who harbour such feelings. As the results suggest, the discontent generated by 
perceiving corruption to be pervasive is likely to make individuals who do not have 
ethnicity-related complaints to behave like those who do. 
 
Moving on to the contextual effects— the central aim of this chapter—the analysis reveals 
strong cross-national variability in the effect of corruption perceptions. This makes sense 
if we consider as outlined in chapter four, that respondents’ evaluation of the levels of 
corruption in their countries is likely to be strongly linked to contextual factors. 
Corruption scandals, election campaigns that empathise issues of corruption and the anti-
corruption campaigns are some of the factors likely to affect perceptions of the level of 
corruption (also see, Rose 2015, Klasnja, Tucker and Deegan-Krause 2013). The 
objective experience of bribery is on the other hand largely independent of these changes 
in national context (Klasnja, Tucker and Deegan-Krause 2013). A person who has had a 
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routine experience with paying bribes is unlikely to change his opinion about what people 
should do about corruption based on the latest corruption scandal. This partly explains 
why the effect of the experience of bribery on support for collective action varies a lot 
between individuals but not so much between societies.  
 
Several studies on collective action emphasise the important role of generalised trust and 
a sense of collective efficacy on willingness to challenge corruption. As Lieberman, 
Posner and Tsai (2014:80) observe, “for citizens to act on behalf of change, they must 
believe either that their own individual actions can make a difference or, if they think that 
generating real change will require collective action, that others in the community will act 
with them”.58 Further to that, according to Mungiu-Pipiddi (2013:110), the conundrum 
facing countries with high levels of corruption is “one of inducing a sense of efficacy that 
will mobilise individuals in favour of changing the rules of the game, and then building a 
critical mass of such individuals”. Building on these ideas, this chapter examined the 
individual- and contextual-level effects of the belief that people can fight corruption. The 
results show, as expected, that an increase in this belief is associated with stronger support 
for citizen-centred anti-corruption tactics, more especially among those who think that 
corruption levels are high.   
 
But more importantly, the results indicate that a strong sense of perceived collective 
efficacy is impervious to the corrosive effect of corruption. Individuals who strongly 
believe that ordinary people can fight corruption are significantly more likely to support 
collective action as their perceptions of corruption accumulate. Their support for 
collective action is also less likely to be influenced by the context characterised by poor 
corruption control. On the other hand, those who strongly disagree that people can fight 
corruption become increasingly unlikely to support collective action as the country level 
measure of corruption changes from lowest to highest values. This finding has important 
theoretical implication. It seems as Ostrom (2000) argued that society has at least two 
types of actors; those who are more predisposed to contribute to collective action 
regardless of their institutional settings, and those whose behaviour is conditional upon 
the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanisms.  
                                                 
 
58 My emphasis 
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In closing, a few practical (or policy-oriented) implications can be distilled from these 
results and their interpretations. Identifying and involving high trusters in anti-corruption 
efforts is likely to change the dominant narrative around anti-corruption in high 
corruption societies. Marwell, Oliver and Prahl (1988:522) have argued that “collective 
action usually depends on a ‘critical mass’ that behaves differently from typical group 
members”. This critical mass often bears the largest costs of getting collective action off 
the ground (Marwell and Oliver 1993, Oliver 1993). Those who believe that citizens can 
fight corruption even in highly corrupt settings can form part of this ‘critical mass’, whose 
attitudes and (hopefully) behaviour are likely to change beliefs about what most other 
actors are likely to do about corruption (see Mungiu-Pipiddi 2013, 2016). Indeed, as 
Ostrom (2000) observes, trusting attitudes and behaviours tend to influence the attitudes 
of non-trusters, persuading them to co-operate with others in public goods settings. This 
has the potential to change the equilibrium from the expectation that most people have no 
interest in anti-corruption to one in which a majority believe in the efficacy of collective 
resistance.  
 
The fact that the poor people involved in corruption are not as acquiescent as was 
previously thought suggests that an anti-corruption campaign that specifically targets this 
section of the population may receive a strong backing among those who have had 
personal experience with corruption. Apart from that, collective mobilisation against 
corruption is likely to receive support among individuals who perceive high levels of 
corruption and live in poor countries whose governments’ provision of public goods 
occurs in particularistic fashion. Again, the grievances model provides a more plausible 
interpretation of these results. The grievance generated by perceiving corruption to be 
widespread is more intense in poor countries or where the government’s infrastructural 
and social spending is considered to be highly discriminatory.  
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Chapter Seven 
Demanding accountability in clientelistic settings: the case of 
Nigeria 
 
 7.1. Introduction  
 
As mentioned in section 2.2 of chapter two, prominent students of African politics view 
patron-clientelism (or neo-patrimonialism) as being the core feature of political relations 
in Africa. Chapter two summarised the literature pointing out the negative effect of neo-
patrimonialism on citizens’ propensity to demand political accountability and the rule of 
law. The discussion in chapter three questioned the veracity of these pessimistic 
assertions on methodological grounds, and in light of the emerging evidence from more 
systematic studies of state-society relations in Africa. In particular, the analysis in chapter 
three noted that democratic norms and values are taking root among African publics. The 
aim of this chapter is to take this debate further by analysing the role of clientelism in 
fostering or hindering collective demand for accountability in highly corrupt societies. 
Due to the complexity of analysing clientelistic relations at individual-level using cross-
national data (see Stokes 2009, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), the chapter focuses on the 
case of Nigeria. This has the advantage of keeping country-level factors constant as the 
analysis delves into individual-level relationships. Focusing on a single case helps us to 
gain a deeper understanding of how the phenomenon of clientelism might shape collective 
action in places where corruption is endemic.   
 
Two major factors motivate the choice of Nigeria as the case for analysis. First, as I shall 
briefly show in the next section, Nigeria is notorious for being one of the most thoroughly 
corrupt countries in the world. Yet, it also boasts high levels of collective action, often in 
the name of tackling corruption. Citing Larry Diamond (1999), William Reno (2002:838) 
reminds us of the fact that “even under the repressive Abacha regime (1994–98), ‘human 
rights organisations continued to research, publicise, expose, lobby, and organise, 
sometimes treading more carefully while still facing arrest and imprisonment’ indicates 
that there is ‘a vigorous social basis for organising an alternative political programme.’59 
                                                 
 
59 My emphasis 
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Indeed, chapter six of this dissertation demonstrated an exceptionally strong preference 
for various citizen-centred and collective action methods of tackling corruption among 
the Nigerians (see page 124). I intimated that given the high levels of corruption, 
Nigerians’ strong preference for the use of collective action methods contradicts the 
pessimistic view of anti-corruption collective action. Rather, it is consistent with the 
optimistic view that high levels of corruption can act as a basis for willingness to engage 
in collective action.  
 
Nigeria is indeed an excellent case with which to examine further the nuts and bolts of 
the nexus between corruption and collective demand for accountability in places where 
corruption is endemic. The other reason for choosing Nigeria is that it embodies several 
characteristics of a typical African society. These features, which are central to the 
analysis of governance and development in Africa, include religious and ethnic 
heterogeneity, ubiquitous clientelism, widespread poverty and overall institutional 
weakness (see Hoffman and Patel 2017, Reno 2002). Accordingly, an in-depth analysis 
of Nigeria can offer important insights into the complex relationship between clientelism 
and collective demand for accountability in the African setting. 
 
This chapter is organised as follows. The first section offers a brief overview of corruption 
and collective demand for accountability in Nigeria. It then goes on to demonstrate how 
Nigeria’s strong collectivist culture — marked by high in-group solidarity, affective 
loyalty and hierarchy — nurtures clientelistic relations, which underpin the propensity for 
reproducing corruption and engaging in collective civic action against ‘corruption’. 
Because clientelistic relations are marked by bonds of dependence and control, patrons 
can mobilise their clients to take part in various collective endeavours that have nothing 
to do with public interests. Furthermore, Nigeria’s collectivist culture enables elites to 
trump up grievances against which collective action can then be used to advance 
particularistic interests.  
 
With these ideas in mind, the analysis draws on Afrobarometer data to show why high 
propensity for collective civic engagement in highly corrupt societies should be 
cautiously interpreted. Statistical analysis shows that holding everything else constant, 
those Nigerians who have the highest likelihood of taking part in collective action can be 
described as clients rather than democratic citizens. Despite having the highest likelihood 
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to take part in protests and demonstrations, individuals identified as ‘clients’ consistently 
reject the idea that citizens should be involved in efforts to hold their government 
accountable. On the other hand, respondents that are classified as democrats are 
significantly more likely to take part in collective action and also express unconditional 
support for the idea that the government ought to be accountable to citizens.  
 
The conclusion is that clientelism explains a large part of the willingness to take part in 
collective civic engagement that can be observed in Nigeria. As a result, some of the 
collective activities directed at the state may not qualify as representing the potential for 
demanding a system of governance based on ‘impartiality’, which is what anti-corruption 
scholars have in mind when they talk about demand-side accountability. Nevertheless, 
the fact that those who are likely to be acting in public interests are also likely to take part 
in collective action suggests that the situation is much more complex. Collective civic 
action in Nigeria is neither purely clientelistic nor exclusively representative of a genuine 
demand for political accountability. The analysis juxtaposes the academic literature on 
Nigeria, official reports and media sources before drawing upon rounds five and six of 
the Afrobarometer surveys.  
 
7.2. A bird’s eye-view of corruption and collective action in Nigeria 
 
On the 18th May 2006 the United States’ House of Representatives’ sub-committee on 
Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations held a hearing entitled 
‘Nigeria’s Struggle with Corruption’. In that meeting, George Ayittey, an eminent scholar 
of Africa’s political economy described Nigeria as a truculent African tragedy, which 
instead of becoming “Africa’s giant and the answer to South Korea” was “reduced to a 
comatose midget” due to its “kamikaze plunder by military bandits” (Ayittey 2006:51). 
Ten years later, on the eve of the international anti-corruption summit in London, the then 
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, David Cameron, was caught on camera 
describing Nigeria and Afghanistan as ‘fantastically corrupt’ and ‘possibly the two most 
corrupt countries in the world’ (Asthana and Grierson 2016). The notion that corruption 
is rampant in Nigeria is not peddled exclusively by Western governments and scholars 
based in Western universities. It precedes the global obsession with corruption, which can 
be traced to the birth of Transparency International in 1993 and James Wolfensohn’s 
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cancer of corruption speech in 1996.60 Indeed, a quick review of official documents 
suggests that Nigerian leaders considered corruption as being endemic as far back as the 
1970s, and made some (largely fruitless) efforts61 to combat it. Olusegun Obasanjo had 
this in mind when he noted in his presidential inauguration speech in 1999:  
Government and all its agencies became thoroughly corrupt and reckless. 
Members of the public had to bribe their way through in ministries and parastatals 
to get attention and one government agency had to bribe another government 
agency to obtain the release of their statutory allocations of funds. The impact of 
official corruption is so rampant and has earned Nigeria a very bad image at home 
and abroad. 62 
 
Ten years ago, conservative estimations were that more than 400 billion US dollars had 
been looted since Nigeria got its independence in 1960 (Young 2012, Ayittey 2006). It is 
also estimated that General Sani Abacha stole more than 3 billion US Dollars within his 
five-year military dictatorship (Ayittey 2006, Young 2012)63. More recently, Sambo 
Dasuki, a security adviser to the former president, Goodluck Jonathan, was charged with 
stealing a huge chunk (about 60 million US dollars) of the money earmarked for buying 
military equipment essential for fighting Islamic terrorism. Further to that, according to 
the former governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria — who was fired after repeatedly 
raising concerns about missing oil revenue — corruption cost Nigeria an average of one 
billion US dollars per month during Jonathan’s presidency.64  
 
Petty corruption is equally rife in Nigeria. The report compiled by Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) reveals shocking details of impunity by members of the Nigerian police force. 
The report shows that apart from demanding bribes to investigate a crime, Nigerian police 
can often round up and place random people under arrest only to release them, without 
                                                 
 
60 James Wolfensohn was the president of the World Bank. In the speech delivered at the annual meeting of World 
Bank and the IMF in 1996, Wolfensohn announced that countries needed to deal with the cancer of corruption to 
achieve growth and reduce poverty. The speech marked the turning point in the Bank’s approach to corruption, which 
hitherto was seen as being too political to form the core of the World Bank strategy on poverty reduction. The Bank 
has since committed itself to the fight against corruption.  
61 For example, General Murtala Mohammed’s ‘Operation Purge the Nation’ saw more than 10,000 high ranking civil 
servants removed on account of corruption (Aina 1982). In 1979, Nigeria adopted an anti-corruption revolution under 
the aegis of ‘ethical revolution’. In subsequent years, various military administrations launched a flurry of clean-up 
campaigns including General Buhari’s War against Indiscipline (WAI) and Abacha’s War against Indiscipline and 
Corruption (WAIC)   
62 See the full transcript of the speech here: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/monitoring/356065.stm Accessed 26 
July 2017 
63 More details here:  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/18/switzerland-to-return-sani-abacha-loot-
money-to-nigeria Accessed 29 July 2017  
64 Further details here: http://www.ibtimes.com/nigeria-lost-1b-month-under-goodluck-jonathan-former-central-bank-
governor-lamido-2213980 Accessed 29 July 2017 
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charge, when a bribe has been negotiated (HRW 2010). Refusal to pay bribes at a police 
checkpoint can quickly escalate, resulting in the police officer shooting uncooperative 
motorists (HRW 2010). On one occasion, “Nkechi Obidigwe, a 22-year-old student was 
allegedly shot and killed by a stray bullet fired by a police officer at a motorist who 
refused to pay a bribe” (HRW 2010:52). 
 
Ordinary Nigerians see grand corruption as being pervasive. The popular concept of a 
‘Nigerian factor’ was coined by Nigerians themselves to describe the embedded nature 
of corruption into every fabric of social, economic, and political life. As Femi Omotoso 
observes, when Nigerians use the term ‘Nigerian factor’, they are talking about the 
pervasive, “improper ways of doing things, which puts sectional interest, political 
considerations, elite interest, pecuniary considerations, and wealth accumulation over and 
above public service” (Omotoso 2014:118). A local informant once remarked that, “if 
you don’t understand the ‘Nigerian factor’” you do not understand anything about 
Nigerian politics and society (Smith 2010:8). Nigerians also often use the colloquial 
expression of ‘national cake’ to refer to their country’s resources of which all Nigerians 
deserve a share (Hoffman and Patel 2017).  
 
As intimated, Nigeria’s endemic graft co-exists with a strong propensity for collective 
political action that goes back to the anti-colonial movements of the 1950s and the labour 
movements that defied the high-handed military dictatorships from the 1960s to the 1980s 
(Kew 2016). Nigeria’s collective action capacity also manifested itself in the anti-
government uprisings at the height of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in 1993. 
These protests forced President Ibrahim Babangida to end his military dictatorship and 
hand power over to an interim civilian authority (Kew 2016, Branch and Mampilly 2016). 
The Occupy protests of 2012 — one of the largest anti-government uprisings since 
Nigeria’s return to civilian rule — forced President Goodluck Jonathan to reconsider the 
removal of a fuel subsidy and ultimately, reduce the fuel price by 70 per cent. Complaints 
about corruption and marginalisation featured prominently in many of these and other 
large-scale protests, strikes and riots (Branch and Mampilly 2015).  
 
The presidential election of 2015 could also be regarded as one example of a collective 
response to Nigeria’s egregious vice. The election marked the first time the incumbent 
lost a presidential election in this country. Pre-election polls showed that the need to 
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tackle corruption was among the top three individual motivations to vote (IFES Nigeria 
Pre-Election Survey 2014). These polls also showed that most Nigerians preferred a 
president who would prioritise the fight against corruption (IFES Nigeria Pre-Election 
Survey 2014). This strong anti-corruption sentiment is one of the main reasons why 
Muhammadu Buhari’s election campaign honed in on the fight against corruption.  Buhari 
tapped into pre-existing corruption-related discontent that reached its peak during the 
final years of Jonathan’s administration when, among other things, he eulogised and 
pardoned the convicted fraudster, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, the former governor of 
Bayelsa state. 
 
Other examples of collective dissent linked to corruption include the deadly Boko 
Haram65 insurgency in the northern part of the country (Smith 2014). Indeed, as Branch 
and Mampilly (2015:105) remind us, many analysts of Nigeria see the rise of Boko Haram 
as “the rural expression of the same structural forces that give rise to urban protests”. As 
the argument goes, Boko Haram uses corruption-related socio-economic and political 
grievances that are felt at the individual level to inspire anti-state collective violence.  
 
7.3. Social identity and collectivist culture as the basis for corruption 
and anti-corruption in Nigeria 
 
According to Geert Hofstede, collectivism arises in “a society in which people from birth 
onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people’s 
lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty” (Hofstede 
2001:225). Nigeria’s very high collectivism score on Hofstede’s individualism-
collectivism dimension of culture66 suggests that most individuals think of themselves, 
primarily, as members of social groups and perceive loyalty to that group as of paramount 
importance. The role of culture in shaping attitudes that promote corruption in Nigeria 
and indeed, in other parts of Africa was highlighted in chapter two (also see for example 
                                                 
 
65 Boko Haram is an Islamist terror group aiming to replace secular institutions with Islamic Laws, including Sharia 
Law. Its name translates as “western education is forbidden”. It has carried out a series of bombings and kidnappings 
in the Northern part of Nigeria. In 2014, Boko Haram made international news after its militants kidnapped the 
approximately 300 school-girls in the small town of Chibok.     
66 Hofstede developed the famous cultural dimensions theory to describe the role of culture in people’s values, 
attitudes and behaviours in the workplace. These cultural dimensions are equality versus inequality and hierarchy; 
collectivism vs. individualism; uncertainty avoidance vs. uncertainty tolerance; masculinity vs. femininity), temporal 
orientation and indulgence vs. restraint and; power distance.  
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Blundo and de Sardan 2006, de Sardan 2011, Smith 2008, 2014). Peter Ekeh’s (1975) 
widely cited ‘Two Publics’ thesis was partly about how collectivist cultural imperatives 
reproduce corruption in Nigeria and other post-colonial societies. As he argued, state 
officials feel under pressure to rob the civic public (federal, state and local-level 
departments) in order to sustain their primordial community. Through an ethnographic 
methodology, Smith (2007, 2009) offers a detailed account of collective culture and its 
impact on the reproduction of corruption in South-Eastern Nigeria. 
 
The foregoing can seem to project collectivist culture as being exclusively in favour of 
abuses of power for private gain. Quite to the contrary, Smith is quick to point out that 
“to the extent that it is reasonable to talk at all about a ‘Nigerian culture’ (a country as 
vast and diverse as Nigeria is, of course, characterised by considerable cultural 
heterogeneity), it is as much a ‘culture against corruption’ as it is a ‘culture of 
corruption’” (Smith 2008:7).67 Analysing the role of social identity (especially ethnic 
identification) in Nigerian society sheds more light on the contradictions that Smith 
describes. Basically, Nigerians are likely to challenge corruption when it is perpetuated 
by members of other ethnic groups while tolerating corrupt actions of members of their 
own ethnic groups.   
 
Because of the strong social group identification, regard for the ‘collective’ often 
manifests as a chain of emotional bonds between individuals of the same social group. 
The principles that underpin solidarity, loyalty and reciprocity, thereby reproducing 
corruption and willingness to engage in collective political endeavours, operate within 
ethnic, religious and regional groups (Smith 2008). As intimated in chapter three, in 
ethnically divided societies such as Nigeria, taking part in corrupt exchanges or defending 
those who do can often be justified as standing with your own people.  
 
Apart from ethnicity, region and religion also act as important sources of social and 
political identity for a majority of Nigerians. The country has an approximately equal 
number of Muslims and Christians. There is also a strong relationship between ethnicity 
and religion, more especially among the three largest ethnic groups; the Igbos, Yorubas 
                                                 
 
67 Emphasis in original 
154 
and the Hausa-Fulani. For instance, the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group tends to be 
predominantly Muslim while the Igbos are predominantly Christian (Kew 2016). This 
explains the political salience of ethnicity as well as Christian-Muslim identities at both 
national and state levels in Nigeria. A strong evidence of the political saliency of social 
identity in Nigeria is perhaps the tacit understanding among Nigerian leaders that 
presidential and vice-presidential positions ought to rotate between Muslims and 
Christians.68 Referred to as zoning, this informal agreement has been enforced since 1999 
when Nigeria returned to democracy after four decades of military rule.  
 
As intimated in chapter three, anti-corruption collective action can arise among ethnic 
group members who feel that the particularistic logic that underpins highly corrupt 
societies puts their ethnic group at a disadvantage. The on-going nationalist agitation by 
the Igbo, one of Nigeria’s largest ethnic groups, is facilitated by a sense of exclusion and 
corruption associated with the production of oil in the Biafra region. Smith (2014:788) 
captures this as follows: 
Ethnic nationalist rhetoric builds on and stokes anger and discontent over the 
very system of corruption itself. Ordinary Igbos who support or at least 
sympathise with the idea of independence from Nigeria express both the desire 
for a bigger share of the patronage pie and the aspiration for a less corrupt society. 
 
Anti-corruption riots and protests by less prominent ethnic groups have also occurred in 
other oil-producing regions, including the Delta state and Rivers state. The Movement for 
the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), a militant group that demands the Niger 
Delta gets a greater share of oil sales, recruits from the Ijaw — one of Nigeria’s smaller 
ethnic groups. The Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), and the newly formed New Delta 
Avengers lay claim to a more accountable and less corrupt society. They contest the fact 
that despite being the backbone of Nigeria’s oil industry, Niger Delta remains one of the 
most unequal and poorest regions, with shabby infrastructure and lack of basic amenities. 
Making the situation even worse, the oil operations in the region have destroyed the 
fishing industry that sustained the livelihoods of the majority of the poor.  
 
These are some of the conditions that facilitate the creation of numerous anti-corruption 
movements in Nigeria. They form the basis for anti-state mobilisation through the 
                                                 
 
68 If the president is Muslim, a Muslim becomes the vice president and vice versa. 
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language of anti-corruption. But, to what extent does this anti-corruption mobilisation 
represent a genuine demand for political accountability as understood in anti-corruption 
scholarship? Are participants driven by the desire to have a more impartial, rule-bound 
and accountable system? What is the role of the elites in generating corruption-related 
grievances and using anti-corruption mobilisation to further their own private interests? 
The next section explores these issues. 
 
 7.4. Clientelistic perversion of collective action in Nigeria    
 
Apart from the ethnic-religious dimension of collective action, much of what Smith 
describes as ‘Nigeria’s collective action capacity is demonstrated by the numerous 
voluntary associations that exist across the country (Smith 2006). As Kew observes, 
“regardless of ethnic grouping, economic class, religion, age, gender, or other major 
social cleavage, most Nigerians typically belong to several different civil society groups, 
and often partake in creating more” (Kew 2016:72).  But, Nigerian scholars make a point 
that many of these so-called civil society organisations (CSOs) were formed for purposes 
of furthering the financial and political interests of the elites, sometimes in ways that clash 
with the principles of good governance (Smith 2010). Even those local associations that 
have an appearance of ‘civicness’ “eventually serve as veritable means of gaining the 
attention of patrons and the political class” (Omobowale and Olutayo 2010:468). Indeed, 
as Smith (2010) demonstrates, in Nigeria, “the facade of civil society is frequently 
manipulated as a ruse to carry out corruption and consolidate the social positions of the 
powerful” (Smith 2010:250).  
 
Omobowale and Olutayo (2010) present an excellent expose of the ways in which patron-
clientelism arises and dominates local level civil society groups in Nigeria. Nigeria’s state 
institutions do not always provide public goods and services based on universalistic 
criteria (see Reno 2002). This creates a need for citizens to form associations through 
which to leverage their influence and effectively compete for access to public goods in 
the form of political patronage. In other words, forming associations and appointing ‘a 
patron’ enables local people to gain indirect access to state resources they are unable to 
obtain through formal structures. The authors emphasise that civic associations enable 
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citizens to have more clout with patrons and, by extension, more influence in the decisions 
of the politicians in the centre (Omobowale and Olutayo 2010:455).69  
 
Usually a wealthy individual, an association’s patron70 is a true problem solver, who 
offers financial assistance and acts as a conduit through which the association can address 
local-level problems through political patronage. But his role does not end there; apart 
from influencing leadership positions within the association, the patron uses his influence 
to get members to support certain community projects for which he is likely to secure 
funding from politicians. Of course, a patron’s legitimacy is not built on his ability to 
provide funding and act as a link between the centre and the periphery; it is sourced from 
the perception that he is part of the community and that he understands the needs of the 
community. As Stokes (2009) has argued, patronage brokers (such as these CSOs’ 
patrons) rely on bonds of friendship and feelings of gratitude to build support for higher-
level patrons.   
 
Indeed, Omobowale and Olutayo point out that “once association members yield their 
support to particular patrons and politicians, they informally campaign and solicit the 
support of friends, family members and other close associates for support of a particular 
politician or party during election periods” (Omobowale and Olutayo 2010:470). 
Between elections, clients can be easily mobilised to support collective efforts that serve 
the narrow interests of these elites. The solidarity rallies demanding the release from 
prison of prominent politicians incarcerated on charges of corruption illustrate this point. 
In 2002 for instance, hundreds of Nigerians fiercely protested the detention on corruption 
charges of Mohammed Abacha, the son of Nigeria’s most corrupt dictator, Sani Abacha. 
Although Abacha’s family had agreed to return one billion US dollars of Abacha’s loot 
to the Nigerian Government, Mohammed, who had occupied a prominent position in his 
father’s extremely corrupt regime was facing separate corruption and money laundering 
                                                 
 
69 Omobowale and Olutayo’s analysis corresponds with the findings of Auyero, Lapegna and Pana (2009:23) who, 
based on ethnographic research in Latin America, conclude that patron-client networks “can act as those indigenous 
organizations or associational networks that followers of the political process model in the study of social movements 
have long emphasized as a key presence in the emergence of collective action.” 
70 Although this individual is referred to as the association’s patron, his role is more similar to that of a (patronage) 
broker who acts as a link between politicians and citizens. The local contacts and knowledge at the brokers’ disposal 
make them particularly well placed to service patron-client relationships. 
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charges. The Nigerian government eventually bowed to the civic and other pressures to 
drop all charges against Mohammed and his family. 
 
In yet another incidence, when James Ibori, the former governor of Delta state was 
arrested and charged for money laundering, hundreds of people from his home-town took 
to the streets, “with some women going nude for his release” (Bamidele, Olaniyan and 
Oyadele 2016:118). In some instances, protesters were unequivocal that their anger was 
directed specifically at the Nigerian anti-corruption agency, the Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (EFCC), for witch-hunting their son (Amaize and Ige 2010)71 .  
Nigerian courts acquitted Ibori of all charges only for him to be arrested, tried and 
sentenced in London for stealing more than $200 million of public funds. His recent return 
from the British jail was widely celebrated in his home-town, with hundreds of young 
men clad in t-shirts printed ‘Ibori Boys’. Likewise, the early release from prison of the 
late Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, the disgraced former governor of Bayelsa state, was met 
with jubilant celebrations by residents of his home-town (Bamidele, Olaniyan and 
Oyadele 2016).72 During his colourful welcome party, speakers from his church and 
ethnic group eulogised and declared him non-corrupt, and a victim of a political 
conspiracy. This is despite that he had pleaded guilty, during the trial, to some of the 
corruption and money laundering charges for which he was imprisoned (Bamidele, 
Olaniyan and Oyadele 2016).  
 
While the foregoing casts regional, religious and ethnic solidarity as key mobilising 
factors, there are also instances where direct monetary benefits were alleged to have been 
used to mobilise Nigerians for protest action. There are strong allegations that the election 
campaign team of former President Goodluck Jonathan used material inducements to 
mobilise protesters against his challenger, Muhammadu Buhari. In one internal memo 
leaked to the Nigerian press, one of the senior figures in Jonathan’s campaign team 
proposed $20,000 to be used for a protest rally during Buhari’s speech at Chatham House 
in London. The memo offered details of how the protest would be ‘staged’, including 
when and for how long protesters would chant anti-Buhari slogans. This anti-Buhari 
protest did occur outside Chatham House on 26th February 2015. Despite hoisting anti-
                                                 
 
71 See more here: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2010/04/women-march-nude-for-ibori/ accessed 27 July 2017 
72 Majority of people in this town are the Ijaw. This is the ethnic group of Alamieyeseigha. 
158 
Buhari banners, some of the interviewed protesters had no idea why they were taking part 
in this event. When interviewed on camera, a female participant appeared not to know 
exactly why she was protesting, telling the reporter in no uncertain terms that she was 
neither against Buhari nor President Jonathan. 73  Others said they did not know much 
about both candidates but that they were told that Buhari’s presidency would be bad for 
Nigeria. 
 
Allegations on social media were that protesters received money in exchange for showing 
up. Wobbly video footage appeared to show a woman admitting that Jonathan’s campaign 
team paid her to ‘buy’ protesters. In the video clip, she can be heard saying:  
That’s what I do. I can give you my contact. I can arrange for crowd anywhere 
(sic). Today we are supporting Jonathan, tomorrow we may support Buhari. I can 
arrange hundred (sic). We rented a bus to come here. I can do Maryland, 
anywhere… [But] Buhari can’t spend the kind of money Jonathan spends.  
 
It is difficult to independently verify the authenticity of the people in these YouTube 
videos. The interviewees may as well have been planted by supporters of Buhari to 
discredit a genuine protest against his candidacy, before being interviewed by a bogus 
journalist. Be that as it may, the claim that the crowd was rented corresponds with the 
now common phenomenon of paying poor Nigerians to participate in protests and 
demonstrations. Indeed, there are strong allegations that recent demonstrators at the 
Amnesty International offices in Abuja were financially rewarded (Uzodinma 2017). The 
Premium Times newspaper published pictures appearing to show protesters receiving 
cash74 after barricading the office of Amnesty International and calling for it to leave the 
country within 24 hours. Writing for the BBC, Adaubi Nwaubani (2017) makes a telling 
statement about this and other protests and demonstrations in Nigeria: “in Nigeria, 
gathering a crowd to cause a stir on one's behalf is only a matter of cash...” 75  
 
According to Beeskers and van Gool (2012) and Smith (2007), some of the most 
politically active (and violent) individuals in Nigeria are okada (motorcycle taxi) riders. 
                                                 
 
73 This Youtube video contains some of the interviews conducted with the anti-Buhari protesters at the Chatham 
House in London. The interviewees appear to have been contacted at random. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XL-gZHOCPRM  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MDAtLpywjtA accessed 
13 March 2017 
74 See here: http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/226842-photo-story-anti-amnesty-international-
protesters-caught-sharing-money.html accessed 21 March 2017 
75 See here: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-40343395  accessed 21 March 2017 
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As Smith (2007) eloquently demonstrates okada drivers are also the most vocal and well-
organised supporters of the Igbo nationalist movement. However, they have often been 
recruited to advance political courses that appear to clash with the Igbo nationalist 
agitation or with the core interests of the taxi industry (Smith 2007). As Beeskers and van 
Gool (2012) and Smith (2007) observe, clientelism plays a major role in these 
contradictory political behaviours of the Okada drivers. Because of their poor economic 
conditions, they easily fall prey to clientelistic capture by powerful patrons. Indeed, many 
Okada drivers are believed to have received their motorcycles “from politicians or state 
governors, in return for public demonstrations of support or for acting as paid muscle in 
conflicts with political adversaries” (Beeskers and van Gool 2012:26).  
 
The phenomenon just described is consistent with what Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-
Boadi (2005) describe as ‘a mobilised’ form of collective action — a progeny of poverty 
and patron-clientelism that characterise Nigerian society. Mobilised or clientelist-
collective action is orchestrated by political patrons and their brokers as opposed to being 
driven autonomously by ordinary citizens in pursuit of their political convictions or public 
interests (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 2005). In clientelist-collective action, 
citizens take part in collective action partly out of loyalty to the patron or simply because 
they were paid to do so. Some attend due to the threats of negative sanctions by the patron 
and his/her brokers, not necessarily to express their own political views or demand 
political accountability. ‘Clientelist-collective action’ explains why, as Bratton, Mattes 
and Gyimah-Boadi discovered in their analysis of twelve African countries, people who 
are least informed about current affairs, and “do not know the identities of key political 
leaders (from local government councillors to national vice president) are likely to show 
up in protests” (Bratton et al 2005:301). 
 
The foregoing raises questions as to whether Nigeria’s high propensity for collective civic 
action is a true reflection of collective demand for accountability in that country. The 
alleged intermediation of state representatives in influencing and setting up ‘protests’ 
strips these events of their true purpose. Similarly, the domination of civic association’s 
agenda by ‘patrons’ undermines civil society as an engine of collective demand for 
accountability at grass-roots level. Overall, the narrative is consistent with the idea that 
where corruption is endemic, and people have a high propensity to act in concert, 
collective political action may be harnessed to serve particularistic interests. To the extent 
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that it is not designed to defend the interests of broad categories of citizens, clientelist 
collective action, including protests, may not qualify as an instance of collective demand 
for accountability.  
 
Nevertheless, it is important not to give an impression that all public protests, and other 
forms of collective civic action in Nigeria are inherently clientelistic. Indeed, field 
research by Scacco suggests that ordinary Nigerians do often organise independently of 
elites. One example is the riots taking place in the rural parts of Nigeria and catching the 
local elites by surprise, thereby indicating a more independent initiative by the rank and 
file (Scacco 2016). This means that clientelistic tendencies and a genuine demand for 
good governance may be simultaneously responsible for collective civic engagement in 
Nigeria. It is important to determine which of these two bases for collective action 
dominates in contemporary Nigeria.  However, it difficult to use qualitative secondary 
data to make this determination. In the sections that follow, I carefully analyse rounds 
five and six of Afrobarometer surveys to establish the extent to which the propensity to 
undertake collective civic action in Nigeria represents a genuine demand for 
accountability.  
 
7.5. Clientelism and collective demand for accountability in Nigeria: 
Evidence from Afrobarometer 
 
The narrative in the previous section is that the patron-client relations that feed corruption 
can also produce the high propensity to participate in collective civic action. This section 
evaluates the role of clientelism in motivating individuals to undertake collective civic 
action. I use self-reported participation in protests and demonstrations as the first 
dependent variable (see page 84). I have noted in chapter three that protests are 
increasingly being considered, in the emerging social accountability studies, as a form of 
popular demand for accountability especially in high corruption settings where more 
institutionalised forms of civic engagement are likely to be ineffective (see Beyerle 2014, 
Fox 2015, Williams 2000). There is a presumption in the bottom-up approaches to anti-
corruption that the act of protesting represents a demand for a more impartial and 
accountable government. In other words, protests tend to be automatically associated with 
democratic accountability. Nevertheless, based on anecdotal evidence, the previous 
section has raised some doubts about the tenability of these assumptions in highly corrupt 
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and clientelistic societies, where elite interests are likely to dominate the civic 
engagement agenda.  
 
One way to test the role of clientelism in collective action is to ascertain whether 
individuals who attend protests and demonstrations also express strong support for 
citizens’ involvement in efforts to exert influence on the decision-making processes of 
the state. To test this proposition, I use the following survey item as the second dependent 
variable in the model in which protest attendance acts as an independent variable: Which 
of the following statements is closest to your view: choose statement 1 or statement 2.  
•Statement 1: It is more important to have a government that can get things done, 
even if we have no influence over what it does. 
•Statement 2: It is more important for citizens to be able to hold government 
accountable, even if that means it makes decisions more slowly. 
  
Because of the phrase ‘even if it makes decisions more slowly’, respondents who agreed 
and strongly agreed with statement two — 40 per cent of the entire sample —  display an 
unconditional support for the involvement of citizens in decision-making processes of the 
state. I call this group democratic citizens. Descriptive analysis shows that most Nigerians 
(60%) prefer a government that gets things done to one that is accountable to citizens. To 
some respondents, the phrase ‘a government that gets things done’ could mean one that 
effectively delivers public goods, while others probably had more particularised benefits 
in mind. Either way, seeking accountability is clearly not a priority for these respondents, 
and they should not be regarded as democratic citizens. Their attitude fits Michael 
Bratton’s description of ‘clients’ as those who “simply seek patronage rather than a role 
in political decision-making” (Bratton 2013:4).  
 
In both models, I use two proxies of clientelism; one attitudinal and another behavioural. 
The attitudinal proxy is based on the question asked for the first time in the sixth round 
of Afrobarometer surveys as follows:  
Please tell me whether you think it is something a good citizen in a democracy should 
always do, never do, or do only if they choose: request personal assistance like help with 
school fees or funeral expenses from elected leaders. 
 
I refer to this variable as ‘support for clientelism’. The italicised phrase ‘personal 
assistance’ gets to the core of patron-clientelism as it supposedly occurs in Nigeria. I 
indicated in chapter two that clientelism in the African context proceeds as a provision of 
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private goods by a high-status person in return for personal loyalty (Lindberg and 
Morrison 2008). Descriptive analysis suggests a moderate to strong support for patron-
clientelism. Approximately one third of Nigerians (31%) feel that citizens should always 
request personal assistance from elected leaders. A further 41 per cent support this 
practice on condition that the individual asking MPs for help with personal problems has 
no problem doing so. As Figure 7.1 illustrates, only 28 per cent of the respondents 
disapprove unconditionally. 
 
Figure 7.1: Attitudes towards citizens’ requests for personal assistance from elected leaders 
 
 
I label those who agreed that people should always seek personal support from MPs as 
unconditional supporters of patron-clientelism, and those who said, “only if they choose”, 
as conditional supporters. In line with the logic of clientelistic collective action, I expect 
unconditional supporters to have the highest probability of turning up for protests but 
offer no support for the idea that ordinary people should participate in holding the 
government accountable.  
 
Patron-client relations require face-to-face contact (Scott 1972). Partly for this reason, 
Young (2009) uses a survey question about the reasons for contacting leaders and 
considers contacting to discuss personal problems as a proxy for clientelism. I improve 
on this measure by multiplying it with an item asking whether respondents contacted 
leaders alone or with a group. The main reason for doing this is to accommodate the 
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possibility, based on the literature on Nigeria that in some instances, clients relate to 
patrons as groups rather than individuals (see pages 157-158). Multiplying the two items 
creates an index measure of contact that consists of the following categories of actors; no 
contact, contacted alone to discuss personal problems, contacted alone to discuss 
community problems, contacted with a group to discuss a personal problem and finally, 
contacted with a group to discuss community problems.  
 
I label as ‘collective clients’ those who contacted leaders with a group to discuss personal 
problems, and as ‘individual clients’, those who contacted alone to do the same. Those 
who went to discuss community issues represent democratic citizens to the extent that 
they were acting in the interest of the public. Nonetheless, it is only the individuals who 
joined forces with other people to promote community interests who truly represent the 
concept of ‘collective demand for accountability’. Close to half of the respondents (48%) 
did not contact leaders. As shown in Figure 7.2, a plurality (20%) of those who contacted 
were accompanied by other people to discuss community problems; 16 per cent of those 
who went alone discussed personal problems; 10 per cent went with others to discuss a 
personal problem while seven per cent went alone to discuss problems affecting the 
community.  
 
Figure 7.2: Reasons for contacting leaders alone or with others 
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Although the two survey items forming this index do not specify the size of the group 
with which a respondent contacted leaders, it is sensible to assume that when they want 
to discuss personal matters, people would rather contact with a group of acquaintances. 
It is easier to talk about personal matters in the presence of neighbours, relatives, friends 
and fellow club members than it is in the presence of more distant others. In this regard, 
it is conceivable that those who felt comfortable enough to talk to leaders about a personal 
matter were accompanied by people they knew very well. Unlike a larger group, a small 
group of individuals asking for personal favours is also more vulnerable to clientelistic 
appeals, and as a result, more likely to support the patron and attend a protest that serves 
his interests. It is also possible that those who talked to leaders about personal problems 
were already part of the leader’s clientelist network in which personal favours were 
regularly being offered in return for loyalty. The point here is that in the political 
environment characterised by high levels of clientelism, cultivating personal relationships 
with leaders puts one at the risk of clientelistic capture. Following the logic of clientelist 
collective action as has been described, I expect those who went to discuss personal 
problems (either alone or in a group) to have a higher probability of taking part in protests 
and demonstrations. However, the same individuals should reject the idea that citizens 
should be involved in efforts to hold the government accountable.   
 
Regarding control variables, the models presented in the next section adjust for the effects 
of most of the variables used in the protest model presented in chapter five, which are: 
associational membership, institutionalised trust, lived poverty, relative living conditions, 
age, gender, education, urban-rural status (i.e. residence), and finally, perception of 
corruption and the experience of bribery.  Section two (see pages 97-98) of chapter five 
offered a summary of the literature regarding the potential effects of these variables on 
protest participation. There is no need to rehash that discussion here. Due in part to the 
important role of ethnicity in Nigerian politics and society, as alluded in previous sections, 
the models also control for the effects of ethnic identification and perceived ethnic 
marginalisation.  
 
7.5.1. The protest action model 
 
The control variables of age, education, urban-rural status, and gender do not exert a 
statistically significant influence on the probability to have joined protests in the last 12 
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months. In line with the model shown in section 5.5 of chapter five, membership in 
community groups and lived poverty have significantly positive coefficients. Importantly, 
an increase in the frequency of paying bribes has a positive effect on likelihood to take 
part in protests and demonstration. Institutional trust and perceptions of corruption have 
non-significant effects. These results are strikingly similar to those presented in section 
5.5.2 of chapter five, which were based on pooled Afrobarometer round three data from 
18 countries. The specification test (i.e. linktest) of the full model shown in Table 7.1 is 
not significant, suggesting that this model is correctly specified.  
 
Table 7.1: Complimentary log-log model of protest participation in Nigeria  
Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
z P>z [95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
Clientelism variables        
Attitude toward clientelism       
       Ask only if they choose 0.065 0.138 0.470 0.637 -0.205 0.336 
        Always ask for help -0.094 0.150 -0.630 0.530 -0.388 0.200 
       
Contact leaders & reasons       
            Alone_community 0.226 0.256 0.880 0.378 -0.276 0.728 
            Group_personal 0.970 0.178 5.450 0.000 0.621 1.318 
           Alone Personal 0.597 0.163 3.660 0.000 0.277 0.916 
           Group_community 0.635 0.163 3.890 0.000 0.315 0.955 
       
Control variables       
Perceptions of corruption 0.109 0.098 1.110 0.266 -0.084 0.302 
Experience of bribery 0.606 0.243 2.490 0.013 0.129 1.082 
Quadratic term of bribery -0.050 0.124 -0.400 0.687 -0.293 0.193 
Institutional trust -0.072 0.079 -0.900 0.366 -0.227 0.084 
Education -0.002 0.028 -0.080 0.935 -0.058 0.053 
Organisational membership  0.367 0.057 6.450 0.000 0.256 0.479 
Rural 0.124 0.120 1.040 0.300 -0.111 0.360 
gender 0.019 0.115 0.160 0.870 -0.206 0.244 
Ethnic marginalisation 0.069 0.060 1.160 0.246 -0.048 0.186 
Strength of ethnic 
identification 
0.153 0.050 3.070 0.002 0.055 0.251 
Lived Poverty Index 0.206 0.062 3.340 0.001 0.085 0.328 
Relative living cond. -0.095 0.063 -1.500 0.133 -0.218 0.029 
Political interest 0.088 0.057 1.54 0.125 -0.024 0.200 
       
Intercept -3.372 0.431 -7.810 0.000 -4.218 -2.526 
Notes 
The binary dependent variable is Protest attendance. 
 
Standard errors are robust. 
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Regarding the first main predictor variable, support for clientelism, the results suggest 
that there is no difference in the probability of protest participation between the 
individuals who agreed with the statement that citizens should always ask MPs for help 
with personal problems and those who said citizens should never do this. Turning to the 
behavioural proxy for clientelism, the contact index, the model suggests that compared to 
not contacting at all, having contacted leaders increases the chances of taking part in 
protests and demonstrations. Table 7.2 shows probability differences between the nine 
contrasts of the contact factor variable.  
 
Table 7.2: Change in probabilities and associated p values for different contrasts of 
contacting leaders  
Probability 
 
Pairwise contrasts Change From To p-
value  
Alone community vs. no contact 0.027 0.116 0.143 0.41 
Group personal vs. no contact 0.156 0.116 0.272 0.00 
Alone personal vs. no contact 0.076 0.116 0.192 0.00 
Group community vs. no contact 0.094 0.116 0.211 0.00 
Group personal vs. alone community 0.129 0.143 0.272 0.00 
Alone personal vs. alone community 0.049 0.143 0.192 0.17 
Group community vs alone community 0.068 0.143 0.211 0.06 
Alone personal vs group personal -0.079 0.272 0.192 0.03 
Group community vs group personal -0.061 0.272 0.211 0.08 
     
Number of observations = 1934 
 
Compared to not contacting at all, those who contacted leaders in a group to discuss 
personal problems (i.e. collective clients) had the largest probability of being involved in 
protests. The results also suggest that, on average, a change from collective clientelism to 
individual clientelism (i.e. contacting leaders alone to discuss personal matters) decreases 
the probability of protest participation from 0.27 to 0.19 on average. In other words, 
individual clients are significantly less likely to take part in protests than collective 
clients. Notably, compared to individual democratic citizenship (i.e. alone to discuss 
community-related problems), collective clientelism increases by 0.13 the probability of 
taking part in protests. Finally, compared to collective democratic citizenship (i.e. 
contacting leaders in a group to discuss community problems), collective clientelism 
increases the probability of protest by 0.061. The verdict is therefore that, compared to 
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everyone else, collective clients have a higher probability of showing up in protests and 
demonstrations.  
 
Quantitative measures of clientelism are always controversial (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 
2007). For this reason, it is important to address the potential criticisms that can be 
levelled against interpreting these results as indicating the effect of patron clientelism on 
collective civic action. First, one might argue that the most important mechanism behind 
the relationship between this contact variable and protest participation is personal 
grievances, rather than clientelism per se. The argument could be that citizens who rely 
on some form of collective action when contacting leaders have intense personal 
grievances, and that they need the influence of a group to gain audience with leaders. The 
same intense personal grievances that drive these individuals to use collective action to 
address personal problems could also underline their very high probability to take part in 
protests and demonstrations. Both contacting for personal interest and taking part in 
protests would then be regarded as indicating the presence of intense personal grievances. 
For this argument to hold, one would have to assume that across the board, those who 
contacted leaders to discuss community problems have less intense grievances compared 
to those who contacted leaders to discuss personal matters. The predicted probability of 
protest action would then be higher, first, for individuals who used collective action to 
pursue personal interests and second, those who contacted alone to discuss the same. As 
the results have shown, this is not the case. Instead, it is the respondents who contacted 
leaders to discuss community-related issues — and whose actions we assume were not 
being propelled by intense grievances – who have the second largest probability of taking 
part in protests and demonstrations. 
 
Further to that, the strong effect of collective clientelism does not disappear when we 
adjust for the effects of the variables that capture socio-economic and political grievances 
(e.g. relative living conditions, poverty, perceptions of corruption and personal 
experience with bribery). This means that this contact variable is picking a phenomenon 
other than (or in addition to) grievances as a driver of the propensity to take part in anti-
corruption collective action. As I argue, this phenomenon is the direct experience with 
clientelism.   
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The second criticism could be that the two contact variables that comprise this index lack 
content validity as the measure of political clientelism because they do not specify that 
‘political leaders’ were contacted. Contacting a religious leader to discuss a personal 
matter may not have the same implications for accountability as contacting a political 
party official. This is unless the religious leaders being contacted also act as patronage 
brokers in a long chain of patron-clientelism, as is sometimes the case in Nigeria. 
Nevertheless, it is to be expected that people will contact religious leaders for more 
personal matters. It is however problematic for principal-agent relations when citizens 
contact local government or political party leaders to help with personal problems, which 
as we have noted can include asking for help with school fees, completing a house or 
burials. 
 
To address these concerns, I introduce a condition such that the response categories of 
the contact index comprise only the respondents who contacted at least one of the 
following political officials: members of parliament, local government councillors and 
political party officials. Besides an obvious reduction in the number of observations (from 
n=1934 to n=1513), this modification does not change much of the narrative already 
presented. However, the four coefficients of the contact factor variable increase in size 
(see Table 7.3). For instance, the probability change from ‘no contact’ to ‘contact with a 
group for personal interests’ is now 0.215 (p<0.001) as opposed to the 0.156 (p<0.001) 
reported in Table 7.2. It could well be that the measure is more sensitive to the data, but 
as I have noted, this does not alter the conclusions drawn from the results in Table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.3: Change in probabilities and associated p values for different contrasts of 
contacting political officers 
 Probability  
Alone community vs. no contact 
Change From To     p-value  
0.027   0.116 
         
0.143 0.50 
Group personal vs. no contact 0.215 0.116 0.331 0.00 
Alone personal vs. no contact 0.102 0.116 0.218 0.00 
Group community vs. no contact 0.138 0.116 0.255 0.00 
Group personal vs. alone community 0.188 0.143 0.331 0.00 
Alone personal vs. alone community 0.075 0.143 0.218 0.08 
Group community vs alone community 0.112 0.143 0.255 0.03 
Alone personal vs group personal -0.113 0.331 0.218 0.01 
Group community vs group personal -0.076 0.331 0.255 0.14 
Group community vs alone personal 0.036 0.218 0.255 0.39 
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Number of observations = 1513 
 
Overall the results support the idea that at least part of the collective civic action in Nigeria 
is due to clientelism, especially collective clientelism. Although the collective clientelism 
variable has the largest effect on the probability of protest participation, the consistently 
positive effect of having contacted with a group to discuss community issues implies that 
clientelism is only part of a complex story of civic engagement in Nigeria. Assuming that 
the type of people who attend protests and demonstrations tell us whether the event 
represents demand-side accountability, these results would lead us to conclude that in 
some instances, Nigeria’s collective initiatives represent a genuine demand for good 
governance while there are instances where this is not the case. This does not mean that 
an individual client never exercises agency; it means that they have a higher risk of 
attending events that undermine democratic agency. In the same way, while democrats 
may attend ‘uncivil’ public protests and demonstrations, they are less likely to do this 
than the clients.  
 
The third criticism could be that this index is a proxy for community of ‘constituency 
service’ rather than clientelism. Making the effort to tell political leaders about personal 
matters may not always translate into an attempt to gain personalised favours. This is a 
fair criticism. Nevertheless, it is important to note that scholars who are more familiar 
with political relations in Africa frequently use these Afrobarometer’s contact items to 
make inferences about patron-clientelism in Africa. For instance, Bratton (2008) 
considers the high propensity of ordinary Africans to contact local leaders (e.g. local 
councillors, etc) rather than government officials when they need solutions to personal 
problems as an indicator of their embeddedness in patron-client relations.  
 
Further to that, we can assume based on our knowledge of Nigeria as a highly clientelistic 
society (see Joseph 1991, Omobowale and Olutayo 2010, Smith 2006) that those who 
went to discuss personal problems were most at risk of being roped in as clients if they 
were not clients already.76 We can also posit that the leader being contacted to offer 
                                                 
 
76 Also, consider that Lindberg (2009) found that in Ghana constituency service also doubles as an avenue for 
clientelistic favours. If political relations in Ghana are considered far less clientelistic than in Nigeria as the V-DEM 
data suggest, we can expect that the pattern Lindberg observed in Ghana could be worse in Nigeria. 
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solutions to personal problems often obliged with a culturally-informed expectation that 
the recipient will reciprocate with loyalty when called upon to do so (see Hyden 2013, 
Young 2012, Schatzberg 2001, Stokes 2009, Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno and Brusco 
2013). As Lauth has argued, culturally-informed exchanges between patrons and clients 
do not always occur simultaneously, “neither do they require synchronicity to a large 
extent like the market logic. Instead, obligations may and will be in general satisfied only 
with a time lag” (Lauth 2004: 209, cited in Muno 2013:42). Further to that, according to 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007:7), “one problem both clients and patrons face is that the 
clientelistic exchange between principals [i.e. citizens] and agents [e.g. politicians] is not 
usually simultaneous but takes place over time.” 
 
7.5.2. Clients versus democratic citizens: Who demands democratic accountability? 
 
As I have noted, the logic of clientelistic collective action leads us to expect respondents 
identified as clients to actively participate in protests but reject the view that citizens must 
be involved in efforts to hold the government accountable. Democratic citizens on the 
other hand, should take part in protests and express unconditional support for citizens’ 
right to be involved in the decision-making processes of the state. The foregoing section 
has provided evidence consistent with the first set of expectations. The evidence presented 
in this section shows that the second set of assumptions is also tenable. This leads to a 
single coherent message, namely that collective action involving respondents identified 
as clients in the previous section is motivated largely by particularistic considerations. 
 
To probe this second set of expectations, I estimate two binary logit models based on 
rounds five and six of the Afrobarometer surveys. In both models, support for citizens’ 
involvement in efforts to hold officials accountable is used as an outcome variable. The 
set of controls used in the model presented in Table 7.1 is retained in both models. In the 
model based on round six, the key predictor variable is the measure of clientelism that 
combines reasons for contacting political representatives (i.e. public or personal reasons) 
with the mode of contacting (alone or with a group). Table 7.4 only shows the predicted 
probabilities associated with this contact factor variable.  
 
Table 7.4: Probability change in the effect of clientelism (using the contact variable) on 
support for demand-side accountability variable    
Probability  
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Change From To     p-value  
Alone community vs. no contact 0.124 0.402 0.526 0.026 
Group personal vs. no contact 0.022 0.402 0.424 0.688 
Alone personal vs. no contact 0.009 0.402 0.411 0.795 
Group community vs. no contact 0.149 0.402 0.551 0.002 
Group personal vs. alone community -0.103 0.526 0.424 0.158 
Alone personal vs. alone community -0.115 0.526 0.411 0.053 
Group community vs alone 
community 
0.025 0.526 0.551 0.719 
Alone personal vs group personal -0.013 0.424 0.411 0.826 
Group community vs group 
personal 
0.128 0.424 0.551 0.053 
Group community vs alone personal 0.141 0.411 0.551 0.008 
 
Number of observations = 1934 
Note: These results are based on the analysis of round six data. Significant contrasts highlighted  
  
The results shown in Table 7.4 suggest that clients (those who contact leaders to advance 
personal interests) are unlikely to approve the statement that it is important for citizens to 
be able to hold the government accountable. On the other hand, democratic citizens (i.e. 
those who act on behalf of the community) express unconditional approval of citizens’ 
involvement in the decision-making processes of the state. Compared to not contacting at 
all, those who contacted leaders to discuss community-related problems (either alone or 
with a group) were significantly more likely to opine that it is more important for citizens 
to be able to hold the government accountable, even if this derails decision-making 
processes. The coefficients of contacting leaders to discuss personal matters — either 
alone or with a group — are both highly non-significant. Further analysis suggests that 
for individuals who are average on all attributes, the probability of supporting citizens’ 
involvement in mechanisms of accountability will rise from 0.389 when they shift from 
contacting political leaders with a group for personal interests, to 0.527 when contacting 
them with a group to advance public interests. This represents a substantial probability 
change of 0.128.  
 
In the fifth round of its surveys, Afrobarometer posed two questions that scholars have 
used as measures of clientelism. The first of such questions reads as follows: 
Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 
or Statement 2. 
Statement 1: Once in office, leaders are obliged to help their home community 
first. 
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Statement 2: Since leaders represent everyone, they should not do anything that 
favours their own group over others. 
 
Bratton (2007) uses this item to capture the concept of clientelism and classifies as clients 
those who agree and very strongly agree with statement 1. The second question reads as 
follows: 
Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 
or Statement 2. 
Statement 1: The government is like a parent. It should decide what is good for 
us. 
Statement 2: The government is like our employee. We are the bosses and should 
tell government what to do 
 
Those who agreed with statement 1 are regarded as more inclined to support clientelism 
while those who chose statement 2 are deemed to have attitudes consistent with 
democratic citizenship (Mattes 2014). When we use these two variables as indicators of 
clientelism, the results suggest that clients are less likely to support the involvement of 
citizens in efforts to hold the government accountable. As shown in Table 7.5, the belief 
that leaders should not elevate the interests of their own social group over public interests 
increases by 0.10 the probability of supporting citizens’ involvement in mechanisms of 
accountability. Similarly, shifting from the position that the government should act like a 
parent and single-handedly decide what is good for citizens, to the position that people 
are the bosses of the government, increases by 0.063 the probability of supporting 
citizens’ involvement in mechanisms of democratic accountability.  
 
Table 7.5: Change in probabilities and associated p values for the contrast between 
clients and democratic citizens  
 Probability  
 Change  From To P-values 
Leaders obliged to help their home community vs. 
leaders should not favour their own family or group. 0.10 0.32 0.42 0.00 
People are the children of the government vs. People 
are the bosses of the government 0.063 0.356 0.419 0.004 
Note: These results are based on the analysis of round five data.  
The results displayed in Tables 7.4 and 7.5 concur that clients are less likely to support a 
genuine citizen-driven demand for good governance. However, as the previous section 
has shown, these individuals will not shy away from joining protests and demonstrations. 
On the bright side, the fact that a high corruption society such as Nigeria has individuals 
who are likely to be genuinely seeking accountability is a promising sign for anti-
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corruption. In fact, it is consistent with the findings of Smith (2009) — an expert on 
corruption in Nigeria— who noted that Nigeria has individuals and organisations that 
continue to resist corruption despite being surrounded by its pervasiveness. As he 
concludes in this regard, understanding the “social currents that push against corruption 
is as important as explaining those that facilitate corruption” in Nigeria (Smith 2009:306). 
Unfortunately, a majority of studies have focused on the social and political dynamics 
that reproduce high levels of corruption, not why some people are willing to fight it. I 
hope this section provides a basis for more systematic studies in this area. 
 
7.6. Conclusions 
 
Nigeria’s rampant corruption and very high propensity for collective action presents an 
excellent opportunity to advance our understanding of the nexus between corruption and 
collective demand for accountability in places where corruption is seen as a rule rather 
than exception. Using the literature on Nigeria as well as news media material, this 
chapter demonstrated that Nigeria’s strong collectivist culture partly explains its high 
level of corruption as well as exceptionally strong propensity for collective civic action, 
often against ‘corruption’. Moving on, the chapter delved into the role of clientelism, an 
off-shoot of collectivist culture, on the propensity to engage in collective civic action. 
This analysis demonstrated, in line with the pessimistic view of anti-corruption civic 
engagement, that patron-clientelism does pervert the accountability relationship of 
citizens as principals and political elites as their agents.  
 
The quantitative analysis suggests that respondents who can be described as ‘clients’ are 
significantly more likely to show up in protests than those who fit the definition of 
democratic citizens. Nevertheless, clients are far less likely to support the idea that 
exercising voice is always important, suggesting that they are more at risk of being 
involved in protests that have nothing to do with accountability and good governance. 
Those classified as democratic citizens, on the other hand, are likely to both take part in 
protests and demonstrations and support the view that citizens’ involvement in demand-
side accountability should never be sacrificed. Overall, the analysis confirms that 
Nigeria’s high propensity for collective civic action is rooted both in genuine demand for 
accountability and clientelistic relations. Indeed, in his analysis of clientelism in Nigeria, 
Reno (2002:856) has cautioned that studies on Nigerian should be aware of the duality 
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“between governance and pretences to governance”, and to recognise “that the former 
does not always coincide with the latter”.  That is, not every collective civic engagement 
conducted in the name of ‘accountability’ seeks to attain procedural impartiality or ethical 
universalism as a governance norm. 
 
Better measurements of clientelism permitting, future studies would do well to unpack 
this duality and enhance our understanding of the type (and motives) of the individuals 
who are likely to use collective action to demand accountability in highly clientelistic 
societies. Additionally, and again data permitting, it could be informative to analyse the 
extent to which client-based collective action can lead to political accountability and the 
rule of law. In this regard, the work of Michael Johnston (2014) offers a good starting 
point as it shows that, historically, good governance institutions emerged from conditions 
that approximate what this chapter has described— individuals motivated by private 
interests rather than democratic ideas.  Institutions of accountability and rule of law 
emerged from the group-based contestations, triggered by corruption and exclusion. It 
remains to be seen whether Johnston’s ideas can be applied in places where clientelism 
is as ubiquitous as it is in Nigeria. 
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Chapter eight 
The prospect for grassroots anti-corruption movement in 
Africa: summaries and conclusions 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
Africa is home to many countries where corruption is viewed as being a rule rather than 
exception. The recent iteration of principal-agent analysis of anti-corruption has 
emphasised the importance of involving citizens in efforts to put this type of corruption 
under control. Central to this citizen- focused (or bottom-up) approach is the assumption 
that ordinary people, especially the poor, have a straightforward interest in anti-corruption 
efforts as they are the greatest victims of malfeasance. One of the main advantages of a 
citizen- focused approach is the ability to inspire and sustain political will— a lynchpin 
of successful institutional reform. These advantages notwithstanding, citizen-centred 
anti-corruption efforts have been subjected to growing scrutiny from studies anchored in 
collective action theory. These studies have put forward two arguments. First, where 
corruption is pervasive, anti-corruption efforts confront an assurance problem to the 
extent that corruption erodes the mechanisms that promote co-operation among 
individuals, including generalised interpersonal trust. Secondly, as a public good, anti-
corruption efforts confront a free-rider problem, which erodes the propensity to view 
collective civic action as a viable solution for systemic corruption.  
 
This study set out to examine the impact of corruption on individual-level propensity to 
support collective action against it. Although an increasing number of studies examine 
the consequences of corruption, very few have looked, specifically, at the influence that 
corruption has on likelihood to get involved in anti-corruption efforts. Further to that, 
none of these (very few) studies delineate the differential impacts of personal experience 
of bribery and subjective perceptions of corruption, as well as the contextual effects of 
these forms of corruption across the African continent. This intellectual neglect has 
created an impression that subjective perceptions and direct experience of corruption 
affect attitudes and behaviour in the same way within and across nations.  
 
This concluding chapter summarises this study’s main findings, highlighting its 
contributions to knowledge on (anti-)corruption as well as associated practical 
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implications. Most of the findings are consistent with the predictions based on the 
grievance model of collective action, to the extent that individuals seem to be willing to 
challenge corruption when they incur personal losses from it or when their perceptions 
and experiences of corruption coincide with pre-existing socio-economic grievances.  
 
It is worth repeating that this study is the first to use survey data on two-thirds of the 
African countries to analyse the attitudinal impact of corruption. Importantly, the data on 
which these conclusions are based truly represent the African continent, having been 
drawn from countries located in the continent’s major regions. It is also worth stressing 
the point that this is the first study to employ multilevel regression modelling to 
investigate the conditional effects of corruption in Africa. This analytical approach 
considers simultaneously, the impact of observed and unobserved institutional factors on 
the dependent variable. Nevertheless, the study also concentrated on a single case of 
Nigeria to offer a more nuanced account of how clientelism might shape citizens’ demand 
for accountability— a missing detail in studies on bottom-up approaches to anti-
corruption in Africa where clientelism is thought to be a core feature of political relations. 
I believe that using different designs and analytical techniques has allowed me to provide 
a richer account of the complex relationship between corruption and citizens’ demand for 
accountability in Africa, and beyond. 
 
8.2. Grievances and the mobilising potential of the exposure to 
corruption 
 
One of the major findings of this dissertation, which survives various empirical 
conditions, is that individuals with the highest experience of bribery have the lowest 
propensity to report corruption. This finding is in line with the idea that individuals who 
regularly participate in bribery are unlikely to report, as they may feel that “it is 
meaningless to report corruption since this will not make any difference [as] it is simply 
the way ‘things work’” (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2013:458). Despite their 
reluctance to report corruption, frequent bribers display the highest propensity to utilise 
civic action tactics available to them to address corruption. These include joining protests 
targeting corruption, raising awareness about corruption and voting for anti-corruption 
champions.  
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One theoretical implication of these results is that, as far as participants in corruption are 
concerned, the lack of willingness to report corruption should not be confused with the 
lack of willingness to punish corruption. Contrary to the postulates of collective action 
thinking, bribers’ unwillingness to report is unlikely to be related to the view that ordinary 
people are unwilling to punish corruption. Rather, it seems to be a consequence of bribers’ 
lack of trust in the ability of the government to address corruption (Cho and Kirwin 2007). 
This explains why frequent bribers are more attracted to extra-institutional and citizen-
centred methods of taking control. Indeed, the results based on round three data (in 
chapter five) show that an increasing trust in public institutions increases the likelihood 
to report allegations of corruption while decreasing the propensity to support anti-
corruption protests and demonstrations.  
 
It is also important to highlight the fact that if presented with the choice between refusing 
to pay a bribe and attending anti-corruption protests and demonstrations as a strategy to 
combat corruption, bribers are significantly more likely to choose the latter. They are also 
more likely to prefer to raise awareness about corruption, vote for clean candidates or 
sign petitions calling for tougher sanctions than refuse to pay bribes. What this means is 
that bribers understand that acting alone (e.g. by refusing to pay a bribe) cannot 
effectively help combat corruption where it is endemic. An effective anti-corruption tactic 
is one that involves a concerted and co-ordinated effort. This finding also implies that 
bribers are likely to continue paying bribes when they are demanded while actively 
supporting anti-corruption efforts based on civic action. Anti-corruption scholars and 
practitioners should be aware of these nuances. The same individuals who pay bribes and 
are unlikely to stop doing so in future could stand ready to support citizen-centred means 
of tackling corruption when that opportunity arises.  
 
One of the main weaknesses of the mainstream literature on Africa is the tendency to 
make broad generalisations based on single case analysis or comparisons of few countries 
(see Alence 2012, Briggs 2017). As far as the analysis of corruption outcomes is 
concerned, these studies tend to emphasise the similarities between African countries 
rather than their differences. Furthermore, there is an intellectual wilderness regarding 
the impact of country-specific features on the relationship between corruption and mass 
political behaviour in the African continent. The sixth chapter of this dissertation 
attempted to fill this lacuna by employing multilevel regression techniques. As the results 
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indicate, bribers are likely to express support for citizen-centred and collective action 
methods of tackling corruption, irrespective of their country of residence. In this regard, 
we can be confident that bribe payers, especially those who are poor, can act as an 
important constituency for anti-corruption mobilisation, even in highly corrupt societies. 
Given the consistency of the positive effect of bribery, it is surprising as Cohen and Navot 
point out that Rose and Peiffer’s (2015) Global Guide to Grass-roots Corruption ignores 
“strengthening the individuals fighting the practice in their countries as a strategy for 
reducing corruption” (Cohen and Navot 2016:566).  
 
Moving on, the multilevel analysis suggests that an increase in the perception of 
corruption works differently in different contexts, igniting the support for collective 
action in some highly corrupt countries and eroding this in others. As this finding 
suggests, although observed and unobserved country-level factors account for the 
differential impact of corruption within countries, country-level corruption is not one of 
these factors.  Indeed, the non-significant impact of the interaction between subjective 
perceptions of corruption and the control of corruption (CCI) measure confirms that the 
propensity to support anti-corruption mobilisation is likely to be different in, for example, 
Uganda and Kenya even though both countries are seen as “arguably typically thoroughly 
corrupt” and have been used (on the basis of this feature) in comparative analysis of the 
impact of corruption (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2015:450). 
 
What explains the strong cross-national variability of the perceptions of corruption is the 
material conditions. High corruption perception has greater potential to encourage the 
support for anti-corruption collective action in very poor African countries more than it 
does in their richer counterparts. Despite that Burkina Faso and Niger share a border, key 
institutional attributes and demographics (e.g. French, Fulfude languages are widely 
spoken in both countries), the mobilising effect of perceptions of corruption is stronger 
in Niger due to its higher rate of poverty. In terms of theoretical implications, this finding 
corresponds to the effect of the positive interaction between the frequency of bribery 
payments and individual level poverty. The difference though is that between individuals, 
poor bribers are more likely to support anti-corruption collective action; between 
countries however, those who perceive corruption to be widespread (regardless of their 
objective economic status) are more likely to support anti-corruption collective action as 
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country-level poverty increases. In other words, in poor countries, the perception of 
corruption is likely to draw fighters across different economic classes. 
 
8.2.1. Ethnic grievances  
 
Another strand of the grievance-based explanation considers the interplay between 
perceptions of ethnic marginalisation and subjective perceptions of corruption. 
Individuals who believe that the state always treats their ethnic groups unfairly have a 
higher propensity to support anti-corruption collective action regardless of the changes in 
their perceptions of corruption. However, those who never feel this way are more likely 
to support collective action as their perceptions of corruption increase. Importantly, the 
analysis suggests that at high levels of corruption perceptions, individuals with a strong 
sense of ethnic discrimination and those without such feelings will have the same 
likelihood of supporting citizen-centred anti-corruption efforts. Overall, the perception of 
corruption does not modify the effect of ethnicity-related grievances on anti-corruption 
collective action in a significant way. 
 
The practical implication of these results is that individuals who harbour ethnicity-related 
grievances and those aggrieved by pervasive corruption may unite behind an anti-
corruption drive. But, they will be drawing inspiration from entirely different sources. 
Indeed, Orjuela (2013) cites a couple of studies showing that in deeply divided societies 
corruption can help forge new alliances and indeed a new identity of ‘victims of 
corruption’. This identity can be used to mobilise people across ethnic and religious fault 
lines to rally behind anti-corruption efforts. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, 
protesters of different ethnic and religious formations used a “slogan ‘You are all 
disgusting, no matter what ethnicity you belong to’, directed at the ruling elite” instead of 
the ethnic other (Orjuela 2013:764).77 
 
The foregoing constitutes the positive aspect of these findings. The potentially negative 
aspect in the African context where ethnicity is politically salient is that those who are 
inspired by a perception of ethnic discrimination may hijack an anti-corruption coalition 
(that includes people without these grievances) to push through an agenda that seeks to 
                                                 
 
77 Bosnia-Herzegovina is regarded as one of the most ethnically polarised countries (see Mungiu-Pipiddi 2016) 
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supplant a particularised order with another one. When this happens, an anti-corruption 
drive can lose credibility, and indeed be dismissed as a ploy to advance the narrow 
interests of certain ethnic groups. But, as I have shown, perceptions of corruption can also 
dominate this broad-based anti-corruption coalition, gradually de-emphasising ethnicity 
as the key motive for an anti-corruption effort. 
 
This analysis provides a window into the broad-based, messy and complex nature of an 
anti-corruption mobilisation. In practice, citizen-centred anti-corruption efforts are likely 
to be characterised by multiple incentives and sometimes irreconcilable goals. Johnston 
(2014:46) alludes to this when he notes that anti-corruption coalitions are likely to 
comprise “groups with partially overlapping agendas, pursuing what are likely to be less 
coherent but mutually agreeable changes”. Indeed, such “coalitions can be a delicate 
balancing act among people who may not completely trust each other, and who agree 
more about what they oppose than about what they want in its place” (Johnston 2014:46). 
 
8.3. Clientelism and clientelistic collective action  
 
Research on ordinary Africans’ reactions to corruption would not be complete without a 
critical assessment of the role of clientelism in fostering both corruption and collective 
action against it. The first attempt at this is found in chapter six where I introduced a 
context-level variable measuring the extent to which the country’s social and 
infrastructural spending is narrowly targeted at a specific social group, region, party or 
set of constituents. The analysis reveals that an increase in the non-universalist 
distribution of public goods increases the effect of subjective perceptions of corruption. 
That is, societies characterised by high levels of state-level clientelism are likely to 
experience high rates of anti-corruption collective action as citizens’ perceptions of 
corruption increase. This is in line with the proposition that particularistic policies and 
programmes that define national-level clientelism generate intense grievances among 
excluded citizens.  
 
Because state-level clientelism deepens social and political divisions and creates the 
incentive for political entrepreneurs to mobilise along these lines, there is a danger that 
the anti-graft collective political action that occurs in high clientelism societies does not 
represent a genuine demand for accountability. Reflecting the clientelistic character of 
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society and the state, ‘anti-corruption’ collective action can be a ruse to perpetuate the 
existing particularistic order or replace it with another one. Seized with these conjectures, 
chapter seven examined the extent to which clientelism, measured at the individual-level, 
influences collective action in Nigeria — one of Africa’s highly corrupt societies with 
strong support for anti-corruption collective action among citizens. Indeed, notions of 
anti-corruption feature predominantly in the majority of Nigeria’s violent and non-violent 
forms of civic engagement. Focusing on Nigeria enabled the analysis to keep the context-
level clientelism and other country-level factors constant while exploring variations at 
individual level. The analysis confirms that individual-level clientelism plays a 
significant role in collective mobilisation. Clients have a higher propensity to engage in 
collective action compared to individuals described as democratic citizens. But, the 
analysis also shows that the propensity to engage in collective action in highly clientelistic 
settings cannot be entirely attributed to clientelism — pervasive as it may be. While 
clientelism is a more powerful predictor of collective action, concerns about public goods 
are also important drivers of the propensity to engage in collective action.  
 
The tone in chapter seven gives an impression that clientelistic collective action is harmful 
to the ultimate goal of anti-corruption civic engagement, which is to establish impartiality 
as a governing principle. This may be true. Indeed, Mungiu-Pipiddi (2016) identifies 
clientelism as one of the biggest challenges facing bottom-up approaches. Likewise, as 
Beeskers and van Gool (2012:29) argue, “the social and political initiatives that ‘ordinary’ 
citizens develop in response to …neo-patrimonial neglect do not necessarily correspond 
to the ideals of ‘good governance’”. Nevertheless, it is possible that when it produces a 
strong propensity to defend interests through collective civic engagement (as it does in 
Nigeria), clientelism could provide a critical building block towards ultimately 
controlling abuses of power, even though it is likely to increase corruption in the interim.  
 
Indeed, Johnston’s (2015) historical analysis suggests that ideas about accountability 
gained traction when organised interests sought to assert limits on political power. In 
particular, Johnston makes a point that initially, notions of ‘public goods’ and 
accountability were not part of the vocabulary of the groups challenging entrenched 
particularism and abuses of power. These ideas only became central at a later stage as by-
products of political settlements. If support for impartiality as a governing principle is 
borne out of particularistic political contention, dismissing clientelistic collective action 
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might be akin to throwing the baby out with the bath water. Indeed, one might argue that 
in deeply divided and highly corrupt societies, clientelistic collective action represents 
what Johnston (2015) calls a half-way house towards deep democratization as an antidote 
for systemic corruption.  
 
To the extent that this analysis is sound, it calls for an anti-corruption reform that goes 
with the proverbial grain rather than against it. In practice, this may involve organising 
an anti-corruption drive in line with the motivating forces of collective political action at 
local level, and importantly, changing the language of anti-corruption reform from its 
current emphasis on notions of ‘good governance’ “and a brighter future for all” to one 
that engages self-interest (Johnston 2015:648).  
 
8.4. Principled principals? The resilience of collective efficacy to the 
corrosive impact of corruption 
 
One of the recurring themes in collective action analysis of corruption is interpersonal 
trust, reciprocity and solidarity. As Bauhr and Grimes noted, “a key ingredient, perhaps 
the lynchpin, of a group’s ability to solve a social dilemma is the expectation that other 
actors are also willing and able to collaborate” (Bauhr and Grimes 2014:310). Part of 
chapter six examined how individual and context-level corruption influenced the belief 
in citizens’ ability to address corruption (i.e. anti-corruption collective efficacy). The 
results suggest, first, that an increase in the belief that citizens can fight corruption has a 
strong impact on support for anti-corruption mobilisation. Second, and more importantly, 
an increase in perceptions of corruption has a strong positive effect among individuals 
with a strong sense of collective efficacy to tackle corruption. Curiously, regardless of 
the level of corruption in their countries, those who strongly believe that people can fight 
corruption have a higher propensity to support citizens’ efforts. The context characterised 
by high levels of corruption erodes the propensity of low-trust/efficacy individuals to 
support collective action tactics. Thus, the gap in propensity to support collective action 
between low-trust individuals and their high trusting counterparts gets wider as context-
level corruption increases.  
 
Further analysis confirms that institutional characteristics of countries have the strongest 
effect among those with the lowest belief in the ability of ordinary people to tackle 
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corruption. This is why high trust individuals have roughly the same propensity to support 
collective civic engagement regardless of where they live while the opposite is true for 
low trust individuals. Overall, these results indicate that rational choice institutionalism, 
on which collective action analysis is premised only accounts for how low trusting 
individuals are likely to behave in both high-corruption societies and their low-corruption 
counterparts. This study is the first to articulate these findings using public opinion data 
on Africa.  
 
Nevertheless, these results are broadly consistent with the findings of Habyriamana, 
Humphreys, Posner and Weinstein (2009). These authors’ laboratory experiments in 
Uganda show that individuals who possess strong other-regarding attitudes are 
significantly more likely to co-operate compared to non-altruistic individuals. This 
difference in propensity to co-operate in public-goods settings was not significant when 
the context was altered by introducing an enforcer in subsequent prisoner dilemma games. 
An enforcer’s presence increased, substantially, the propensity of non-altruistic people to 
co-operate in public goods’ provision. On the contrary, this possibility of punishment had 
a very weak effect on the propensity of the altruistic group to co-operate. Indeed, quite in 
line with the results of this dissertation, “once punishment was permitted within the game, 
the difference in co-operation rates between egoists and non-egoists almost completely 
disappeared”, suggesting that “expectations of sanctioning contribute substantially to co-
operation among subjects, especially egoists” (Habyriamana et al 2009:114).  
 
The practical implication of these findings is that low trusters are more likely to join anti-
corruption collective action where corruption is less of a problem. This increases the 
number of people willing to take a stand against corruption, which in turn, sets in motion 
the virtuous cycle of trust, co-operation and regard for public interest that characterise 
low corruption societies. Although the proportion of individuals willing to fight 
corruption is smaller in high-corruption settings, the situation is not hopeless. Since the 
attitudes of low trusters are more malleable and indeed strongly influenced by contextual 
factors, political leaders’ show of commitment to institutional reforms can create the 
assurance that low trusters need before committing themselves to anti-corruption efforts. 
An information revealing genuine efforts of the government to fight corruption can 
change the views of low trust individuals, significantly increasing the number of people 
in society who are willing to work with others to tackle corruption. But, most importantly, 
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individuals are more likely to be motivated by beliefs and behavioural examples of other 
ordinary people. For this reason, it is important that high trust/efficacy individuals are 
given a platform to instil the belief in the ability of ordinary people to challenge corruption 
(Hoffman and Patel 2017).  
 
8.5. Directions for future research 
 
The mobilising effect of the experience of bribery and the strong positive effect of 
corruption perceptions in poor countries suggest that a grass-roots anti-corruption drive 
is most likely to receive support in Africa’s poorest societies. What future studies can 
help us establish is whether this willingness to support a grass-roots anti-corruption drive 
can act as an effective anti-dote against systematic and systemic abuses of power. In 
particular, future studies could shed light on the contextual conditions under which 
bottom-up approaches can be sustained and eventually succeed to change the ‘corrupt’ 
institutional equilibrium to a non-corrupt one. They could examine whether the initial 
contextual conditions (e.g. economic development) that provoke the willingness to 
support anti-corruption collective action also act to sustain it.  
 
Apart from that, future studies should examine whether the propensity for anti-corruption 
support varies significantly by the type of public institution. Results of that analysis will 
be more useful for targeted anti-corruption mobilisation. For instance, if it is found that 
paying bribes to police officers is more annoying than paying extra to get a passport or 
permit, it would be better for anti-corruption campaigns to put more emphasis on police 
services. Similarly, future studies could examine whether perceiving widespread 
corruption in the policy implementation institutions (police, judiciary and government 
officials) has a different mobilisation impact to the perception of corruption in policy-
making institutions (MPs, local councillors and political parties). Are people annoyed 
more by corruption in the service delivery/policy implementation institutions than other 
institutions of the state? Furthermore, studies can also examine the effect of the specific 
types of corruption (e.g. election fraud) as well as the impact of the onset of major 
corruption scandals on willingness to engage in anti-corruption collective action.   
 
This study has noted that individuals who perceive high levels of corruption are 
consistently more likely to say that there is nothing people can do about corruption. On 
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the other hand, bribers are consistently more likely to reject this statement. Researchers 
can explore in more details the empirical manifestation of ‘resignation’, including 
providing a full profile of the individual most likely to feel fatalistic as a result of 
corruption. It is important to examine whether fatalism manifests in a similar way across 
socio-economic classes. Finally, studies can also look into the relationship between a 
sense of resignation and propensity to adopt what Alam (1995) described as evasive 
countervailing action (Alam 1995) or what Hirschman (1970) called the exit option — a 
strategy that is often adopted by educated people living in high corrupt societies. Do those 
who exit (e.g. leave the city, country, organisation etc) feel nothing can be done about 
corruption?  
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Variables used in the study 
 
Table A3: Variables used in the study 
Variable  Exact wording Variable 
construction 
information and 
supplementary 
notes 
Preferred action 
against suspected 
acts of corruption 
(Round three) 
What, if anything, would you do to try 
to resolve each of the following 
situations: You suspected a school or 
clinic official of stealing? 
1= Don’t worry, things will be resolved 
given enough time, 2= Lodge a 
complaint through proper channels or 
procedures, 3= Use connections with 
influential people, 4= Offer a tip or 
bribe, 5= Join in public protest, 
7=Nothing, because nothing can be 
done. 
 
Most effective 
action against 
corruption by an 
ordinary person 
What is the most effective thing that an 
ordinary person like you can do the help 
combat corruption in this country? 
[Interviewer: Do not read options. 
Code from response.] 
 
0= Nothing / Ordinary people cannot do 
anything  
1= Refuse to pay bribes  
2= Report corruption when you see or 
experience it  
3= Vote for clean candidates or parties 
or for parties that promise to fight 
corruption  
4= Speak out about the problem, for 
example, by calling a radio program or 
writing a letter  
5= Talk to friends and relatives about 
the problem  
6= Sign a petition asking for a stronger 
fight against corruption  
7= Join or support an organization that 
is fighting corruption  
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8= Participate in protest marches or 
demonstrations against corruption 
Bribe paid index In the past year, how often (if ever) 
have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, 
or do a favour to government officials 
to: A) Get a Document or a permit? B) 
Get a child into school? C) Get a 
household service (like piped water, 
electricity or phone)? D) Get medicine 
or medical attention? E) Avoid a 
problem with the police (like passing a 
checkpoint or avoiding a fine or arrest)? 
0 = Never, 1 = Once or twice, 2 = A 
few times, 3 = Often 
 
Maximum 
likelihood factor 
analysis with 
oblique rotation 
extracted one 
solution with a 
Cronbach’s alpha 
value of 0.70 for 
both rounds three 
and six. 
Corruption 
perception index 
How many of the following people do 
you think are involved in corruption, or 
haven’t you heard enough about them to 
say? A) The president and officials in 
his office? B) Members of Parliament? 
C) Elected local government 
councillors? D) National Government 
Officials? E) Local government 
officials? F) Police? G) Tax officials? 
H) Judges and magistrates? 
 0 = None of them, 1 = Some of them, 2 
= Most of them, 3= All of them 
Maximum 
likelihood factor 
analysis with 
oblique rotation 
extracted one 
solution with a 
Cronbach’s alpha 
value of 0.80 for 
both rounds three 
and six 
Lived Poverty 
Index (LPI) 
Over the past year, how often, if ever, 
have you or your family gone without: 
A) Enough food to eat? B) Enough 
clean water for home use? C) Medicines 
or medical treatment? D) Enough fuel 
to cook your food? E) A cash income? 
Never= 0, Just once or twice=1, Several 
times=2, many times=3, Always=4 
Maximum 
likelihood factor 
analysis with 
oblique rotation 
extracted one 
solution with a 
Cronbach’s alpha 
value of more than 
0.75 for both 
rounds three and 
six 
 
Relative living  
conditions 
In general, how do you rate your living 
conditions compared with those of other 
countrymen? 
 
Education What is the highest level of education 
you have completed? 
 
Organisational 
membership 
Please tell me whether you are an 
official leader, an active member, an 
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inactive member, or not a member? 
Member of voluntary association or 
community group. 
Support for 
investigative 
media 
Which of the following statements is 
closest to your view? Choose Statement 
1 or Statement 2. 
[Interviewer: Probe for strength of 
opinion: Do you agree or agree very 
strongly?] 
 
Statement 1: The news media should 
constantly investigate and report on 
government mistakes and corruption. 
 
Statement 2: Too much reporting on 
negative events, like government 
mistakes and corruption, only harms the 
country. 
 
Agree Very Strongly With 
Statement 1 
Agree with Statement 1 
Agree Very Strongly With 
Statement 2 
Agree with Statement 2 
 
   
Support for 
citizens’ 
involvement in 
political 
accountability 
Which of the following statements is 
closest to your view? Choose Statement 
1 or Statement 2. 
[Interviewer: Probe for strength of 
opinion: Do you agree or agree very 
strongly?] 
 
Statement 1: It is more important to 
have a government that can get things 
done, even if we have no influence over 
what it does. 
 
Statement 2: It is more important for 
citizens to be able to hold government 
accountable, even if that means it makes 
decisions more slowly. 
 
Agree Very Strongly With 
Statement 1 
Agree With Statement 1 
Agree Very Strongly With 
Statement 2 
Agree with Statement 2 
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Support for 
democracy 
Which of these three statements is 
closest to your own opinion? 
STATEMENT 1: Democracy is 
preferable to any other kind of 
government.  
STATEMENT 2: In some 
circumstances, a non-democratic 
government can be preferable.  
STATEMENT 3: For someone like me, 
it doesn’t matter what kind of 
government we have. 
 
Institutional trust 
index 
How much do you trust each of the 
following, or haven’t you heard enough 
about them to say? The president; 
Parliament; The National electoral 
commission; Tax department; The 
army; The police; Elected local 
government officials; Courts of law. 
0 = Not at all, 1 = Just a little, 2 = 
Somewhat, 3 = A lot 
 
Maximum 
likelihood factor 
analysis with 
oblique rotation 
extracted one 
solution with a 
scale reliability of 
= 0.89 
Protest 
attendance 
Please tell me whether you, personally, 
have done any of these things during the 
past year: Attended a demonstration or 
protest march? 
 
Political interest How interested would you say you are 
in public affairs? 
 
 
News media use  How often do you get news from the 
Radio? 
 
 
Internet use How often do you use the internet? 
 
 
Generalized 
interpersonal 
trust 
Generally speaking, would you say that 
most people can be trusted or that you 
must be very careful in dealing with 
people? 
1 = Most people can be trusted, 0 = You 
must be very careful 
Only asked in 
round three 
Corruption 
tolerance index 
For each of the following, please 
indicate whether you think the act is not 
wrong at all, wrong but understandable, 
or wrong and punishable. 
A. A government official gives a job to 
someone 
These questions 
were only asked in 
round three. 
Scale reliability = 
0.67 
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from his family who does not have 
adequate 
qualifications 
B. A government official demands a 
favour or an additional payment for 
some service that is part of his job? 
 
C. A public official decides to locate a 
development project in an area where 
his friends and supporters lived 
 
Support for 
citizens’ right to 
complain  
 
For each of the following actions, 
please tell me whether you think it is 
something a good citizen in a 
democracy should always do, never do, 
or do only if they choose.: 
Complain to government officials when 
public services are of poor quality: 
0=Never do 
1= Do if they choose 
2= Always do 
 
Perceived ethnic 
marginalisation 
How often, if ever, are ___________s 
[Respondent’s Ethnic Group] treated 
unfairly by the government? [Read out 
options] [If 
respondent did not identify any group 
on Q87– that is, IF they REFUSED to 
answer (9998), DIDN’T KNOW 
(9999), or said 
“Zambian only” (9990) – then circle 7 = 
Not Applicable for questions Q88A and 
Q88B and continue to question Q89.] 
0= Never 
1= Sometimes 
2= Often 
3=Always 
 
Ethnic 
identification 
Let us suppose that you had to choose 
between being a Motswana and being a 
________[R’s ETHNIC GROUP]. 
Which of the following statements best 
expresses your feelings? [If respondent 
did not identify any group on Q87 – that 
is, IF they REFUSED to answer (9998), 
DIDN’T KNOW (9999), or said 
“Motswana only” (9990) – then circle 7 
= Not Applicable 
for questions 88A and 88B and continue 
to question 89.] 
5= I feel only Motswana 
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4= I feel more Motswana than 
_________ [insert R’s ethnic group] 
3= I feel equally Motswana and 
_________ [insert R’s ethnic group] 
2= I feel more _________ [insert R’s 
ethnic group] than Motswana 
1= I feel only _________ [insert R’s 
ethnic group] 1 
7= Not applicable [Do not read] 
9= Don’t know [Do not read] 
Assessment of 
government 
performance 
index 
How well or badly would you say the 
current government is handling the 
following matters, or haven’t you heard 
enough to say? [Interviewer: Probe for 
strength of opinion] 
A. Managing the economy 
B. Creating jobs 
C. Keeping prices stable 
D. Narrowing gaps between rich and 
poor 
E. Reducing crime 
F. Improving basic health services 
G. Addressing educational needs 
H. Delivering household water 
I. Ensuring everyone has enough to eat 
J. Fighting corruption in government 
K. Combating HIV/AIDS 
1=Very Badly 
2= Fairly Badly 
3= Fairly Well 
4=Very Well 
 
Assessment of 
government’s 
anti-corruption 
effort 
How well or badly would you say the 
current government is handling the 
following matters, or haven’t you heard 
enough to say? [Interviewer: Probe for 
strength of opinion] 
Fighting corruption in government 
 
Clientelism variables from round six data for chapter seven 
Contact index  Q24. During the past year, how often 
have you contacted any of the following 
persons about some important problem 
or  
to give them your views? [Read out 
options]  
A. A local government councillor  
B. A Member of Parliament  
C. An official of a government agency 
D. A political party official 
E. Traditional leaders 
F. Religious leaders 
Multiply 25(A) and 
25 (B) as explained 
in chapter  
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Q25. Thinking of the last time you 
contacted any of these leaders. Did you 
go: [If respondent answered 0=Never 
for ALL 
PARTS of Q24, i.e. they NEVER 
contacted any of these leaders, circle 
code 7=Not applicable in both parts of 
Q25] 
A. Alone or with a group? 
1= Alone 
2= with a group 
7=Not applicable 
9= Don’t know 
B. To discuss a community problem or 
a personal problem? 
1= Community problem 
2= Personal problem 
7=Not applicable 
9= Don’t know 
Support for 
clientelism variable  
26. For each of the following actions, 
please tell me whether you think it is 
something a good citizen in a democracy 
should always do, never do, or do only if 
they choose.  
Request personal assistance like help with 
school fees or funeral expenses from 
elected leaders  
0=Never do  
1= Do if they choose  
2= Always do  
Only asked in round 
six  
Clientelism variables from round five for chapter seven 
   
Support for 
clientelism 1 
(round 5 survey)  
Statement 2: Since leaders represent 
everyone, they should not do anything 
that favours their own group over others.  
1= Agree very strongly with statement 1  
2= Agree with statement 1  
3Agree very strongly with statement 2  
4= Agree with statement 2  
Responses 1 and 2 
were combined to 
form a single 
category as were 
responses 3 and 4  
Support for 
clientelism 2 
(round 5 survey) 
Which of the following statements is 
closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 
or Statement 2.  
Statement 1: The government is like a 
parent. It should decide what is good for 
us.  
Statement 2: The government is like our 
employee. We are the bosses and should 
tell government what to do  
1= Agree very strongly with statement 1  
2= Agree with statement 1  
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3Agree very strongly with statement 2  
4= Agree with statement 2  
NOTES ON VARIABLES FROM THE V-DEM DATASET 
Measure of political clientelism from Varieties of democracy (V-DEM) data set 
Question: 
Considering the profile of social and infrastructural spending in the national 
Budget, how “particularistic” or “public goods” are most expenditures? 
 
Clarification:  
Particularistic spending is narrowly targeted on a specific corporation, sector, social 
group, region, party, or set of constituents. Such spending may be referred to as 
“pork,” “clientelistic,” or “private goods.” 
Public-goods spending is intended to benefit all communities within a society, 
though it may be means-tested so as to target poor, needy, or otherwise 
underprivileged constituents. The key point is that all who satisfy the means-test are 
allowed to receive the benefit. 
Your answer should consider the entire budget of social and infrastructural 
spending. We are interested in the relative value of particularistic and public-goods 
spending, not the number of bills or programs that fall into either category. 
 
Responses: 
0: Almost all of the social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic. 
1: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic, but a significant 
portion (e.g. ¼ or 1/3) is public-goods. 
 
2: Social and infrastructure expenditures are evenly divided between particularistic 
and public-goods programs. 
3: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods but a significant 
portion (e.g., ¼ or 1/3) is particularistic. 
4: Almost all social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods in character. 
Only a small portion is particularistic. 
 
V-DEM data Version 6.2 and codebook are available at: 
https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-6-2/  
 
Measure of civil Society robustness (Core civil society index) (V-DEM) 
 
This core civil society index (CCSI) is designed to provide a measure of a robust 
civil 
society, understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens 
freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived. 
 
This index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis 
model of the indicators for CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs), CSO repression 
(v2csreprss) and CSO participatory environment (v2csprtcpt).  
The original index ranges from 0 to 1. 
 
V-DEM data and codebook are available at: 
https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-6-2/ 
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Appendix 2: Regression tables for the robustness checks in chapter five 
 
Table 5.1A: Generalised ordered logit regression model of preferred action against 
corruption  
       
Coef Robust 
Std. Err. 
Z P 
values 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Acquiescents 
      
Experience of bribery -0.005 0.088 -0.050 0.957 -0.177 0.168 
Corruption 
perceptions 
0.070 0.051 1.390 0.163 -0.029 0.170 
Organizational 
membership 
0.046 0.021 2.180 0.029 0.005 0.088 
Lived poverty -0.028 0.028 -0.990 0.321 -0.082 0.027 
Tolerance for 
corruption 
0.250 0.086 2.930 0.003 0.083 0.418 
Persons living 
conditions 
-0.048 0.033 -1.450 0.147 -0.114 0.017 
Relative living 
condition 
0.002 0.034 0.060 0.951 -0.064 0.068 
Institutional trust 0.225 0.046 4.890 0.000 0.135 0.315 
Education attainment 0.099 0.020 4.820 0.000 0.059 0.139 
Age 0.002 0.003 0.710 0.480 -0.003 0.007 
Female -0.171 0.038 -4.460 0.000 -0.247 -0.096 
Generalised trust 0.064 0.095 0.670 0.501 -0.123 0.251 
Political interest 0.126 0.025 4.980 0.000 0.076 0.175 
Internal political 
efficacy 
0.00 0.025 0.02 0.988 -0.051 0.051 
Intercept 1.629 0.089 18.360 0.000 1.455 1.803        
Carefrees       
Experience of bribery -0.036 0.080 -0.440 0.658 -0.193 0.122 
Corruption 
perceptions 
0.070 0.051 1.390 0.163 -0.029 0.170 
Organizational 
membership 
0.066 0.020 3.380 0.001 0.028 0.104 
Lived poverty -0.028 0.028 -0.990 0.321 -0.082 0.027 
Tolerance for 
corruption 
0.412 0.075 5.520 0.000 0.266 0.559 
Persons living 
conditions 
-0.061 0.032 -1.920 0.055 -0.123 0.001 
Relative living 
condition 
0.042 0.033 1.300 0.193 -0.021 0.106 
Institutional trust 0.243 0.041 5.870 0.000 0.162 0.325 
Education attainment 0.122 0.019 6.300 0.000 0.084 0.160 
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Age 0.000 0.002 -0.210 0.830 -0.005 0.004 
Female -0.171 0.038 -4.460 0.000 -0.247 -0.096 
Generalised trust -0.137 0.085 -1.610 0.106 -0.302 0.029 
Political interest 0.126 0.025 4.980 0.000 0.076 0.175 
Internal political 
efficacy 
0.00 0.025 0.02 0.988 -0.051 0.051 
Intercept 1.342 0.088 15.320 0.000 1.171 1.514 
       
Reporters 
      
Experience of bribery 0.514 0.084 6.140 0.000 0.350 0.678 
Corruption 
perceptions 
0.070 0.051 1.390 0.163 -0.029 0.170 
Organizational 
membership 
-0.017 0.027 -0.660 0.512 -0.070 0.035 
Lived poverty -0.028 0.028 -0.990 0.321 -0.082 0.027 
Tolerance for 
corruption 
-0.338 0.094 -3.590 0.000 -0.522 -0.153 
Persons living 
conditions 
0.076 0.041 1.830 0.067 -0.005 0.156 
Relative living 
condition 
-0.085 0.042 -2.030 0.042 -0.166 -0.003 
Institutional trust -0.109 0.064 -1.710 0.087 -0.235 0.016 
Education attainment -0.088 0.032 -2.750 0.006 -0.150 -0.025 
Age -0.002 0.003 -0.540 0.590 -0.007 0.004 
Female -0.171 0.038 -4.460 0.000 -0.247 -0.096 
Generalised trust 0.602 0.154 3.910 0.000 0.301 0.904 
Political interest 0.126 0.025 4.980 0.000 0.076 0.175 
Internal political 
efficacy 
0.00 0.025 0.02 0.988 -0.051 0.051 
Intercept -2.587 0.110 23.36 0.000 -2.803 -2.369 
       
Bribers 
      
Experience of bribery 0.508 0.150 3.390 0.001 0.215 0.801 
Corruption 
perceptions 
0.070 0.051 1.390 0.163 -0.029 0.170 
Organizational 
membership 
0.019 0.047 0.400 0.688 -0.073 0.110 
Lived poverty -0.028 0.028 -0.990 0.321 -0.082 0.027 
Tolerance for 
corruption 
-0.071 0.189 -0.380 0.706 -0.442 0.299 
Persons living 
conditions 
-0.044 0.059 -0.760 0.448 -0.159 0.070 
Relative living 
condition 
0.024 0.078 0.300 0.762 -0.129 0.176 
Institutional trust -0.109 0.088 -1.240 0.215 -0.282 0.063 
Education attainment -0.031 0.047 -0.680 0.499 -0.123 0.060 
Age -0.009 0.005 -2.030 0.042 -0.018 0.000 
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Female -0.171 0.038 -4.460 0.000 -0.247 -0.096 
Generalised trust 0.725 0.186 3.890 0.000 0.360 1.091 
Political interest 0.126 0.025 4.980 0.000 0.076 0.175 
Internal political 
efficacy 
0.00 0.025 0.02 0.988 -0.051 0.051 
Intercept -4.167 0.147 -28.360 0.000 -4.455 -3.879 
Notes: Dependent variable is preferred action against corruption. Highest/ reference 
category is protesters. Standard errors clustered by region within countries 
 
 
Figure 5.2A: Firthlogit regression model predicting preference for anti-corruption 
protests  
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. 
Interval]       
Experience of bribery 0.472 0.098 4.840 0.000 0.281 0.664 
Corruption perceptions -0.032 0.078 -0.420 0.677 -0.185 0.120 
Organizational 
membership 
0.109 0.029 3.780 0.000 0.052 0.165 
Lived poverty -0.006 0.065 -0.090 0.927 -0.133 0.121 
Tolerance for corruption -0.187 0.111 -1.680 0.093 -0.404 0.031 
Persons living conditions -0.064 0.054 -1.190 0.235 -0.169 0.041 
Relative living condition 0.146 0.060 2.430 0.015 0.028 0.264 
Institutional trust -0.149 0.073 -2.050 0.040 -0.291 -0.007 
Education attainment 0.013 0.032 0.400 0.688 -0.050 0.075 
Age -0.013 0.004 -2.950 0.003 -0.021 -0.004 
Female 0.056 0.107 0.520 0.605 -0.155 0.266 
Generalised trust 0.349 0.123 2.840 0.005 0.108 0.590 
Political interest 0.226 0.057 3.960 0.000 0.114 0.339 
Internal political efficacy 0.269 0.127 2.110 0.035 0.019 0.518 
Intercept -2.885 0.223 -12.910 0.000 -3.323 -2.447 
Note: Dependent variable is ‘prefer anti-corruption protests’. Country fixed 
effects included in regression modelling but omitted from the table 
 
Table 5.3A: Multinomial logistic regression predicting preferred action against 
corruption (Round six data)  
Refuse Report Vote clean 
candidates 
Awareness Sign a 
petition 
Join protests 
Experience 
of bribery 
-0.012 
(0.06) 
0.256*** 
(0.06) 
0.402*** 
(0.07) 
0.437*** 
(0.07) 
0.229** 
(0.09) 
0.427*** 
(0.13) 
Corruption 
perceptions 
-
0.179*** 
(0.03) 
-0.212*** 
(0.03) 
-0.035 
(0.04) 
-0.113** 
(0.04) 
-0.104* 
(0.04) 
-0.172* 
(0.07) 
Institutional 
trust 
0.001 
(0.02) 
0.064*** 
(0.02) 
0.078** 
(0.03) 
0.024 
(0.03) 
-0.003 
(0.03) 
-0.026 
(0.05) 
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Relative 
living 
condition 
0.054** 
(0.02) 
0.084*** 
(0.02) 
0.039 
(0.03) 
0.128***-
(0.03) 
0.091** 
(0.03) 
0.053 
(0.04) 
Personal 
living 
conditions 
0.067*** 
(0.02) 
0.062*** 
(0.02) 
0.021 
(0.03) 
0.084*** 
(0.02) 
-0.005 
(0.03) 
-0.046 
(0.04) 
Lived 
poverty 
-0.005 
(0.00) 
0.003 
(0.00) 
0.017** 
(0.01) 
0.024*** 
(0.01) 
0.018** 
(0.01) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
Education 
attainment 
0.084*** 
(0.01) 
0.096*** 
(0.01) 
0.063*** 
(0.01) 
0.037** 
(0.01) 
0.076*** 
(0.01) 
0.064** 
(0.02) 
Female 0.046 
(0.03) 
-0.084** 
(0.03) 
0.019 
(0.05) 
-0.128** 
(0.05) 
-0.127* 
(0.05) 
-0.161 
(0.08) 
Age 0.003* 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.005** 
(0.00) 
-0.004* 
(0.00) 
-0.011*** 
(0.00) 
Political 
interest 
0.097*** 
(0.02) 
0.115*** 
(0.02) 
0.141*** 
(0.02) 
0.097*** 
(0.02) 
0.078** 
(0.02) 
0.119** 
(0.04) 
membership 0.051** 
(0.02) 
0.101*** 
(0.02) 
0.070* 
(0.03) 
0.151*** 
(0.02) 
0.156*** 
(0.03) 
0.145** 
(0.04) 
Intercept -
1.267*** 
(0.14)** 
0.096 
(0.12) 
-1.858*** 
(0.19) 
-1.616*** 
(0.18) 
0.229** 
(0.09) 
-2.640*** 
(0.34) 
 
Country 
fixed effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: 
Dependent variable: preferred action against corruption  
*= Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** Significant at 0.1% 
Country dummies included in regression but omitted from the table 
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Appendix 3: Full regression tables for chapter six 
 
Table 6.1A: Multilevel complimentary log-log regression predicting support for collective action  
against corruption 
         
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Individual-level variables 
                
Experience 
of bribery 
0.168*** 
(0.05) 
0.182*** 
(0.05) 
0.196** 
(0.07) 
0.173*** 
(0.05) 
0.169*** 
(0.05) 
0.170*** 
(0.05) 
0.168**
* 
(0.05) 
0.170*** 
(0.05)    
Corruption 
perceptions 
-0.104* 
(0.04) 
-0.061 
(0.06) 
-0.108* 
(0.04) 
-0.068 
(0.05) 
-0.104* 
(0.04) 
-0.211** 
(0.07) 
-0.014 
(0.07) 
-0.091*   
(0.04)    
Collective 
efficacy  
0.131*** 
(0.02) 
0.136*** 
(0.02) 
0.131*** 
(0.02) 
0.139*** 
(0.03) 
0.130*** 
(0.02) 
0.128*** 
(0.02) 
0.129**
* 
(0.02) 
0.115*** 
(0.02)    
Institutiona
l trust 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.002 
(0.01) 
-0.000 
(0.01) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.000    
(0.01)    
Relative 
ling cond. 
0.021 
(0.01) 
0.021 
(0.01) 
0.021 
(0.01) 
0.021 
(0.01) 
0.021 
(0.01) 
0.021 
(0.01) 
0.021 
(0.01) 
0.022    
(0.01)    
Personal 
living cond. 
-0.005 
(0.01) 
-0.005 
(0.01) 
-0.004 
(0.01) 
-0.005 
(0.01) 
-0.004 
(0.01) 
-0.004 
(0.01) 
-0.004 
(0.01) 
-0.005    
(0.01)    
Lived 
poverty 
index 
0.020*** 
(0.00) 
0.019*** 
(0.00) 
0.020*** 
(0.00) 
0.020*** 
(0.00) 
0.020*** 
(0.00) 
0.020*** 
(0.00) 
0.020**
* 
(0.00) 
0.020*** 
(0.00)    
Education -0.021** 
(0.01) 
-0.021** 
(0.01) 
-0.021** 
(0.01) 
-0.022** 
(0.01) 
-0.022** 
(0.01) 
-0.022** 
(0.01) 
-
0.022** 
(0.01) 
-0.022**  
(0.01)    
Support for 
democracy 
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Democracy 
sometimes 
preferable 
0.144*** 
(0.04) 
0.147*** 
(0.04) 
0.143*** 
(0.04) 
0.144*** 
(0.04) 
0.144*** 
(0.04) 
0.142*** 
(0.04) 
0.145**
* 
(0.04) 
0.144*** 
(0.04)    
Democracy 
always 
preferable 
-0.046 
(0.03) 
-0.055 
(0.03) 
-0.046 
(0.03) 
-0.044 
(0.03) 
-0.046 
(0.03) 
-0.048 
(0.03) 
-0.047 
(0.03) 
-0.045    
(0.03)    
Female -0.052* 
(0.02) 
-0.051* 
(0.02) 
-0.052* 
(0.02) 
-0.050* 
(0.02) 
-0.052* 
(0.02) 
-0.053* 
(0.02) 
-0.053* 
(0.02) 
-0.052*   
(0.02)    
Age -0.004*** 
(0.00) 
-0.004*** 
(0.00) 
-0.004*** 
(0.00) 
-0.004*** 
(0.00) 
-0.004*** 
(0.00) 
-0.004*** 
(0.00) 
-
0.004**
* 
(0.00) 
-0.004*** 
(0.00)    
Interest in 
politics 
0.003 
(0.01) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
0.003 
(0.01) 
0.003 
(0.01) 
0.003 
(0.01) 
0.003 
(0.01) 
0.004 
(0.01) 
0.003    
(0.01)    
Citizens 
must hold 
government 
accountable 
0.027 
(0.02) 
0.030 
(0.02) 
0.027 
(0.02) 
0.028 
(0.02) 
0.027 
(0.02) 
0.026 
(0.02) 
0.027 
(0.02) 
0.027    
(0.02)    
Attended 
protest 
0.165*** 
(0.03) 
0.167*** 
(0.03) 
0.170*** 
(0.03) 
0.168*** 
(0.03) 
0.165*** 
(0.03) 
0.165*** 
(0.03) 
0.165**
* 
(0.03) 
0.166*** 
(0.03)    
Investigate 
media 
harms the 
country 
0.040*** 
(0.01) 
0.041*** 
(0.01) 
0.041*** 
(0.01) 
0.041*** 
(0.01) 
0.040*** 
(0.01) 
0.040*** 
(0.01) 
0.040**
* 
(0.01) 
0.040*** 
(0.01)    
Frequency 
of internet 
usage 
-0.018 
(0.01) 
-0.017 
(0.01) 
-0.017 
(0.01) 
-0.016 
(0.01) 
-0.018 
(0.01) 
-0.018 
(0.01) 
-0.018 
(0.01) 
-0.019    
(0.01)    
Frequency 
of news 
media use 
0.051** 
(0.02) 
0.051** 
(0.02) 
0.050** 
(0.02) 
0.049** 
(0.02) 
0.051** 
(0.02) 
0.050** 
(0.02) 
0.050** 
(0.02) 
0.051**  
(0.02)    
Association
al 
0.041*** 
(0.01) 
0.041*** 
(0.01) 
0.041*** 
(0.01) 
0.039** 
(0.01) 
0.041*** 
(0.01) 
0.042*** 
(0.01) 
0.042**
* 
0.042*** 
(0.01)    
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membershi
p 
(0.01) 
Bribery x. 
poverty 
0.011* 
(0.01) 
0.011* 
(0.01) 
0.009 
(0.01) 
0.011* 
(0.01) 
0.011* 
(0.01) 
0.011* 
(0.01) 
0.011* 
(0.01) 
0.011*   
(0.01)    
Corruption 
Perceptions 
x. 
collective 
efficacy 
0.046*** 
(0.01) 
0.043*** 
(0.01) 
0.047*** 
(0.01) 
0.036** 
(0.01) 
0.046*** 
(0.01) 
0.048*** 
(0.01) 
0.047**
* 
(0.01) 
0.043*** 
(0.01)    
 
Country-level variables and cross-level interactions 
State-level 
clientelism 
    0.212** 
(0.10) 
0.209* 
(0.10) 
0.153  
(0.11) 
0.211*  
(0.10)    
CSO 
robustness 
    0.595** 
(0.31) 
0.584 
(0.31) 
0.585 
(0.31) 
0.600    
(0.31)    
Mean 
poverty rate 
    -0.067** 
(0.03) 
-0.093** 
(0.03) 
-
0.067** 
(0.03) 
-0.068** 
(0.03)    
Control of 
corruption 
    0.001 
(0.11) 
0.004 
(0.11) 
0.003 
(0.11) 
-0.122    
(0.12)    
Mean 
poverty rate 
by 
perceptions 
of 
corruption 
     0.019** 
(0.01) 
                 
                
State-level 
clientelism 
      0.037* 
(0.02) 
                
                
CCI x 
collective 
efficacy 
       0.034**  
        (0.01)    
223 
Intercept -1.775*** 
(0.11) 
-1.616*** 
(0.10) 
-1.777*** 
(0.11) 
-1.729*** 
(0.11) 
-1.768*** 
(0.12) 
-1.918*** 
(0.14) 
-
1.640**
* 
(0.14) 
-1.742*** 
(0.12)    
                        
Variance of 
the 
intercept 
0.152*** 
(0.04) 
0.342* 
(0.14) 
0.151*** 
(0.04) 
0.302*** 
(0.08) 
0.116*** 
(0.03) 
0.117*** 
(0.03) 
0.117**
* 
(0.03) 
0.117*** 
(0.03)    
         
Variance of 
perceptions 
of 
corruption 
 0.059 
(0.02) 
                     
                
         
Variance of 
bribery 
experience 
  0.030 
(0.02) 
                    
                
         
Variance of 
collective 
efficacy 
   0.011 
(0.00) 
                   
                
Model statistics  
Countries 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Individuals  37936 37936 37936 37936 37936 37936 37936 37936 
AIC 38519.68 38459.64 38508.13 38433.60 38518.92 38516.18 38517.9
9 
38513.96 
BIC 38716.18      38673.22 38721.71  38647.19   38749.59       38755.40     38757.2
1      
38753.17  
Notes: 
Dependent variable is support for anti-corruption collective action 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***=  p< 0.01, ** = p<0.05, 
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 *= p<0.1 (considered for country-level variables and cross-level interactions only) 
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Table 6.2A. Full multilevel complimentary log-log regression showing the effect of 
ethnic identification, perceived ethnic marginalisation and ethnic diversity at country 
level 
 Model A Model B    
                  
Experience of bribery 0.120** 
(0.06) 
0.118* *  
(0.06)    
Corruption perceptions 
 
-0.101** 
(0.05) 
0.149    
(0.10)    
Institutional trust 0.140*** 
(0.02) 
0.145*** 
(0.02)    
Relative ling cond. -0.005 
(0.02) 
-0.003    
(0.02)    
Personal living cond. 0.022 
(0.01) 
0.021    
(0.01)    
Lived poverty index 0.001 
(0.01) 
0.002    
(0.01)    
Education 0.020*** 
(0.00) 
0.019*** 
(0.00)    
Support for democracy -0.019** 
(0.01) 
-0.019**   
(0.01)    
Democracy sometimes preferable 0.150** 
(0.05) 
0.132**  
(0.05)    
Democracy always preferable -0.055 
(0.04) 
-0.071    
(0.04)    
Female -0.075** 
(0.02) 
-0.079**  
(0.02)    
Age -0.004*** 
(0.00) 
-0.004*** 
(0.00)    
Interest in politics -0.003 
(0.01) 
-0.005    
(0.01)    
Citizens must hold government accountable 0.018 
(0.02) 
0.023    
(0.02)    
 Attended protest 0.196*** 
(0.04) 
0.209*** 
(0.04)    
Investigate media harms the country 0.037** 
(0.01) 
0.039*** 
(0.01)    
Frequency of internet usage -0.014 
(0.01) 
-0.015    
(0.01)    
Frequency of news media use 0.046** 
(0.02) 
0.043*   
(0.02)    
Associational membership 0.032* 
(0.01) 
0.034**  
(0.01)    
 
Perceived ethnic group marginalisation  0.142*** 
(0.03) 
0.079*** 
(0.01)    
Strength of ethnic  identification -0.031** 
(0.01) 
-0.031**  
(0.01)    
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Corruption perceptions x. collective efficacy 0.048*** 
(0.01) 
0.046*** 
(0.01)    
Bribery x. poverty 
 
0.012** 
(0.01) 
0.013* *  
(0.01)    
Corruption perceptions x. perceived ethnic 
marginalisation  
-0.040** 
(0.02) 
 
         
Country-level variables and cross-level interactions 
State-level clientelism  0.037    
(0.09)    
Ethno-linguistic Fractionalisation  0.225    
(0.35)    
Corruption perceptions x. ethno-linguistic 
Fractionalisation  
 -0.379**  
(0.12)    
   
Intercept 
 
-1.659*** 
(0.12) 
-1.423*** 
(0.24)    
Variance of the intercept 0.111*** 
(0.03) 
       0.094*** 
(0.03)            
    
Number of countries  30 30 
Number of individuals  30669.000 30411.000    
AIC 31480.559 31120.250    
BIC 31697.165 31353.282    
Notes: 
Dependent variable is support for anti-corruption collective action 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***=  p< 0.01, ** = p<0.05, 
 *= p<0.1 (considered for country-level variables and cross-level interactions only) 
 
 
Appendix 4: Supplemental tables for chapter seven 
 
Table 7.1A. Logistic regression model of support for citizens’ involvement in 
governance processes (based on round six data set)  
Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
z P>z [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Clientelism variables 
      
Contact Political leaders & 
reasons 
      
            Alone_community 0.501 0.238 2.110 0.035 0.035 0.967 
            Group_personal 0.037 0.234 0.160 0.873 -0.421 0.495 
           Alone Personal 0.020 0.150 0.130 0.894 -0.273 0.314 
           Group_community 0.613 0.213 2.880 0.004 0.195 1.031 
Attitude toward clientelism 
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 Ask only if they 
choose 
0.193 0.137 1.410 0.159 -0.076 0.463 
        Always ask for help 0.043 0.145 0.300 0.767 -0.241 0.327 
Control variables 
      
Perceptions of corruption 0.224 0.095 2.360 0.018 0.038 0.410 
Experience of bribery 0.248 0.291 0.850 0.394 -0.322 0.818 
Quadratic term of bribery -0.126 0.157 -0.800 0.421 -0.433 0.181 
Institutional trust 0.197 0.084 2.360 0.018 0.033 0.361 
Education 0.012 0.030 0.410 0.683 -0.047 0.072 
Organisational membership  -0.120 0.063 -1.910 0.056 -0.243 0.003 
Rural -0.065 0.115 -0.560 0.574 -0.291 0.161 
gender -0.327 0.112 -2.910 0.004 -0.548 -0.107 
Ethnic marginalisation -0.168 0.059 -2.870 0.004 -0.283 -0.053 
Strength of ethnic 
identification 
-0.119 0.044 -2.670 0.008 -0.206 -0.032 
Lived Poverty Index -0.153 0.062 -2.460 0.014 -0.275 -0.031 
Relative living cond. 0.080 0.055 1.440 0.150 -0.029 0.189 
Political interest -0.120 0.058 -2.070 0.038 -0.234 -0.007 
Attended protest -0.273 0.155 -1.760 0.078 -0.576 0.031        
Intercept 0.651 0.400 1.630 0.104 -0.133 1.434 
 
Notes 
The binary dependent variable is support for citizens’ involvement in governance 
processes. 
Coded: 
0= It is more important to have a government that can get things done, even if we have 
no influence over what it does. 
1= It is more important for citizens to be able to hold government accountable, even if 
that means it makes decisions more slowly. 
 
Standard errors are robust. 
 
Table 7.2A. Logistic regression model of support for citizens’ involvement in 
governance processes (based on round five data set)   
Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
z P>z [95% Conf. 
Interval]  
   
   
Clientelism variables       
Political leaders should treat all 
equally vs. help community 
0.445 0.105 4.24 0.000 0.240 0.651 
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People are the bosses and should 
tell government what to do vs. Govt 
is like a parent 
0.267 0.099 2.70 0.007 0.073 0.461 
Control variables       
       
Perceptions of corruption -0.294 0.086 -3.40 0.001 -0.463 -0.125 
Experience of bribery 0.101 0.023 4.33 0.00 0.055 0.147 
Age 0.009 0.004 2.21 0.027 0.001 0.017 
Institutional trust -0.009 0.009 -1.04 0.299 -0.026 0.008 
Education 0.066 0.027 2.45 0.014 0.013 0.119 
Organisational membership  -0.038 0.053 -0.71 0.477 -0.142 0.066 
Rural 0.017 0.102 0.17 0.867 -0.183 0.218 
Female 0.325 0.104 3.13 0.002 0.122 0.528 
Ethnic marginalisation -0.104 0.051 -2.04 0.041 -0.203 -0.004 
Strength of ethnic identification -0.079 0.059 -1.34 0.181 -0.196 0.037 
Lived Poverty Index -0.006 0.057 -0.10 0.92 -0.117 0.106 
Relative living cond. 0.101 0.051 2.00 0.045 0.002 0.2 
Political interest -0.12 0.05 -2.41 0.016 -0.217 -0.022 
Attended protests 0.497 0.173 2.88 0.004 0.158 0.835 
       
Intercept -1.150 0.481 -2.390 0.017 -2.092 -0.207 
Notes: 
The binary dependent variable is support for citizens’ involvement in efforts to hold officials 
accountable. 
Coded: 
0= It is more important to have a government that can get things done, even if we have no 
influence over what it does. 
1= It is more important for citizens to be able to hold government accountable, even if that 
means it makes decisions more slowly. 
 
          Standard errors are robust. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
